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IntroductionECONOMIC POLICIES IN THE EURO AREA 
AFTER THE CRISIS1
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
Sciences Po, OFCE
In 2019, 20 years after the launch of the single currency, the euro area
policy framework remains highly debated among politicians, academics,
and citizens. The need to improve this framework had been highlighted by
the widening of imbalances prior to the 2007 financial crisis, and after-
wards by the huge impact of the financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis in
Southern European countries, and the Great Recession. The issues under
debate may be divided into four main axes.
An unfinished construction?
The architectures of the European Union (EU) and even more of the
euro area are specific and subject to never-ending changes, with disagree-
ment on the plans among EU architects. 
For federalists, the EU should become a federation that progressively
acquires all the powers and characteristics of a nation. The single market,
the single currency, the monetary union (the European Central Bank,
ECB, the banking union), the fiscal union (the Stability and Growth
Pact, the Fiscal Treaty, the “first European semester”) already exist.
Fiscal EU should be deepened (a federal fiscal policy), as well as the
banking union, the capital markets union, EU diplomacy, social Europe,
European taxation, European defence, etc. There is a need to move
forward, towards greater integration than in current treaties. At each step,
1. This volume brings together a group of papers, following a reviewing process and based on earlier
drafts presented at the 15th EUROFRAME Conference on economic policy issues in the European
Union: “Economic Policies and Political Economy in the EU after the Crisis”, held in Milan (Italy) on
8 June 2018. EUROFRAME is a network of ten independent European research institutes: DIW and IfW
(Germany), ESRI (Ireland), OFCE (France), PROMETEIA (Italy), CPB (Netherlands), WIFO (Austria), ETLA
(Finland), CASE (Poland), and NIESR (United Kingdom). Since 2004, every year in June EUROFRAME
has been organising a Conference on economic policies in the EU. In 2018, 25 papers were presented.
Most of them are available on the Conference web page (http://www.euroframe.org)Revue de l’OFCE, Hors-série (2019)
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak6Europe remains an unstable construction, which needs to be consolidated
through more Europe.
For the proponents of a Europe of Nation-states, the EU should keep an
intergovernmental functioning, and decisions should be made by heads of
government, under the unanimity principle. EU powers and its size should
not be extended. The subsidiarity principle should be respected: decisions
should be made at the lowest possible level, and domestic specificity
should be allowed to remain.
Each of these strategies raises economic and democratic issues. The
federalist strategy does not account for EU countries’ diversity in terms of
economic and social structure. The Member States (MS) are expected to
converge towards a single model, defined through a technocratic process.
According to some, the EU should oblige the MS to converge towards a
neo-liberal economic model, the only model suitable to globalisation.
According to others, the EU should protect the European social model,
with its specificities, its scale of social protection, labour laws, etc. The
Nation-state strategy is not promising. It does not account for interde-
pendencies between the MS. There is a strong contradiction between on
the one hand the single market and the single currency, and on the other
hand domestic structures, be it in terms of wage developments, taxation,
the social system, or industrial policy. In both cases, crucial decisions are
being made at the EU level without democratic debate, without political
choices, either within technocratic federalist circles or through compro-
mises reached by governments. This is what we have seen since the 2007
crisis, with the absence of democratic debates at the EU level on issues such
as financial support for Greece, the Fiscal Treaty and Brexit. 
There are permanent tensions in the euro area between a federalist
ambition (an ever closer Union) and desires to retain or recover domestic
sovereignty (taking back control). These tensions may lead to open or
hidden crises, like Brexit, or some MS’ reluctance to combat tax optimisa-
tion or the refusal of some Central and Eastern European countries to open
their frontiers to migrants. 
A crisis of national cohesions
In addition, in all the advanced economies, national cohesion is being
weakened by technical progress, globalisation, financialisation and migra-
tion. De-industrialisation, robotisation and automation reduce the number
of stable and relatively well-paid jobs for lower- and middle-class workers.
Conversely, a small number of people benefit from financialisation and
globalisation. Wage and income inequalities increase. While social protec-
tion needs grow, the public finances are constrained by tax competition.
Temptations towards protectionism and nationalism mount. The fracture
between the upper class and the rest of the society widens as the lower
Introduction. Economic Policies in the Euro Area after the Crisis 7class loses trust in the elites. This is not a phenomenon specific to the euro
area, as can be seen from Brexit or the election of Donald Trump in the US.
In Europe, this often translates into rejecting European construction. 
Each advanced country (or area) has to choose between two strategies:
strengthening competitiveness and attractiveness, and thereafter relying
on job and wage flexibility to allow the invisible hand to restore a satisfac-
tory equilibrium; or strengthening domestic (or EU) protection, either via
trade policy, industrial policy, or social policy. Moreover, the ecological
constraint requires tough economic decisions. Strategic choices are
particularly hard to make in the EU where the MS are in different situations
and have diverging interests and ways of thinking. So far, the attempt by
French President Emmanuel Macron to promote a “European renaissance”
has faced inertia from some MS and clear hostility from other MS, who
oppose any move towards further European integration. How to make
strong and constructive decisions in these conditions? 
Which rules of functioning?
The euro area does not have satisfactory functioning rules. Fears of
Northern countries about fiscal laxism leads to the introduction of numer-
ical fiscal rules lacking economic rationale, such as the deficit limit of 3% of
GDP and the 60% limit of GDP for public debt, the objective of long-term
public structural balance, or the requirement to reduce the structural
deficit by an annual 0.5% of GDP. The EU Commission and several MS are
refusing to change the rules, although they do not fit the current economic
context. A situation with nominal interest rates at the zero lower bound
was not anticipated. Some level of public deficit and public debts seem
necessary today for the macroeconomic equilibrium. The pre-crisis periods
have shown the need for more precise economic policy coordination; it has
turned out that the tricky points were wage coordination and the compati-
bility of external balances objectives.
Fortunately, the principle of the absence of solidarity between MS as
well as of the ECB not being allowed to buy public bonds have been
forgotten. But more generally speaking, while some progress has been
made, this has not resulted in a coherent architecture. The EU institutions
assess the economic policies implemented in the MS and provide critical
assessments if the latter do not follow EU rules and guidelines, but they do
so on a country-by-country basis, with no real overall coherence. It would
be illusory anyway to try to reach coherence if the MS that have room for
manoeuvre refuse to use it. All in all, the EU can only criticize MS whose
fiscal policy does not follow the predefined rules; but this does not at all
define an overall fiscal and wage strategy.
Introduction. Economic Policies in the Euro Area after the Crisis 8In principle, there is a single monetary policy for the whole euro area,
but the financial markets increase spreads on long-term interest rates,
punishing fragile countries (such as Italy) and lending at low rates to strong
countries (such as Germany), which exacerbates divergences. This could
be corrected by a macro-prudential policy, which nevertheless conceals an
ambiguity: how to control domestic imbalances by imposing credit ratios
on increasingly internationalized banks?
On the one hand, one may wish to give the EU authorities more power
to steer euro area macroeconomic developments, either by offering them
the possibility to play a fiscal role, or by organizing automatic transfers
between MS in differing economic situations. On the other hand, this
would require that EU authorities abandon rigid fiscal rules and that they set
themselves the objectives of full employment and the elimination of intra-
zone imbalances. But these are areas where a consensus is very difficult to
reach, meaning that national fiscal policies will have to remain autonomous
for a long time, with the EU authorities having only an advisory role.
National fiscal policies would be facilitated if a European budget
financed investments, and more generally European common goods (such
as fighting against climate change), by using common resources (the
carbon tax and the financial transaction tax) and by issuing Eurobonds. But
this cannot be a pretext for adding constraints on national budgets.
The European institutions believe that they can overcome these prob-
lems by two strategies. On the one hand, the capital markets union is
supposed to improve financial efficiency and play an automatic stabilizing
role, but only if portfolio diversification is sufficient, which is not assured.
On the other hand, structural reforms are expected to contribute to the
convergence of the European countries. However, will these be sufficient
to cope with the divergent trends induced by the polarization of industrial
activities? Moreover, the direction of these reforms would probably benefit
from a more open debate.
Towards which kind of normalisation?
At the time of the EUROFRAME Conference, in June 2018, EU economic
policy was facing two main challenges: monetary policy normalisation and
improving the fiscal policy framework. So far, no advanced country has
succeeded in bringing their economy back to a normal situation, where
real interest rates would be close to long-term output growth and a
primary structural balance close to 0. Central banks are considering a move
to increase their interest rates and to progressively bring non-conventional
policies to an end. Higher interest rates are anticipated, and one may
expect that companies and financial institutions are prepared for this.
Almost all EU countries already run structural primary surpluses. The issue is
more of a macroeconomic order. Will monetary policy normalisation be
Introduction. Economic Policies in the Euro Area after the Crisis 9implemented without being accompanied by more expansionary fiscal or
wage policies, which are difficult to coordinate in the EU? The need for an
ecological transition could suggest a new orientation of fiscal and mone-
tary policies, gearing them towards joint support for investments made in
the ecological transition framework. 
More fundamentally, the euro area economic policy framework will
need to be redesigned, by taking into account European choices and
national choices, in terms of monetary policy but also of credit, fiscal
policy, tax policy, and wage policy. Once simplistic solutions, such as a
federal unification under the auspices of the EU institutions or such as the
full autonomy of the national choices have been removed, a painful
compromise will have to be found.
The papers released in this volume address three main topics: fiscal
rules, which remain at the core of fiscal policy debates in the EU, euro area
governance, and bank stability.
Fiscal rules 
Katja Rietzler (Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK) at the Hans-
Boeckler-Foundation, Düsseldorf) and Achim Truger (University of Duis-
burg-Essen, German Council of Economic Experts, Wiesbaden, and IMK),
in “Is the ’Debt Brake’ behind Germany’s successful fiscal consolidation?”,
carry out a comparative analysis of the “structural” consolidation of public
finances in Germany from 1991 to 2017. They show that Germany’s
successful budget consolidation since 2010 is due not to the introduction
of the German debt brake, which serves as a model for the European fiscal
treaty, but to fiscal stimuli, the progressive reduction in transfers to East
Länder, and low interest rates.
Heikki Oksanen (University of Helsinki), in “New output gap estimates
for the euro area and elsewhere”, proposes a simple statistical method for
estimating output gaps: to introduce explicit assumptions about future
growth and to smooth GDP by an HP filter. This method would give results
that are as satisfactory as the more elaborate methods used by interna-
tional organizations (EC, IMF and OECD). The author recognizes, however,
that the output gap estimates remain subject to revisions, which affect the
fiscal effort assessment. Looking at the years 2011-14, the author shows
that an undervaluation of potential growth can be self-fulfilling, leading to
overly restrictive fiscal policies and thus a decline in effective growth.
However, the author argues for transfers between countries based on
differences in output gaps.2
2. A critique of statistical methods to estimate output gaps, as well as of the use of potential
growth for forecasting and for economic policy analysis may be found in: Catherine Mathieu
and Henri Sterdyniak (2015): “Should we still use the concept of potential growth?”, OFCE
Working Paper, 2015/30. 
Introduction. Economic Policies in the Euro Area after the Crisis 10Euro area governance 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak (OFCE) in “Euro area macroe-
conomics—where do we stand twenty years later?” recall recent euro area
reform proposals from EU institutions (a convergence and competitiveness
instrument, a fiscal stabilization mechanism at the euro area level) and
from the Member States (more budgetary discipline supervised by markets
or, on the contrary, more solidarity between MS and a euro area budget).
The authors present and discuss the different viewpoints of economists:
those who trust financial markets to control national economic policies,
those who want to strengthen fiscal rules, those who want to improve
existing rules, those who want to organize more or less automatic transfers
between MS, those who want to establish a euro area budget and finance
minister, those who want to move towards a democratized federal Europe,
those who propose original measures to reduce public debts, and finally
those who advocate a better coordination of autonomous fiscal policies in
a Keynesian perspective.
Harmen Lehment (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), in “Fiscal
implications of the ECB’s public sector purchase programme” analyses the
fiscal impacts in terms of the seigniorage gains of the public sector
purchase programme (PSPP), which the ECB started in 2015 for monetary
policy purposes. The author shows that this programme allowed govern-
ments to get funding through banks’ excess reserves, i.e. at a short-term
and entirely safe interest rate instead of selling longer-term bonds at an
interest rate bearing a risk premium. The gain increases as the remunera-
tion on reserves is low and the risk premium is high. In order to
compensate for the future rise in the rate of remuneration of reserves, the
author recommends increasing banks’ reserve requirements and not to
remunerate them. 
Bank stability 
Ilkka Kiema (Labour Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki) and
Esa Jokivuolle (Bank of Finland) in “Bank stability and the European deposit
insurance scheme” analyse the impact of a deposit insurance mechanism,
under the assumption that depositors anticipate the risk that governments
may default, and compare the cost of a guarantee with the cost of a loss in
reputation. From this perspective, the European deposit insurance scheme
would improve bank stability for a limited crisis, but its effects might be
ambiguous in a systemic crisis that affects the whole Banking Union
(increasing the risk of voluntary default by all MS).
IS THE “DEBT BRAKE” BEHIND GERMANY'S 
SUCCESSFUL FISCAL CONSOLIDATION?1
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE “STRUCTURAL” 
CONSOLIDATION OF THE GOVERNMENT 
SUBSECTOR BUDGETS FROM 1991 TO 2017
Katja Rietzler
Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK) at the Hans-Boeckler-Foundation, Duesseldorf, Germany
Achim Truger
University of Duisburg-Essen, German Council of Economic Experts, Wiesbaden, and Macroeconomic 
Policy Institute (IMK) at the Hans-Boeckler-Foundation, Duesseldorf, Germany
The German general government recorded a surplus for the fourth year in
a row in 2017. The fast consolidation after the Great Recession coincided with
the transition period for the full introduction of the federal debt brake. At the
same time Germany's economy is performing better than those of many other
countries. Therefore it is nearly impossible to overrate the symbolic power of
the debt brake as a seeming success story. We scrutinise this story by carrying
out a comparative analysis of the “structural” consolidation of public finances
in Germany for the period from 1991 until 2017, showing that the German
debt brake is not the cause of the successful budget consolidation since 2010.
The improvement of the general government finances since 2010 was smaller
than in previous consolidation phases and was strongly supported by both a
favourable macroeconomic environment and one-off effects. Finally, without
the blessing of a strong upswing, Germany would hardly have become the
fiscal role model for Europe, and the German debt brake would not have
become the blueprint for the European Fiscal Compact.
Keywords: Germany, debt brake, consolidation, Euro crisis, sovereign debt.
1. This paper is based on an article in German (Rietzler and Truger, 2017) that has been completely
updated and substantially modified. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful
suggestions and comments. We are also grateful to the participants in the “Fiscal sustainability”
session at the 15th EUROFRAME Conference in Milan on 8 June 2018 and the participants in the
session “Preparing for the next crisis: a macroeconomically sensible European Fiscal governance” at
the 22nd conference of the Forum for Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policies “10 Years after
the Crash: What Have We Learned?” on 27 October 2018 in Berlin. The usual disclaimer applies.Revue de l’OFCE, Hors-série (2019)
Katja Rietzler and Achim Truger12In the summer of 2009, the so-called “debt brake” was incorpo-
rated into the German constitution. Its central feature is that it strictly
limits structural deficits to 0.35% of GDP for Germany’s federal govern-
ment and 0% for its state governments. In addition a cyclical
component increases or decreases the scope for borrowing across the
economic cycle. In case of an emergency, an exception clause permits
borrowing beyond the usual limits. Further, a control account ensures
that the federal government complies with the debt brake in both the
draft and the execution of the budget. For the federal government, the
debt brake has been fully binding since 2016; for the states, this will be
the case from 2020 onwards. 
From the beginning the debt brake has been a highly controversial
issue, and numerous objections and warnings have been expressed
(Truger and Will, 2013). Nevertheless, its supporters will believe that
their initial point of view has been confirmed, as Germany’s public
finances seem to be in excellent shape since the introduction of the
debt brake—by both international and historical standards. Since
2010, the consolidation of the general government finances
proceeded at a fast pace. Already in 2012 and 2013 the general
government net borrowing (national accounts definition) was close to
zero. Since 2014, the general government’s balance has been positive
and increasing every year. According to recently revised data on
Germany’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) notification, the surplus
amounted to 1.3% of GDP in 2017.2 In 2014, Germany belonged to a
group of only three countries in the euro area with a budget surplus. In
2017, eleven euro area countries were still running deficits. 
After decades of budget deficits, the federal government recorded a
surplus for the fourth time in a row—both according to the national
accounts and the government finance statistics. The rapid consolida-
tion of the federal government budget has coincided with the
transition period for the full introduction of the debt brake, which is
sometimes interpreted as causality (e.g. BMF, 2015). The federal
government’s budget, including all extra-budgetary operations, has
complied with all the debt brake regulations, by a wide margin. At the
same time Germany’s performance in terms of growth and especially
2. The calculations for Germany presented in the paper are based on annual data published in
February 2018. 
Is the “Debt Brake” Behind Germany’s Successful Fiscal Consolidation? 13employment has been better than that of many other countries. This is
often attributed to the strategy of “growth-friendly consolidation”
associated with the debt brake, which is said to prove that budget
consolidation and growth can go hand in hand, or even that the former
is a prerequisite for the latter. Thus, the strict adherence to the debt
brake—and the permanent over-compliance with its requirements via
the policy of the “schwarze null” (“black zero”, i.e. policy of a perma-
nently balanced budget)—became the hallmark of Finance Minister
Schäuble’s “sound fiscal policy” (“solide Finanzpolitik”, BMF 2016). For
this reason it is nearly impossible to overrate the symbolic power of the
debt brake as a seeming success story. As a consequence, the German
debt brake became the blueprint for tightened fiscal rules and plans to
anchor the limitation on budget deficits in the legal systems and even
the constitutions of EU countries via the Fiscal Compact. 
With this paper the authors aim to scrutinise the seeming success
story of the debt brake and assess it on the basis of empirical facts.3
Is the debt brake really the cause of the good performance of
Germany’s public finances? A closer inspection reveals that this is
highly implausible. To illustrate this we carry out a comparative analysis
of the “structural” consolidation of public finances in Germany for the
period from 1991 until 2017. We start with some methodological
remarks (Section 1). This is followed by a comparison of different
consolidation phases between 1991 and 2017, in which the “struc-
tural” balance of the general government sector increased (Section 2),
which already casts doubt on the debt brake as a success story. In
Section 3 we show that the seemingly impressive consolidation of the
federal budget since 2010 looks much less impressive when compared
to the consolidation in other government subsectors over time, and
that the post-2010 consolidation has benefited from special circum-
stances. In Section 4 we apply a simple simulation to illustrate how the
balances of the government subsectors would have evolved if the
German economy had not experienced such an unexpectedly dynamic
recovery since 2010. Section 5 sums up the economic and fiscal policy
implications.
3. A similar analysis can be found in Paetz et al. (2016), but this is confined to the federal
government budget and based on government finance statistics (instead of the national accounts
used here) on the one hand, and incorporates numerous institutional details on the debt brake for
the federal government on the other hand. 
Katja Rietzler and Achim Truger141. Methodological Remarks
In the following we analyse key fiscal indicators of the general
government, the territorial entities4 as well as the social security funds
as defined in the national accounts for the period from 1991 until
2017. The working tables (“Arbeitsunterlage”) on the accounts of the
government sector provided by Destatis in February 2018 serve as the
main data source. Using the national accounts data has the important
advantage that the government sector and its subsectors are clearly
defined according to uniform criteria and that time series are available
for a sufficiently long period and with reasonable publication lags. Due
to the large number of entities, differing definitions and variations in
the coverage over time, an analysis based on government finance data
would have been not only time-consuming, but also inaccurate.
Recently government finance statistics published by Destatis have over-
come some of these drawbacks, as they now use the same definition of
the government sector as the national accounts and thus include rele-
vant extra-budgetary operations. However, the publication lag is rather
long, and the time series starts as late as in 2011, making comparisons
over longer periods of time impossible. 
The use of national accounts data also has the advantage that the
relevant benchmark indicators of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
are based on the same concept. However, it is a drawback that the
national accounts data differ substantially from the public revenue and
expenditure data relevant for the German debt brake. Thus, the anal-
ysis in this paper allows only a very rough assessment of the budget
balance relevant for the federal and state governments according to
the debt brake. Therefore, it cannot indicate an immediate need for
fiscal policy action as dictated by these institutional constraints. 
The federal government’s official Spring projection of potential
output and the output gap serves as a basis for the estimation of the
cyclically adjusted “structural” indicators (BMWi/BMF, 2018). The
German Federal Ministry of Finance provided the budget semi-elasticities
for the government subsectors upon request. For the government sector
as a whole, these add up to the general government estimate of the
European Commission of 0.55 (Mourre et al., 2014). The government
uses a variant of the European Commission’s method of calculating
potential GDP (Mourre et al., 2014), which therefore suffers from the
4. Bund = federal government, Länder = state governments, Gemeinden = municipalities.
Is the “Debt Brake” Behind Germany’s Successful Fiscal Consolidation? 15same problems of endogeneity (Truger, 2015). What is more, the exact
details of the method have never been published and are still not trans-
parent, as had already been pointed out by Truger and Will (2013).
2. Doubt Number 1: Comparison of different consolidation 
phases
Figure 1 shows the general government budget balance, the struc-
tural balance—adjusted for cyclical and one-off effects—and the
structural primary balance, i.e. the structural balance minus gross
interest payments, for the period from 1991 until 2017.5 Indeed, the
graph shows an impressive consolidation performance in the period
since the introduction of the debt brake. The budget balance moved
from a deficit of 4.2% of GDP in 2010 to a surplus of 1.1% of GDP in
2017—an improvement of 5.3 percentage points. Concerning the
structural balance, the improvement is substantially smaller at
3.2 percentage points, because of the cyclical adjustment and the
adjustment for large one-off expenditures to stabilise the banking
sector, which amounted to 1.3% of potential output in 2010. If we
further take into account that public finances strongly benefitted from
unusually low interest rates and thus look at the structural primary
balance, the improvement is reduced to 2% of potential output, which
is nevertheless a substantial consolidation performance.
However, Figure 1 reveals at a glance that there were similar phases
of substantial budget consolidation even before the introduction of the
debt brake. Table 1 compares four consolidation phases after 1991,
which were identified on the basis of the structural balance. Obviously,
the structural balance increased substantially in the phases from 1991
until 1994, from 1996 until 1999, from 2002 until 2007 and from 2010
until 2017. Interestingly, the phase with the most pronounced consoli-
dation is not the most recent phase following the introduction of the
debt brake. Both the period from 1991 until 1994 and the fairly recent
period from 2002 until 2007 exhibited much stronger improvements,
by 3.6 and 3.4 percentage points respectively in the case of the struc-
5. We have classified the year 2017 as the end year of the last consolidation phase, although strictly
speaking we could have classified the year 2015 as the end year, because from 2015 to 2016 there
was a very small worsening of the structural balance-to-GDP ratio. This would not only have
decreased the length of the consolidation period, but also the overall size of consolidation in that
phase by 0.31 percentage points for the structural balance. However, as the worsening in 2016 was
only -0.00023 percentage points and therefore negligible, we decided to use 2017 as the end year.  
Katja Rietzler and Achim Truger16tural budget balance, and by 4.1 and 3.2 percentage points in the case
of the structural primary balance, compared to only 3.2 percentage
points for the structural balance and 2.0 percentage points for the
structural primary balance in the phase from 2010 until 2017. In the
analysis, potential GDP rather than GDP is used as the yardstick in order
to avoid strong cyclical distortions—especially due to the sharp reces-
sion triggered by the financial crisis. 
In addition, it has to be noted that unlike the period from 2002 until
2007 the most recent phase after the introduction of the debt brake has
been characterised by very favourable macroeconomic conditions:
although the estimated average output gap of -0.5% of potential
output was hardly better than in the preceding period (-0.7%) and the
average growth rate of 1.8% was only slightly higher (2002-2007:
1.6%), the period after 2010 was much more dynamic than the
preceding period, which included several years of stagnation from 2002
until 2005. After 2010 the average growth rate of wages and salaries
was 4.0% and the unemployment rate was as low as 4.8%, whereas
these indicators amounted to 1.0% and 9%, respectively, in the
preceding period. As the recent literature on fiscal multipliers suggests,
it can be assumed that fiscal multipliers are higher in downturns than in
upswings (Gechert, 2015). Therefore, it is highly plausible that the
consolidation was much easier and produced smaller negative macroe-
conomic effects than in the period from 2002 until 2007 when the
economy stagnated for several years. 
 Figure 1. Balance, structural balance and structural primary balance of general 
government in Germany, 1991–2017
In % of potential GDP
Sources: Destatis, authors’ calculations. 
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Is the “Debt Brake” Behind Germany’s Successful Fiscal Consolidation? 17From a macroeconomic point of view, the structure of the budget
consolidation during the individual phases is also remarkable. Figure 2
shows both the general government structural balance and structural
revenues and expenditures. It reveals that the consolidation during the
period from 2002 until 2007 was almost exclusively achieved on the
expenditure side of the budgets. Substantial tax cuts under the “red-
green” coalition in the early 2000s were followed by substantial
spending cuts in order to reduce deficits that were partly cyclical and to
comply with the rules of the SGP (Rietzler et al., 2017). As a conse-
quence, the expenditure ratio fell by 3.7 percentage points. As
expenditure multipliers are much higher than revenue multipliers
(Gechert, 2015), the overall macroeconomic effect can be assumed to
have been strongly negative (Truger, 2010: 29 ff). 
Table 1. Phases of structural budget consolidation of general government, 1991-2017
In % of potential GDP
Consolidation (+) 1991-1994 1996-1999 2002-2007 2010-2017 1991-2017
Δ structural balance (% POT) 3.6 1.0 3.4 3.2 7.2
Δ structural primary balance (% POT) 4.1 0.7 3.2 2.0 5.6
Average output gap 2.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1
Average GDP growth rate 1.1 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.4
Average growth rate of wages 
and salaries (domestic concept) 4.2 1.6 1.0 4.0 2.6
Average unemployment rate 6.8 8.5 9.0 4.8 7.0
Sources: Destatis, Federal Ministries of Finance (BMF) and of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), authors’ calculations.
 Figure 2. Structural general government balance, structural revenue 
and expenditure ratios, 1991-2017
In % of potential GDP
Sources: Destatis, Federal Ministries of Finance (BMF) and of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), authors’ calculations.
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Katja Rietzler and Achim Truger18According to the cyclically adjusted data used here, the consolida-
tion process has been much more benign for the macro economy since
2010—with about 67% on the revenue side and only 33% on the
expenditure side. On balance there were no discretionary tax increases
(Rietzler et al., 2017). 
It can be noted that the consolidation of the general government
budget has been somewhat weaker since 2010 than in the preceding
periods, although the debt brake did not exist back then. In addition the
consolidation has been facilitated by favourable macroeconomic condi-
tions and the resulting improvement in revenues, which had very
limited negative effects on the economy. However, it is problematic
from a macroeconomic perspective that the budget consolidation after
2011 was almost continuously accompanied by a rising current account
surplus, as the private sector saw no overall decrease in its balance, so
that the already substantial external imbalances were exacerbated
(Figure 3). It was only from 2010 until 2011 that the consolidation was
strongly supported by the domestic economy via a reduction of the
private sector’s net lending. If the German model of current account
surpluses—recently exceeding 8% of GDP—came increasingly under
political pressure from countries with current account deficits, as we can
expect, this would therefore have an immediate negative impact on the
sustainability of Germany’s fiscal consolidation. 
 Figure 3. Net borrowing/net lending in Germany by institutional sector, 1991-2017
In % of potential GDP
Sources: European Commission (2018), authors’ calculations.
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of government subsectors
How much have the individual government subsectors consolidated
their budgets since 2010? Figure 4 and Table 2 show that the federal
level accounted for most of the consolidation. Its contribution to the
general government consolidation of 3.2% of potential output was
1.9 percentage points, whereas the joint consolidation of the states
and the municipalities accounted for 1.5 percentage points, and the
structural budget balance of the social security funds deteriorated by
0.2 percentage points. The relative consolidation performance remains
broadly unchanged, if the consolidation effort is assessed on the basis
of the structural primary balance.
Is this indeed evidence for the effectiveness of the debt brake, which
has been fully in force for the federal government since 2016? In order
to answer this question a comparison of the consolidation phases
mentioned above is helpful. This time we focus on the developments in
the government subsectors (Table 2). We can see that, except for the
phase immediately after German reunification, the federal government
hardly contributed to the budget consolidation of the government
sector. Instead the improvement of the general government structural
balance was largely brought about by consolidation efforts at state
level. The municipalities and the social security funds contributed far
less than the states, but still more than the federal level. 
 Figure 4. Structural budget balance of government subsectors in Germany, 
1991-2017
In % of potential GDP
Sources: Destatis, Federal Ministries of Finance (BMF) and of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), authors’ calculations.
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
General Government
Federal 
government
State governments
Local governmentsSocial security funds
Katja Rietzler and Achim Truger20Obviously the other government subsectors had already proceeded
further with their budget consolidation in the earlier phases, particu-
larly from 2002 until 2007, and could thus build on previous
achievements—interrupted only briefly by the effects of the global
economic and financial crisis and the stimulus packages. In the case of
the municipalities and the social security funds, which have only
limited scope for credit-financed counter-cyclical policies, it is not
surprising that the consolidation was achieved without any debt brake.
Indeed, Figures 7 and 8 illustrate that the structural expenditure ratios
of the municipalities and the social security funds quickly adjusted to
their declining revenue ratios after 2001.
However, the decline of the structural expenditure ratio after 2002 is
particularly pronounced in the case of the states, which, in principle,
had access to higher credit financing. Their structural expenditure ratio
fell from 13.4% of potential GDP at the beginning of the consolidation
phase to 12.4% in 2007—a reduction by a whole percentage point of
potential output or 7.5% (Figure 6). Obviously the states were able and
willing to cut spending substantially without any pressure from the debt
brake. By contrast, the federal government accepted the revenue short-
falls at the beginning of the millennium to a much larger extent and
reduced expenditures far less, thus tolerating far higher deficits, which
corresponds to a much higher need for adjustment in 2010 (Figure 5).
Table 2. Phases of structural budget consolidation, General government 
and subsectors (1991-2017)
Change in % of potential GDP
Consolidation (+) 1991-1994 1996-1999 2002-2007 2010-2017 1991-2017
Δ structural balance  
General government 3.6 1.0 3.4 3.2 7.2
Federal government 3.1 0.0 0.8 1.9 4.4
State governments 0.0 0.5 1.5 1.0 1.7
Local governments 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.7
Social security funds 0.2 0.3 0.5 -0.2 0.4
Δ structural primary balance  
General government 4.1 0.7 3.2 2.0 5.6
Federal government 3.6 -0.1 0.5 1.2 3.5
State governments 0.0 0.4 1.5 0.5 1.3
Local governments 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.5
Social security funds 0.2 0.3 0.5 -0.2 0.4
Sources: Destatis, Federal Ministries of Finance (BMF) and of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), authors’ calculations.
Is the “Debt Brake” Behind Germany’s Successful Fiscal Consolidation? 21Nevertheless, it is a fact that the federal government addressed the
obvious need to balance its budget set by the debt brake in 2010 and
rapidly improved its budget balance. As the cyclically adjusted national
accounts data suggest, the consolidation focused on the expenditure
side, reducing the structural expenditure ratio of the federal government
from 14.6% in 2010 to 12.5% in 2017, while the structural revenue ratio
 Figure 5. Structural budget balance, revenue and expenditure ratios 
of the federal government, 1991-2017
In % of potential output
Sources: Destatis, Federal Ministries of Finance (BMF) and of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), authors’ calculations.
 Figure 6. Structural budget balance, revenue and expenditure ratios 
of the states, 1991-2017
In % of potential output
Sources: Destatis, Federal Ministries of Finance (BMF) and of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), authors’ calculations.
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Katja Rietzler and Achim Truger22actually declined by 0.1%. How did the federal government manage to
reduce spending by 2.1% of (potential) GDP in such a short time? Of
course, it benefitted from the unexpected favourable cyclical upswing.
In addition, interest payments fell by 0.7% of potential GDP despite
higher debt because of the exceptionally low interest rate level.  
 Figure 7. Structural budget balance, revenue and expenditure ratios 
of the local governments, 1991-2017
In % of potential output
Sources: Destatis, Federal Ministries of Finance (BMF) and of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), authors’ calculations.
 Figure 8. Structural budget balance, revenue and expenditure ratios 
of the social security funds, 1991-2017
In % of potential output
Sources: Destatis, Federal Ministries of Finance (BMF) and of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), authors’ calculations.
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Is the “Debt Brake” Behind Germany’s Successful Fiscal Consolidation? 23This still leaves unexplained a substantial expenditure-side consoli-
dation of 1.4% of potential GDP. A significant part of the explanation is
that the federal government was able to cut its transfers to the social
security funds that it had increased substantially in the crisis years of
2009 and 2010 (Figure 9). As employment rose and the financial situa-
tion of the social security funds improved, the federal government
reduced its transfers to the social security funds by 1.0% of potential
GDP. At first sight it seems surprising that the current transfers to the
states have not increased relative to potential GDP since 2010, even
though the federal government supported the states (and indirectly
the municipalities) via a number of additional programmes. The fact
that this does not seem to show up in the numbers can be explained
first by the compensating effect of shrinking transfers from the “Soli-
darpakt” (solidarity pact for East German states), which is being
gradually phased out by 2019. Second, a part of the additional
programmes was financed by reducing the federal government’s share
of VAT rather than by additional transfers from the federal budget. This
shift in revenues left the expenditure side unaffected, but it explains the
weak structural expenditure growth of the federal government as well
as the dynamic expenditure growth of the states (Figures 5 and 6).
 Figure 9. Substantial net flows between government subsectors 
% of potential GDP
Sources: Destatis, Federal Ministries of Finance (BMF) and of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), authors’ calcula-
tions; CT = current transfers, PT = property transfers.
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Katja Rietzler and Achim Truger24Another one-off effect helped the structural consolidation of the
federal budget: the stimulus packages of 2009 and 2010 included
some merely temporal measures affecting mostly the federal budget.
Examples are the car-scrapping bonus and especially the investment
programmes of €11 billion over several years, which were largely
financed by the federal government (Truger, 2010; IMK Arbeitskreis,
Konjunktur 2010). When these programmes gradually expired after
2010, the federal budget improved automatically by several tenths of a
percentage point of potential GDP without any discretionary consoli-
dation measures.
In retrospect almost all of the structural consolidation achievements
can thus be attributed to favourable circumstances (cyclical upswing,
low interest rates) and one-off effects (reduction of transfers to the
social security funds, phasing out of stimulus packages). Obviously,
what it cannot be attributed to is the debt brake.6
4. Doubt Number 3: Public finances without “the blessing of 
the upswing”
In the preceding sections we have repeatedly stressed that the
unexpected favourable macroeconomic environment since 2010 has
greatly helped the consolidation of the general government finances.
One may object that the business cycle is merely relevant for the head-
line (cyclically unadjusted) budget balance, but not for the adjusted
one. However, this is not quite true, as the usual cyclical adjustment
methods underestimate the size of cyclical fluctuations and thus lead to
a pro-cyclical policy, if they are applied to fiscal benchmarks. The
method of the European Commission, which is used in the context of
the German debt brake, has proved particularly problematic, because
the potential output it produces is strongly affected by the current
cyclical situation and especially the unemployment rate (Klär 2014;
Truger and Will, 2013). Thus potential output is rapidly revised down-
wards in downturns, whereas it is rapidly raised in upswings. The
sensitivity of potential output estimates to the business cycle is not
merely an academic problem, but entails very concrete and serious
consequences for the estimated structural deficits and thus for the
ensuing consolidation requirements. During the euro crisis the Euro-
6. A detailed analysis of the factors determining the federal government’s compliance with the debt
brake based on government revenue and expenditure statistics is provided in Rietzler et al. (2017: 7-11).
Is the “Debt Brake” Behind Germany’s Successful Fiscal Consolidation? 25pean Commission was already forced to admit that its estimates based
on changes in the structural deficits substantially underestimated the
actual consolidation efforts. For this reason the European Commission
is now considering additional indicators (Carnot and de Castro, 2015). 
When the debt brake was introduced this problem was already
obvious, and corresponding concerns were voiced. At the same time it
was pointed out that the debt brake might turn out to be seen as a
success story if there were an unexpectedly strong and sustained
cyclical upswing and, consequently, a “structural” consolidation,
which is in fact cyclical:
“If the trend growth rate during a consolidation period turns out
worse than expected, the structural deficit and the resulting
consolidation requirements will increase […]. This finding
neglects the problem that the strong endogeneity of the esti-
mated structural deficit combined with a restrictive fiscal policy
may lead to a self-reinforcing vicious circle: if the macroeco-
nomic performance worsens unexpectedly, part of this
worsening will be recorded as a structural decline in growth. This
automatically raises the structural deficit that remains to be
reduced. If fiscal policy tries to comply by further tightening the
fiscal stance, this may worsen the macroeconomic performance,
further raising the structural deficit that has to be reduced. In
this case the economy would remain caught in a stagnation trap
and budget consolidation would be extremely difficult and
entail a huge macroeconomic and social cost. Potentially, this
mechanism also works in the other direction. In case of an unex-
pected favourable macroeconomic performance the required
consolidation effort might actually decrease. The fiscal stance
could then be loosened, which would in turn reduce the consoli-
dation requirement via higher growth. In case of such positive
feedback it is even conceivable that the fiscal strategy of the new
federal government could prove reasonably successful. The
government could then—at least for a few years—reconcile tax
cuts with the transition towards the full implementation of the
debt brake, without having to resort to extreme spending cuts
or offsetting tax hikes.” (Truger 2010, 21; authors’ translation
from German original). 
This raises the question of how key fiscal policy indicators would
have evolved if the macroeconomic performance since 2010 had been
worse. In the following we analyse a scenario of weaker performance
Katja Rietzler and Achim Truger26for the period from 2010 until 2015 (Table 3). The “crisis scenario”
assumes that the GDP growth rates for 2011 and 2012 that had been
forecast when the debt brake was enacted at the peak of the global
economic and financial crisis in the Spring/Summer of 2009 were real-
ised. Therefore we use the GDP growth rates of the Spring joint
forecast published in the years 2009 and 2010 (Projektgruppe Gemein-
schaftsdiagnose, 2009 und 2010), which predicted growth rates of
merely -0.5% and 1.4 % for 2010 and 2011, instead of the actual rates
of 4.1% and 3.7%. Beginning with 2012 we use the actual GDP
growth rates. 
For cyclical adjustment we do not use the complex method of the
European Commission, on which the—still not adequately docu-
mented—method applied by the German federal government is also
based. Instead we use the modified Hodrick-Prescott filter, which has
been developed by the Swiss federal finance administration and which
is used for the Swiss debt brake (Bruchez, 2003) for the sake of
simplicity. According to calculations by the RWI (2010), it may even be
less pro-cyclical than the European Commission method.7 In order to
compare the output gaps of our simulation with those published by
the federal government, we also have to estimate an output gap based
on actual GDP. For all deviations of the simulated GDP from actual
GDP, we can thus calculate the ensuing adjustments of the output gap.
We subsequently multiply the change in the output gap with the
respective budget semi-elasticity for the government subsectors and
thus obtain the change of the structural budget balance caused by the
revision of potential output. For the headline budget balance, we apply
the budget semi-elasticities directly to the difference in GDP. 
Table 3. Scenarios for real GDP growth in Germany, 2009-2017
In %
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
De facto growth rates -5.6 4.1 3.7 0.5 0.5 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.2
Scenario “crisis” -5.6 -0.5 1.4 0.5 0.5 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.2
Sources: EU Commission (2018); Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose (2009, 2010); authors‘calculations.
7. In Truger and Will (2013) a similar, though forward-looking, simulation was carried out using a
version of the European Commission’s method. With respect to the endogeneity of potential output
estimates, the results are broadly comparable, justifying the time-saving approach with the HP filter.
Is the “Debt Brake” Behind Germany’s Successful Fiscal Consolidation? 27Figures 10a and b provide a summary overview of the simulation
results. In the crisis scenario the general government deficit would
have exceeded 3% of GDP until 2014. In 2017 it would still be at 2.4%
of GDP. No government subsector would have recorded a balanced
budget over the whole simulation period up to 2017. The findings are
similar for the structural balance. The structural budget balance of the
federal government would have been -0.8% in 2014 and would have
worsened to -1.3% of GDP by 2017. From this national accounts indi-
cator we cannot draw direct conclusions for the structural balance
according to the government finance statistics, but it is highly likely
that the structural deficit in this definition would have exceeded the
0.35% ceiling of the debt brake, causing major consolidation efforts.
In addition, it would be highly unrealistic to assume a reduction of
transfers to the social security funds of the size actually observed,
because the funds’ finances would have turned out much worse, with
a deficit of 0.7% of GDP, which would have caused additional pressure
on the federal budget. Although, again, the definition of the structural
balance relevant for the federal states’ debt brakes may be different
from the one calculated from the national accounts, the federal states
would have come under severe pressure, as their structural balances
would not have improved over the entire period from 2009 to
2017, with the deadline for the zero structural deficit approaching
in 2020.   
 Figures 10. ab Scenario “crisis”: Budget balance and structural budget 
of the general government and its subsectors, 2009-2017
In % of GDP
Sources: Destatis; BMWi/BMF (2018); authors’ calculations.
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Katja Rietzler and Achim Truger28From the counterfactual simulation we can conclude that without
the favourable macroeconomic environment since 2010, neither the
general government nor the federal government would be in such
good shape in terms of their fiscal indicators. Instead, the German
government—like many other governments in the euro area—would
have struggled to comply with both the SGP and the German debt
brake. Painful consolidation measures and spending cuts like those
observed from 2002 until 2007 would have been very likely. They
would have certainly had negative repercussions on the macroeco-
nomic performance, rendering the budget consolidation even more
difficult. Without the blessing of a strong upswing, Germany would
hardly have become the fiscal role model for Europe, and the German
debt brake would not have become the blueprint for the European
Fiscal Compact.
5. Conclusion
The analysis has shown that—unlike suggested by some—the
German debt brake is not the cause of the successful budget consolida-
tion in Germany since 2010. The improvement of the general
government finances since 2010 was even smaller than in previous
consolidation phases, although the debt brake was not yet in place
then. Furthermore, the consolidation was supported by a favourable
macroeconomic environment and surging revenues. The federal
government’s seemingly impressive structural consolidation achieve-
ment since 2010 is due almost exclusively to favourable circumstances
(cyclical upswing and low interest rates) as well as one-off effects
(reduction of transfers to the social security funds, phasing out of the
stimulus packages). Obviously, the debt brake contributed very little or
not at all to these favourable developments. Finally, neither the general
government sector nor the federal government would be in such a
good shape in terms of their fiscal indicators had the economy evolved
less favourably since 2010. Instead, the federal government—like many
other governments in the euro area—would have struggled to comply
with the SGP and the debt brake. Without the blessing of a strong
upswing, Germany would hardly have become the fiscal role model for
Europe, and the German debt brake would not have become the blue-
print for the European Fiscal Compact.
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NEW OUTPUT GAP ESTIMATES 
FOR THE EURO AREA AND ELSEWHERE
Heikki Oksanen1
University of Helsinki
Output gaps (OG) identify economic cycles. A new simple method for
estimating them is presented, giving results that are more transparent than
those published by the leading economic policy institutions. The retroactive
changes to the OGs as such do not indicate that they would have been
incorrect. Instead, they depend on what happened afterwards, including
changes in the policies implemented. After the Great Crunch of 2008-09, fiscal
policy was tight, notably in 2011-13 in the euro area, contributing to an
unexpected fall in GDP, which led to large retroactive corrections of the OG
estimates for earlier years. A more nuanced interpretation is that the retroactive
corrections stemmed from the unduly tight fiscal policy followed in 2011-13.
The new OG estimates explicitly based on an assessment of the possible
changes in the long-term growth prospects provide the rudiments for a fiscal
policy that both rationally copes with short term disturbances and underlines
the policy measures necessary for long-term sustainability. This could help to
avoid pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in the euro area in future.
Keywords: Euro, fiscal policy, output gaps.
Distinguishing the cyclical and more persistent changes in macro-
economic development by estimating output gaps (OGs), together
with their projections a few years forward, has become a dominant
1. Acknowledgements: I am grateful to the participants at the EUROFRAME conference on 8 June
2018 in Milan for useful comments on the previous longer version, which subsequently became
CESifo working paper Oksanen (2018). The present paper includes the new output gap estimates
presented in Oksanen (2018), referring to details presented in its Technical appendix. I want to thank
an anonymous referee and the editors of this journal for comments and suggestions and John Rogers
for excellent editorial assistance. I take sole responsibility for any remaining deficiencies or errors.Revue de l’OFCE, Hors-série (2019)
Heikki Oksanen32feature in designing and assessing fiscal policy. In particular, they are
used for identifying the cyclical and structural components in govern-
ment budget balances and indirectly in assessing the sustainability of
government debt. This way they provide crucial data for policy making
in the euro area and in the European Union (EU) more generally, as well
as for the surveillance work of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the OECD also on other countries.
The OG is defined as the percentage difference between the GDP
(data for the past and a forecast for the future) and the reference level
in each year that is estimated to represent the underlying “trend” or
“potential”, with the term depending on the method used.
For comparing the OG estimates produced by different institutions,
it is not sufficient to compare only the OGs, but as the main interest is
about the current and next years and the forecasts for the GDP itself
also differ, it is indispensable to examine the estimates for the reference
levels as estimated by each institution, including because those esti-
mates are interesting also for other purposes. 
In the present paper we present a new application of the Hodrick-Pres-
cott (HP) filter for estimating the “trend” and the results are compared to
the estimates of the three main institutions mentioned above.2
In the present paper we cover the years from 2002, with special
emphasis on the Great Crunch of 2008-09 and how it led to a “new
normal” as estimated in real time, and as a further issue, on how the
policies in the subsequent years shaped the developments, affecting
the retrospective estimates of the “trend” or “potential” GDP before
and after the Great Crunch. 
It will be shown that our new application of the HP filter seems a
useful and reasonably simple method for distinguishing the short-term
movements from the more long-term trends, producing the results for
2. While the work on the new HP application reported here was underway, Hamilton (2017)
published an article entitled “Why you should never use the Hodrick-Prescott filter”. The advice
“never say never” seems appropriate here. It seems that Hamilton (2017) is promoting replacement
of HP filter-based short-term forecasts for some variables and cases with a simple projection based on
the most recent data, say, over the past four years. However, in estimating the “normal” level of GDP
for the current and next years for calculating the OG, we are not producing a forecast for the GDP.
The short-term forecasts we refer to are produced by each institution separately (using conventional
practices based on a bulk of relevant data and judgement). Estimating the “normal” or “potential”
GDP obviously benefits from using data from the more distant past, and in our new HP application,
also from assessing the growth potential in the more distant future than just over the usual short-term
GDP forecast. 
New Output Gap Estimates for the Euro Area and Elsewhere 33the “new normal” over those years. There is no need to accept it as the
only method for estimating the OGs. On the contrary, using several
parallel methods may be useful for complementing the picture. The HP
as a single variable method, using only the GDP series, is a viable alter-
native, as it is simple, relatively easily understood and does not rely on
macroeconomic theories that are always controversial.
Also, the HP filter does not pretend to produce the only correct esti-
mate on the “trend” of any variable, as the result depends on the value
set by the user for a certain smoothing parameter for which there is no
unique objective basis. Here, we use for our annual time series the
commonly applied value of 100. It distils the short-to-medium term
cycles from the possible underlying deceleration of the growth and
possible long-term fluctuations extending over 19.8 years on average
(Casey, 2018, 19).
While the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter) developed in the 1990s
was the first common method for estimating the trend of GDP, data on
the stock of capital and the labour market was supplemented to esti-
mate the reference level. The IMF and the OECD shifted to the new
method, calling it the production function approach (PF) and labelling
the result as “potential GDP” rather than “trend”. In 2002, the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) introduced its own PF estimates and gave them
a dominant role, though continuing to produce also the HP estimates
until today (Havik et al., 2014).
The competing OG estimates have spurred quite heated controver-
sies, as they are at the same time vitally important in designing fiscal
policy and problematic to define and measure. The debate has only
intensified recently, particularly due to the difficulty in judging the
causes and consequences of the Great Crunch of 2008-09 and onwards.
In this paper we shall mostly work on the data on the aggregate of
the 11 EU member states that formed the euro area in 1999 (EA11),
adding observations on its four largest members (Germany, France,
Italy and Spain) and the US.3
3. We use a fixed composition of the 11 member states to avoid any effects of new members
coming in. The EA11 accounts for 96% of the GDP in the euro area (EA19) in 2017. As our real time
data on the OGs will start from 2002, we could have included Greece, which became a euro member
in 2001. However, as it is a special case, it is left out. Its share of the EA11’s GDP peaked at around
2.5% in 2009 and it was 1.7% in 2017, so including or excluding it from our aggregate hardly affects
our results. In 2017 the four largest members accounted for 79% of GDP in the EA11 and 76% of the
full euro area of 19 members.
Heikki Oksanen34Short critical survey of previous studies on OG estimates
Deutsche Bundesbank (2014) launched a fierce attack on the OG
estimates of the IMF and the OECD. It proclaimed that they are biased
towards loose fiscal policy and an unintended increase in public debt
and that the large retrospective revisions of these estimates disqualify
their use for policy recommendations. Largely to reduce the retrospec-
tive revisions, the Bundesbank promotes an HP-filter application with a
smoothing parameter of 6.25 for estimating the “trend” of GDP.
The issue of retrospective revisions of the OG estimates is most rele-
vant, but minimising the retrospective revisions in the way that the
Bundesbank proposes also reduces the OG estimates in real time by
feeding into the “trend” estimate part of the cyclical movements. Thus,
the purpose of identifying and measuring the cycles is partly dismissed.4
To avoid this, the revisions of the OG estimates should be accepted
as natural consequences of their character: it is obvious that the OG for
any given year will be revised even several times according to develop-
ments taking place after the year in question. One should not be
surprised that even the sign of the OG sometimes changes, as the esti-
mates are often not far from zero. This may happen especially if a major
shock hits the economy. Thus, the revisions are not comparable to revi-
sions of economic data in general, but they provide interesting
information about what was in real time understood to be normal and
what then happened. 
Mc Morrow et al. (2015) complement the Bundesbank analysis by
assessing also the performance of both PF and HP estimates published
regularly by the EC, as these were not covered by the Bundesbank.
They conclude that the EU's PF method has performed better than the
HP filter and the PF estimates by the IMF and the OECD.
Mc Morrow et al. (2015) discredit the HP method referring, espe-
cially to its poor performance in the estimates of the EC for the HP
trend of GDP in spring and autumn 2009. Their judgement turns out to
be dubious, caused by failed mechanical statistical procedures in
dealing with the well-known end-of-the-sample bias in the HP esti-
mates: the HP formula gives a high weight to the latest observations of
the original data series, which tends to bend the end of the estimated
4. The graphs in the Technical appendix of Oksanen (2018, 29) illustrate that the value of 100 for
the smoothing parameter applied on the GDP series seems a reasonable presumption as compared to
the value of 6.25 promoted by Deutsche Bundesbank (2014).
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As the main interest is usually exactly in those years, i.e. in the current
conditions and one-to-two years ahead, the statisticians have
attempted to find operational solutions to deal with this. However, no
mechanical solution would work well in all cases. The HP estimates of
the EC in the year 2009, when the direness of the economic situation
had emerged, turn out to be one such failed case, as the swings in the
HP-based OG estimates by the EC in spring and autumn 2009 were in
the mechanically produced extensions of the GDP forecasts rather than
by the HP method itself (shown in the graphs in Oksanen, 2018, 31).
Noting this, we can conclude that the HP filter can produce useful
results when used carefully.
Several recent studies also compare the merits of the parallel and
often competing estimates for the OG in terms of their stability in the
short term and proneness to revisions when the economies progress.
For example, Busse (2016) and Kuusi (2017) investigate the impacts of
the revisions of the output gaps and cyclically adjusted budget
balances under the fiscal framework in the EU. Also, recent IMF
Working papers on improving the estimates for potential output and
OG (Blagrave et al., 2015, and Alichi, 2015) develop improvements to
their PF methodology. 
Practically all studies conclude that the OG estimates are indispen-
sable for policy making—distinguishing the cycle from the trend (and
identifying any specific factors) is both important and not straightfor-
ward. First, it is useful to admit that before the Great Crunch of 2008-
09, the OG estimates used in policy making failed to guide policies to
dampen the boom. Second, the retrospective revisions of the OG esti-
mates for 2006-2013 are not an adequate reason to abandon them
altogether. Instead, all the competing OG estimates should be looked
at constructively, though critically.
Purpose, scope and outline of the present paper
The motivation of the present paper is that there is scope for
improvement. While no perfect method will appear, we shall present
new OG estimates produced with a new application of the HP filter.
Special emphasis is given to the transparency and simplicity of the
method so that the results can be understood also by non-experts and
policy makers.
Heikki Oksanen36In Section 1 we present our new real-time estimates for the OGs
based on the HP-filtered trend of GDP. “Real time” means here that we
use the data and short-term forecasts available at the time. We focus on
the estimates for the current year and the next. Our results are then
compared to the estimates published by the EC, IMF and OECD in the
context of their regular forecasts over the period 2002-2017.5
The novel idea in the present application is to make explicit that the
estimates for the trend GDP and the OG for the current year and the
next will always depend on the assumed path of the GDP in the
consecutive years. 
In Section 2 we shall discuss the main use of OG estimates for policy
design, which is to separate the cyclical and structural components of
government budget balances. Especially their projections based on
planned fiscal policies obtain pivotal importance under the (complex)
fiscal policy rules for the euro area (Vade Mecum on the Stability and
Growth Pact, European Commission, 2017a). In this context we present
the data on the retrospective revisions of the OG estimates and the
real-time and retrospective estimates for the “new normal” level of
GDP after the Great Crunch, covering the estimates of the three institu-
tions as well as those based on our new HP trend estimates.
We are not interested in the OG estimates only for their descriptive
usefulness, but also for their use in policy making, recognising an impor-
tant simultaneity: the policies shape the economies and thereby affect
the revisions of the OG estimates, and not only exogenous factors. This
is the topic in Section 3. Regarding recent history, the question is to
what extent were the policies responsible for the further fall in GDP in
2012-13 in the euro area and hence for the revisions to the OG esti-
mates. We shall discuss the conflicting views on this, highlighting the
evidence of the persistent pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in the euro area.
In Section 4 we discuss two examples of the new OG estimates used
as indicators of the cyclical position of the economy and in policy
design. First, they can be used for designing a simple smoothing mech-
5. The data set required to perform these tasks is quite large: it contains all the forecasting vintages
of the EC in 2002-2017 gathered from the original sources and made freely available by the
FIRSTRUN (Fiscal Rules and Strategies under Externalities and Uncertainties) project; it contains data
by EU member for several macroeconomic indicators, and the historical data goes back to 1960. We
do not use all indicators but mainly those for the GDP, estimates of the potential GDP and the trend
estimated by their HP application (and the implied OGs), the various budget balance indicators, etc.
Similar data covering the real-time estimates by the IMF and the OECD are downloaded from their
respective freely available data banks. 
New Output Gap Estimates for the Euro Area and Elsewhere 37anism for country-specific asymmetric shocks, proposed by Oksanen
(2016a), and second, the approach can be used for assessing a possible
significant permanent downturn in GDP growth, supplementing the
analysis of the consequences of the Great Crunch of 2008-09. 
Section 5 gives a summary and concludes the paper.
1. New OG estimates generated by the HP method 
1.1.  Real-time OG estimates for the EA11 and others
The new OG estimates are the deviations of the observed (and fore-
cast) data from a HP-filtered trend of GDP, which is derived using our new
application: the GDP series as an object is based on the real-time data on
GDP, including its short-term forecast by the respective institution (for the
EA11 by the EC; for the US by the IMF) and its extension to future years.
The extension is composed as follows: (1) the official forecasts of the
respective institution for the current and coming years (t and t+1) are
taken as given, (2) an assumption for the underlying long-term rate of GDP
growth from year t+2 onwards is injected, and (3) the GDP from year t+2
onwards is additionally set to adjust so that the OG estimated for year t+1
will fade away by year t+5. Here, like in what follows, we only give the
principles of constructing the new HP trend estimates and advise the
reader to refer to the Technical appendix in Oksanen (2018).
The assumption on the future GDP is vital in our application. It is
one source for tracking the revisions of the OG estimates afterwards:
the OG will be revised due to the deviation of GDP from its previously
assumed long-term path. Extending the GDP series into the future also
allows us to cope with the possible end-point bias in the HP-filter appli-
cations. As the assumed underlying future growth is set by the user,
any number of alternative results can be generated.
For the baseline, the underlying long-term growth rates for the
EA11 countries are roughly based on the work of the Ageing Working
Group (AWG) in the EU. In the AWG reports 2001, 2006 and 2009, the
rough figure for EA11 GDP long-term growth was 1.5% pa. In the
report 2012 it was lowered to 1.3%.6 As the views of long-term growth
6. This coincides also with the projection by Mc Morrow et al. (2016, Table 1), who produce a no-
policy-change medium-term projection for 2015-2024 of 1.3% average growth for euro area GDP,
based on the negative fallout from the financial crisis and the emerging drag on growth emanating
from ageing populations.
Heikki Oksanen38obviously started to change earlier, we set the figure at 1.4% for our
calculations for 2010 spring and autumn forecasting vintages, and
1.3% from autumn 2011 onwards (the assumptions of the AWG report
2012 were published in 2011). For the four largest countries, the
growth assumptions are similarly based on the country-specific
assumptions in the AWG reports.
The assumption that the OG in year t+1 closes by year t+5 follows
the conventional practice in the AWG work and elsewhere where long-
term projections are constructed and used. 
The GDP data used starts from 1960, and the extended data runs
until 2040, long enough to feed into the calculation the assumed
underlying growth rate in future. For estimating the HP-filtered trends,
we use logarithmic series (as the GDP series normally grow exponen-
tially) and 100 as the HP smoothing parameter, which is a conventional
practice with macroeconomic annual data.
The new results are based on real-time data from the forecasting
rounds over 2002-2017. They are then compared to the real-time OG
estimates published by the three institutions (EC, IMF and OECD) for
the EA11. Additional results for the US and the four largest member
states in the EA are found in Oksanen (2018, 33-34). All autumn fore-
casting vintages over 2002-2017 are treated, together with the spring
forecasting vintages over 2007-2010 (to cover the developments
before and right after the crisis in more detail).
Figure 1 gives a broad picture, displaying the real-time OGs for the
EA11 for the current year (t) generated by the new HP (nHP) method
and those of the EC, IMF and OECD, and the corresponding results for
the following year (t+1) in each case.
The charts show that, with one single exception, the real-time OG
estimates of the three institutions were clearly negative or zero
throughout the whole period 2002-2016. The only exception was the
estimate (+0.6%) by the EC in autumn 2008 for 2008, and even in that
case the forecast for the following year was a negative OG.
The OG estimates of the IMF and the OECD until 2009 are quite
close to each other, and the EC estimate is also practically identical for
2006-2008, i.e. during the boom that was recognised only afterwards.
After 2009 the estimates by the OECD are clearly the most negative
ones, while those by the IMF and the EC are close to each other.
New Output Gap Estimates for the Euro Area and Elsewhere 39Our new HP estimates show slightly positive OGs for the boom
period 2006-2008. They are consistently higher than any of the three
estimates, but their average is also negative over the whole period
since 2002. By construction, the average of the HP estimates should be
close to zero if the period is sufficiently long and the fluctuations are
reasonably regular. This is not the case here, as an exceptional crisis
occurred (2009), followed by another fall in output (2012-13). Thus,
our new HP method also produces a negative average for 2002-2016.
The Great Crunch of 2008-09 is the most interesting episode. All
real time estimates recognised it in spring 2009, including our new HP-
based estimate. The change from earlier estimates was dramatic, the
most negative OGs being presented by the IMF and the OECD.
Comparing our new OG estimates and those by the three institu-
tions we need to note that the differences always come both from the
differences in the estimates of the potential GDP and of the forecast for
the GDP itself. It turns out that the more negative OGs by the IMF and
the OECD partly stemmed from their more pessimistic GDP forecasts
for 2009, which were subsequently revised upwards, while the not-so-
negative OG estimate by the EC for 2009 partly reflects its comparable
low estimate of the potential GDP (in the middle of the crisis), which
was later revised upwards.
The large data published by the institutions together with our new
estimates can be used for showing how the potential GDP estimated by
the institutions and our new HP trend estimates developed over the
Figure 1. Output gap estimates for EA11 in real time forecasting vintages 
2002-2017 for the current year (t) and for the next year (t+1)
Legend: OG = output gap; a = autumn forecast, s = spring forecast. nHP = new HP-based estimate based on real
time data from the EC including forecasts for t+1; EC = European Commission OG estimate, IMF and OECD refer to
their OG estimates, respectively.
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Heikki Oksanen40Great Crunch, from autumn 2007 to autumn 2013 and further to
autumn 2017. These data provide an ample source for history writing
as the real time data formed an important basis for economic policy.
Omitting the details that can be found in the graphs in Oksanen
(2018), a short summary is presented below. 
In spring 2009 the downward revision for the potential GDP by the
EC were significantly larger than in our nHP estimates or those of the
IMF and OECD. The IMF followed with a significant revision in autumn
2009 and delivered the lowest estimates of all. The OECD kept its
potential GDP estimates flat in 2009 and still in autumn 2013 its
projection for potential GDP was higher than those of the other institu-
tions. Only by the projections in autumn 2017 did its view converge to
those of the others. 
Our nHP-trend estimate in autumn 2017 for 2017 is a good one
percentage point lower than the other three, consistently with its
regular pattern. 
The OG estimates for the four largest euro area countries show
broadly the same patterns as for the EA11. For Germany the estimates
of the institutions were mostly positive in 2007-08, but for all the other
three countries almost consistently negative or zero, with the excep-
tion of the EC estimate in autumn 2008 for 2008. Their estimates for
Spain were practically zero or negative throughout the boom 2005-07
while the new HP estimates are clearly positive (the issues concerning
not identifying the boom in Spain in real time are not covered here).
The corresponding data for the US shows equally interesting devel-
opments over the Great Crunch. The steady growth of the US GDP
from 2010 onwards, unlike the second recession occurring in the EA11,
is reflected in the real time estimates and especially in their retroactive
revisions (Oksanen, 2018).
1.2. Summary comparison of the real time OG estimates 
We noted above that the real time OG estimates of the three institu-
tions have been almost always negative for the EA11. There can be
justified reasons for this. For example, as the OECD puts it, one of the
factors behind their estimate for the unemployment gap is that the
estimated equilibrium level of unemployment depends on the inflation
rate (and expectations thereof). It is plausible that most of the time
since 2002 unemployment has exceeded this reference level and there-
fore this factor tends to keep their estimate for the OG below zero. The
New Output Gap Estimates for the Euro Area and Elsewhere 41question nevertheless arises whether an OG estimate that is almost
always negative can be interpreted as depicting a cycle; in ordinary
language a cycle means that a variable fluctuates around its cyclically
corrected level. 
If we corrected the various OG estimates for the level over the
whole period on average, the picture each of them would give of the
fluctuations would not differ dramatically. Noting this, our new HP esti-
mates have several merits. They are simple to be composed and
explained, including the meanings of the relatively small number of
assumptions put on top of the GDP data, and the sensitivity of the
results using alternative assumptions can be easily worked out. This
compares well with the PF estimates, which are based on numerous
underlying assumptions, making them more complicated and less
transparent.
The retroactive revisions of the OG estimates is a separate matter,
significantly affected by developments after any given year. In several
previous studies those revisions have been used for assessing the rela-
tive merits of the competing OG estimates. The adequacy and
reasonability of those assessments is appropriate to be discussed in the
context of the use of the OG estimates in policy design. This is where
we turn next.
2. Using the OGs and structural balances for policy: a critical 
view 
The primary use of the OGs is to identify the cyclical and structural
components of government balances in each conjuncture. This is a
centrepiece of fiscal policy making, originating from the work at the
OECD since the early 1990s and fully rooted in the regular reports on
all countries by all the three institutions (see Mourre et al., 2014, for
references). 
The standard procedure is to estimate the cyclical component of the
government budget balance by multiplying the estimated OG by the
semi-elasticity of the budget balance (defined as the effect of move-
ments in the GDP on the budget balance as a percentage of GDP). The
latest estimate for the semi-elasticity for the EU countries is 0.50 for the
EU on average, ranging from 0.31 to 0.65 across member states
(Mourre et al., 2014, 6). Removing the cyclical component gives the
cyclically adjusted balance and subtracting one-off and temporary
components gives the structural balance.
Heikki Oksanen422.1.  Use of structural balances in euro area policy making 
The structural balances have gained a pivotal role in the fiscal policy
rules for the euro area, explained in the most recent edition of the Vade
Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact (European Commission, 2017a,
where presentation of the rules requires 224 pages). 
The rules have become quite complex especially after the Great
Crunch. The original Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of 1997 focussed
on the headline budget balances, but it became obvious that to be able
to set sensible fiscal policy targets, the cyclical component had to be
acknowledged.
As our new OG real time estimates for the period 2002-2017 are on
average one percentage point higher than the ones by the three insti-
tutions, the cyclical components would be roughly 0.5 percentage
points higher and the estimates for the structural balances correspond-
ingly lower. These are the rough numbers over the whole period on
average, while the corresponding figures for the differences in the OGs
for the subperiods and institutions vary roughly between 0.3 and
1.8 percentage points. 
Here, we do not enter into more detailed comparisons of the
figures. Instead, the conceptual basis of the budget balance estimates
should be clarified, questioning their usefulness and accuracy for policy
design.
2.2.  How to define a cyclical component in government balances?
What should we mean by the cyclical component of the budget
balance? Consider a thought experiment: assume an economy in equi-
librium is hit by an exogenous factor which moves cyclically; assume
then that the government pursues a fiscal policy that completely elimi-
nates the effect on the GDP; this means that the OG remains at zero
through the whole cycle; obviously, the budget balance first moves in
one direction and then in the other, and at the end of the cycle the
equilibrium is restored. The problem is that according to the standard
definition the cyclical component of the estimated budget balance is
zero throughout, following from the zero OG over the whole cycle.
Obviously, this does not make sense. It would be more reasonable to
say that all the variation in the budget balance was cyclical as it
stemmed from the specific joint effect of the exogenous cyclical factor
and the countercyclical policy pursued.
New Output Gap Estimates for the Euro Area and Elsewhere 43This extreme example expresses a terminological conundrum.
A more general concern is that the standard definitions of cyclical and
structural components in government budgets ignore the effects of
changes in fiscal policy on the GDP and via that to the measured OGs
that are used to define and measure the cyclical components. The loop
from fiscal policy to the GDP and further to the OG is missing, even
though the existence of this loop is a core part of conventional
economics.
2.3.  Ex post revisions of the OG estimates obscuring policy
Additionally, we should recognise that the structural balance is not
a reliable indicator of discrete policy actions because they are regularly
changed afterwards as new data come in, leading to revision of the
cyclical and structural components in government balances. Logically,
a measure of a discrete policy action at any given time should not
depend, even in retrospect, on what happened in the economy after-
wards. The structural balance (or its change) does not fulfil this logic. 
Anyway, as the structural balances are used in policy and as their
revisions are directly derived from the revisions of the OG estimates, we
next look at them.
Figure 2 presents the OG estimates for the EA11 for each year (t) in
real time and ex post, the latter being the retrospective estimate from
the data in autumn 2017. It shows that the revisions of all the OG esti-
mates over the period 2002-2017 were indeed significant and roughly
of the same magnitude (though on average greatest for the OECD).
The largest revisions concern the years 2006-2008 in all of them.7 
Our new HP estimates have the advantage that, by their construc-
tion, the main factors behind the revisions can be relatively easily
tracked to the deviation of what happened to GDP growth since 2006
compared to the underlying growth rate assumed in 2006-07 when
the real-time nHP estimates were calculated. The assumption on future
growth in estimating our new HP trend for the EA11 was 1.5% until
2009. As the average 10-year growth fell to 0.6% by 2017, a significant
retroactive revision of the OG estimates followed.
7. As we are focussing on the OG estimates for the current and next year, we should remember
that the revisions come partly from replacing the forecasts for the GDP by their outcomes. However,
the revisions in the OG estimates mainly stem from their intrinsic nature as measures of the cyclical
phase. This is not a matter of updating the GDP data for each year, but results from what happened
in the economy several years afterwards.
Heikki Oksanen44Tracking the sources of revisions of the PF-based OG estimates of
the three institutions would require going into the details of their esti-
mation methods and parameters, including changes in them during
the period investigated (as the estimates have been modified to
improve their accuracy). As in almost all the previous literature, this
major task is beyond the scope of the present paper.8
3. Did policies cause the further fall in EA11 GDP in 2012-13 
and hence the revisions to the OG estimates? 
As noted, the OGs for any given year, no matter how they are esti-
mated, will always be revised retroactively. This happens irrespective of
Figure 2. Output gap estimates for the EA11 in real time for the current year (t) and 
corresponding estimates in autumn 2017; new HP estimates and by institutions 
(European Commission, IMF and OECD)
Legend: nHP OG = new HP output gap estimate; a = autumn forecast, s = spring forecast. EC (=European Commis-
sion), IMF and OECD refer to their OG estimates, respectively.
8. Turner et al. (2014) study the various sources of the changes in the OECD estimates for potential
output. Revisions of the OG estimates for the US and the four largest euro area countries are shown in
Oksanen (2018, 39-41).
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New Output Gap Estimates for the Euro Area and Elsewhere 45the causes of the new developments, but most importantly, the new
developments include also the policies pursued and their effects, which
can be significant and should in any case be of special interest for
assessing those policies.
The recent Great Crunch and subsequent years is a most important
episode for a study of fiscal indicators, notably the OGs. The key ques-
tion is as to what extent the fall in EA11 GDP in 2012-13, which then
came to be the major reason for the retroactive revisions of the OGs,
was caused by fiscal policy itself. 
3.1.  Fiscal policy in the euro area after the Great Crunch
The crisis in 2009 was first followed by counter-cyclical fiscal policy
as a combination of automatic stabilisers and discrete actions, but from
2011 onwards policy was strongly tightened (as confirmed by several
sets of data, including those on discretionary fiscal measures published
by the EC and Carnot and de Castro, 2015a and b, presented and
reproduced in Oksanen, 2018, 43). A number of leading economists
writing in Baldwin et al. (2015, 10-11) observe that “[T]he Eurozone as
a whole saw its 2010 primary [balance] move from about minus €350
billion in 2010 to €10 billion in 2014. This was a massive contractionary
shock—equal to 4 percentage points of the monetary union’s economy.”
They consider that this triggered the fall in euro area GDP in 2012-13.
Despite this, aggregate government deficits in the EA11 were cut over
this period, while the US was growing at a rate of more than two
percent in 2010-15, which was helped by running twice as large fiscal
deficits as in the EA11 over 2011-14 (and in fact already in 2008-10).
The wide consensus that tight fiscal policy in the euro area in 2011-
13 was harmful was later adopted also by the European Commission
(2016, 2), although it added that this was at least partly inevitable as
“many Member States engaged in fiscal consolidation to preserve their
access to the markets at the height of the sovereign debt crisis”. This latter
view is not the full picture. Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015, 47-48) showed
that policy was strongly tightened also in countries that had access to
the markets, with Germany’s share of tightening being more than its
relative share in the euro area. In spring 2010, Germany’s government
deficit was forecast at 5.0% of GDP, and it was pressed to zero by 2012
and subsequently to a surplus.
The reasons for fiscal tightness in 2011-13 are many, but from the
angle of the OG estimates the short-term GDP forecasts are most rele-
vant. They depend on a host of factors, including fiscal multipliers, i.e.
Heikki Oksanen46the effect of fiscal policy on GDP, perceived by the forecasters. The
importance of the perceived fiscal multipliers was brought into discus-
sion at the time by the IMF in its autumn 2012 forecasts, where it
presented evidence that, early in the crisis, for the advanced econo-
mies, the multipliers were substantially underestimated. This meant
that the planned fiscal consolidation led to GDP that was lower than
expected by forecasters. This conclusion applied the most strongly to
forecasts by the IMF itself and to a slightly lesser extent to those by the
EC (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013; Mody, 2018, 371-3; Tooze, 2018,
429-30).
Later, Fatás and Summers (2018) contested the advisability of fiscal
consolidation in the circumstances after the Great Crunch of 2008-09.
According to them, consolidation was self-defeating, i.e. it did not
decrease the deficits at all in most countries but caused a prolonged
recession.9
3.2.  Role of the OGs in designing fiscal policy
We should admit that our new HP estimates would not have
revealed the strength of the boom before the Great Crash much better
than the others: our new real-time OGs for those years are slightly less
than one percentage point above zero. It is prudent to say that the
factors behind the strength of the unsustainable boom were such that
no foreseeable improvements to the OG estimation methods would
convincingly prevent the repetition of the same ignorance in future.
Our discussion above of the underlying causes of the retroactive
revisions of the OGs leads to the conclusion that the revisions do not
necessarily disprove the use of the real-time OG estimates for policy.
However, we should not underestimate the problems with the uncer-
tainty of their level and changes from one year to the next. This
uncertainty is demonstrated by the differences between the estimates
from our four different sources (our nHP-based estimates and those
from the three institutions), which feeds into the uncertainty of the
structural balance estimates. Broadly expressed, those estimates then
9. For assessing their result correctly, we should note that the observed decrease in the deficit over
the period 2011-2015 in the euro area (and elsewhere) does not disprove their conclusion. Instead, a
plausible explanation is that other factors gradually turned supportive to growth and compensated
for the negative effects of the fiscal consolidations (for a survey of estimates of the fiscal multipliers,
see also Carreras et al., 2016). 
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much larger difference in the forecasting vintages of the year 2009).
For this reason, we should conclude that whatever improvements
one could try and achieve, the accuracy of the rules set in the Vade
Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact (European Commission, 2017a)
is an illusion. Also Busse (2016, 30-31), based on his detailed analysis of
the revisions in the EC estimates for the OGs and the implied cyclically
adjusted balances, considers that the errors may lead to ill-fitting policy
advice and unwarranted sanctions. He adds, nevertheless, that the
SGP, thanks to its political flexibility, is faring quite well in dealing with
the uncertainty and revisions.
Busse’s latter conclusion looks carefully balanced, but a critical eye on
the complexity of the fiscal rules is still warranted. After all, is it appro-
priate that the rule book has become so detailed and thick, but still has
to be implemented with political discretion to make sense economically?
Political discretion always triggers disputes and deteriorates the reputa-
tion of all the actors as well as the rules themselves, as compromises
always look bad from one angle or another. The complexity also poses a
challenge to democratic decision making, as no finance minister should
even try and explain them in front of their parliaments.
4. Possible use of the new OG estimates
The critical comments on using all OG estimates for measuring the
structural balances apply also to the new OG estimates presented here.
Therefore, they are not be promoted here as substitutes for the OG esti-
mates currently produced by the institutions (and governments) and
used in fiscal policy under the current euro area rules. However, as the
new OG estimates give new useful insights into the cyclical position of
the economy, they can be useful in several other ways in policy design.
4.1.  Proposals for smoothing asymmetric shocks
Competing views on the need and possible means for smoothing
country-specific asymmetric shocks have been proposed since the very
start of planning the single currency for the EU. The US was always
used as the reference, with an eye on different mechanisms dampening
asymmetric developments across the US states (Oksanen, 2016a).
Alcidi and Thirion (2017) summarise the studies, benefitting from the
recent data covering the changes in dynamics after 2008.
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euro area mainly due to capital market integration, especially cross-
ownership of capital across the states. The other is that, in the euro
area, the smoothing effect via the government budgets is normally
larger than inter-state fiscal transfers in the US federal budget (noting,
in addition, that the state budgets in the US do not contribute to it due
to the common balanced budget requirement). However, smoothing
worked in the euro area in normal circumstance, while all smoothing
practically ceased since 2010 in the periphery (Alcidi and Thirion,
2017, 15) as the Great Crunch turned into a fiscal crisis.
Proposals for smoothing mechanisms remained subdued for the
first decade of the euro, but several initiatives have been presented
recently (European Commission, 2017b, 8, 12; Bénassy-Quéré et al.,
2018, 14-16; Andor et al., 2018). Without going into detail on each of
them, several problems are faced: tackling only large asymmetric
shocks limits their effectiveness; using unemployment as a key indi-
cator is problematic as it is a lagged indicator of exogenous shocks;
conditionality to compliance with other schemes and rules (which can
be controversial) easily leads to disputes over implementing them;
even though it is declared that they should not lead to permanent
redistribution, this is far from being assured.
This topic is relevant here, as Oksanen (2016a) proposed an alterna-
tive scheme where payments in and paybacks depend on the relative
OGs of the member states, being, for example, proportional to half of
the percentage deviation of each member state’s OG from the euro area
average. Importantly, his proposal contains a rule that after an agreed
period, say seven years, the net balances are recorded and netted out in
constant instalments over the subsequent seven-year period. This would
make sure that permanent redistribution would not emerge.
Oksanen (2016a) illustrated his proposal with historical data based
on OG estimates by the EC. He considered that improving the real-time
OG estimates would be advisable, though not indispensable for
starting the new scheme as the details could be improved afterwards.
Now, it seems that using the nHP OG estimates seems encouraging, as
for the two opposite countries, Germany and Spain, these would have
worked better than the EC estimates before the crisis (Oksanen, 2018,
43-44).
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would dampen the asymmetric shocks to an extent comparable to the
US federal budget. Being non-distributive, this would leave redistribu-
tion to policy areas that are specifically tailored for it, including by
limiting their size.
4.2.  Illustration of the OGs if growth falls significantly 
The novel feature of our new HP application is that it makes it
explicit that the prescription of the current state of the economy takes
into account the perspective of GDP growth in the long term. The
latter is not known by anybody, but it is useful to work on freely varied
assumptions and produce alternative scenarios. As an illustration,
imagine that currently, based on the forecast in autumn 2017, it is
perceived that long-term growth will soon go persistently to zero. The
relevance of this simple vision could be argued on several grounds, not
to be discussed further here. 
Assuming zero for the underlying growth in the EA11 from 2018
onwards gives the result that the nHP OG estimate for 2018 would be
+3.3%, which is considerably higher than the baseline result +1.2%
(which is based on 1.3% growth) and the OG estimate +0.3% of the
EC in autumn 2017. And it is almost exactly equal to the retroactive
estimate for 2007, the peak of the overheated boom before the Great
Crunch (shown graphically in Oksanen, 2018, 45).
The high OG for 2018 produced by this thought experiment does
not imply that fiscal policy should be immediately tightened. However,
the new dramatic result could serve as a wake-up call for thinking seri-
ously about long-term challenges and the required policy responses
(some key elements are discussed in Oksanen, 2016b, 385-387; and
Oksanen, 2018, 16-19).
5. Summary and conclusions
We have presented here new output gap (OG) estimates based on a
simple statistical method, the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, to distin-
guish the cycle from a possible change in the trend of GDP. 
We showed that the HP-based estimates have often been criticised
on inadequate grounds. Using the method carefully can distinguish the
cycle from changes in the trend in a way that compares well with the
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is simple, based only on one single-time series, GDP. As the method is
simple, the results and their limitations can be easily understood also
by non-experts.
The contribution here is to present a new application of the HP
filter, where we insert an explicit link to the view about the economy’s
underlying growth in future. This does not complicate the method
unduly, but it is useful in two ways. First, it links the analysis to the
question of what might be happening with respect to long-term
growth prospects, allowing alternative assumptions on it; this question
is encountered continually, especially when a major shock hits the
economy. Second, it is obvious under all OG estimation methods that
the phase of the cycle always depends not only on the current situation
(supplemented by the short-term forecast) and the past, but also on
changes further on in the future. Our new method makes this explicit.
This helps us to understand that the results are always based on
assumptions on unknowns and should therefore be treated with care
and caution.
The same warning is valid also for the OG estimates regularly
produced and published by the three main institutions, the European
Commission (EC), IMF and OECD. Even if they are based on extensive
data and more complicated theories of economic behaviour and
markets, this does not make them more reliable than our simple HP
estimates.
The OGs are an important input for designing policies, primarily but
not only fiscal policy. They are of pivotal importance in the rule book of
the euro area (and the EU as a whole) and underlie important proce-
dures in the joint decision making. 
The problem with the OGs produced in all the three institutions, the
EC, IMF and OECD, is that their estimation methods are liable to criti-
cism on several grounds. Some of the criticism is well-founded, like
pointing out that the real-time OGs have been negative almost without
exception. This has triggered doubt that this might have caused a bias
towards increased public debt. Not taking a definite position on this
possible causality, we consider that there is at least a terminological
problem, as in ordinary language a cycle refers to fluctuations on both
sides of a specified benchmark for which the average over a long
enough period is a natural first choice. This is what the HP filter by its
construction brings to the picture. 
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used as a criterion of their reliability, we emphasise that the revisions
do not necessarily indicate weaknesses in their construction. The recent
history before and after the Great Crunch of 2008-09 is a case in point.
The revisions of all the OG estimates, extending backwards to 2002,
were the consequence of the fall in EA11 GDP not only in 2009 but also
in 2012-13. 
The present paper remains critical towards using the OG esti-
mates—old and new—for deriving the structural balances in
government budgets and conducting fiscal and other policies based on
them. However, the OG estimates based on the forward-looking HP
filter can be useful in identifying and measuring the state of the
economy and they give new elements for designing policies and adjust-
ment schemes. 
One example is to use the new OG estimates in designing a scheme
for smoothing country-specific asymmetric shocks in the monetary
union, an old topic that has emerged again after the Great Crunch. The
reform proposals presented so far encounter several problems. They
are not effective for smoothing and, most seriously, they fuel suspicion
that they would lead to large permanent transfers, and thereby nourish
mistrust and disputes. A quasi-automatic transfer mechanism based on
relative OGs proposed here could be more efficient and help
smoothing both large and small asymmetric shocks. The proposal
contains a provision for reviewing the net transfers periodically so that
no permanent transfers would take place.
Another broad contribution of the new HP filter presented here is
that it allows for deriving new OG estimates that can reflect a wide range
of views about future long-term growth prospects. This can be helpful
for recognising the risks of permanent changes that are not incorporated
in past data and short-term forecasts. This is useful for tackling in a
constructive manner the long-term sustainability of public finances.
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widening of imbalances prior to the 2007 financial crisis, and thereafter by the
huge impact of the financial crisis, the public debt crisis in Southern European
countries, and the Great Recession. Prior to and after the crisis, EU institutions
and Member States (MS) have not been able to implement either a common
economic strategy or satisfactory economic policy coordination.
This led neither to a bursting of the euro area, nor to a substantial change in
its functioning. Euro area institutions were adapted, through the European
Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal Treaty, the “first semester”, the European Central
Bank’s support to MS, and the banking union. These adaptations were painful.
In mid-2018, the economic situation had clearly improved at the euro area
level. However, the following question remains unsolved: can the functioning of
the euro area be improved, accounting for divergent situations, interests and
views in MS? 
The paper recalls proposals from EU institutions and from MS. We present
and discuss a number of proposals made by economists to improve the euro
area policy framework: relying on financial markets to control domestic
economic policies, introducing a euro area budget and a minister of finance,
moving towards a federal EU with increased democracy, and last, improving
economic policy coordination.
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Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak56For almost 20 years, euro area countries have been sharing a single
currency. The drawbacks of the euro area framework were highlighted
by the widening of imbalances prior to the 2008 financial crisis, and
thereafter by the huge impact of the financial crisis, the sovereign debt
crisis in Southern European countries, and the Great Recession. Prior to
and after the crisis, EU institutions and Member States (MS) were
not able to implement either a common economic strategy or satisfac-
tory economic policy coordination (see, for instance, Mathieu and
Sterdyniak, 2014).
This led neither to a break-up of the euro area, nor to a substantial
change in its functioning. Euro area institutions were adapted, through
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Fiscal Compact (TCSG),
the “European semester”, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) support
to MS, and the banking union. These adaptations were painful:
Southern MS public debt remained under the threat of speculation for
a long time period; economic recovery was delayed by the fiscal
austerity recommended or requested by EU authorities; and several MS
were placed under surveillance. Greece is still in a difficult situation.
This is also the case to a lesser extent for Italy. 
In 2018, the economic situation had clearly improved at the euro area
level: euro area GDP grew by 2.7% in the last quarter of 2017 on a year-
on-year basis, but GDP grew on average by a mere 0.6% per year from
2007 to 2017 (against 2.3% per year in the previous decade). The unem-
ployment rate hit 7.8% in December 2018 (against 7.3% in early 2008,
but 12.2% in early 2013). The scars of the crisis remain: unemployment
rates are still elevated, especially in Greece (+11 percentage points as
compared to 2007), Spain (+6 percentage points), and Italy
(+4.5 percentage points); public debts have risen sharply; income
inequalities and precariousness have risen in many countries; and many
countries (France and the Southern countries) are suffering from de-
industrialisation. 
Can the functioning of the euro area be improved, accounting for
divergent situations, interests and views among MS? Section 1 recalls
proposals from EU institutions and from MS. Section 2 presents and
discusses several proposals made by economists to improve the euro
area policy framework. Some economists rely on financial markets to
control domestic economic policies, some are in favour of the introduc-
tion of both a euro zone budget and a minister of finance, some are in
Euro area macroeconomics 57favour of moving towards a federal EU with increased democracy, and
last, some advocate better economic policy coordination. 
1. Projects from EU institutions and from Member States 
EU Treaties and reforms implemented since the crisis have led to a
complicated and unsatisfactory euro area architecture. Euro area
economic policy is run by the ECB, a federal institution, by the Euro-
pean Commission (which deals with the whole EU), by the Euro zone
Council and the Eurogroup (two informal intergovernmental bodies),
by the European Council and the Council of the European Union (two
intergovernmental bodies involving non-euro area countries), by the
European Parliament (democratically elected, but at the EU level, and
with limited powers), by the Fiscal Pact and the ESM (which result from
inter-governmental treaties) and, when needed to help and supervise
MS in difficulty, by the quartet of the European Commission, the ECB,
the IMF and the ESM. The main decisions are made through agree-
ments between the European Commission and MS, without any real
democratic debate.
This framework, the financial crisis and the Great Recession,
followed by the debt crisis in Southern economies, have initiated
numerous project reforms of the EMU, by EU institutions, MS, policy
makers and academics. Projects emanating from EU institutions gener-
ally tend to increase their powers. They face reluctance from MS, who
wish to keep their powers and autonomies: Northern MS reject any
increases in EU transfers; smaller countries wish to keep their specificity,
and refuse the hegemony of larger MS. EU institutions generally tend
to place MS under surveillance as concerns macroeconomic manage-
ment or structural reforms, which comes into contradiction with
domestic democratic sovereignty, as can be seen from the Greek crisis
or Brexit. Besides, EU institutions do neither want to question the
Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact, nor the absence of
explicit coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. 
1.1. Towards a deep and genuine economic and monetary union?
Several texts by EU institutions (EC, 2012, Van Rompuy et al., 2012,
Juncker et al., 2015) suggest substantial steps towards more federalism:
— “All major economic and fiscal policy choices by a MS should be
subject to deeper coordination, endorsement and surveillance
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak58process at the EU level”. The possibility of different economic or
social strategies is not accounted for.
— The need for strengthened fiscal discipline is reasserted, together
with the need for ex ante fiscal policy coordination. But, with the
Fiscal Compact requesting fiscal policies to be run in automatic
mode, how coordination could be implemented is unclear.
— The Commission wishes to be entitled to oblige an MS to revise
its budget plans or to modify its budget implementation and to
be entitled to halt EU payments to MS that do not take the
corrective action requested by the Commission. 
— Short-term government borrowing could be mutualised under
the auspices of a European Treasury. But as MS have no problem
to borrow in the short-term, they cannot agree to lose this
freedom.
— The “euro area should have a fiscal capacity to absorb asym-
metric shocks”. Specific discretionary policies should be raised at
the EU level. This is an awkward suggestion, once MS have been
deprived of their ability to implement discretionary fiscal poli-
cies. But MS cannot accept to lose entirely their fiscal autonomy.
— “An insurance mechanism aiming to absorb specific shocks
could be settled within euro area MS, based on output gaps or
unemployment insurance schemes. However, transfers should
be temporary, each MS would be alternatively beneficiaries or
contributors from time to time. This mechanism should neither
introduce moral hazard, nor reduce incentives to implement
structural reforms”. 
— The macroeconomic imbalance procedure should become more
binding and would recommend structural reforms and also
tackle the case of MS with excessive surpluses. 
— A new convergence and competitiveness instrument (CCI)
should be introduced in the EMU. MS would sign an agreement
with the EU, committing to implement structural reforms, which
would allow them to benefit from a financial reward or from
indulgence for their fiscal deficits.
— “[MS] need flexible economies, yet relative price adjustment will
never occur as quickly as exchange rate adjustments. Financial
markets prevent MS to use the fiscal tool. So, euro area countries
need to pool private risks via the banking and financial union. In
the medium term, when economic structures have converged,
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could be established.” Thus the European Commission recog-
nises that the euro area framework will remain unstable for a
while; many conditions need to be met before setting up a satis-
factory stabilisation mechanism. Business cycle convergence
would be achieved through financial diversification. Should a
country suffer from economic imbalances, this would not be a
problem, since economic agents would hold financial assets
from other MS. However, empirically the economic impact of
this channel is very weak (Clévenot and Duwicquet, 2011). 
— The banking union should be achieved (since the de-nationalisa-
tion of banking systems would lower the risks of financial fragility
and instability). No financial transaction tax (FTT) or separation
between deposit banks and markets and business banks is
suggested.
— The achievement of the capital markets union would be the
priority, as it would facilitate risk diversification and giving SMEs
access to finance (but it is the role of banks to finance SMEs). EU
institutions recognise that eliminating national barriers could
create new financial risks. Therefore, they advocate a single
supervisor for European capital markets.
— The EU should have a single seat at the IMF (although this
request may look surprising, after Greece, Ireland and Portugal
were requested to ask for IMF support during the crisis, which
showed a lack of solidarity and homogeneity in the area).
The proposals to issue Eurobonds guaranteed by all MS as well as
the ECB’s guarantee for public debt were not kept, due to the German
veto of unlimited and unconditional commitments. But it seems diffi-
cult to strengthen the euro area without such commitments. 
On 26 September 2016, the EU Council agreed on the implementa-
tion of National Productivity Boards responsible for the diagnosis and
analysis of productivity and competitiveness developments, which is
problematic in the light of current national institutions of negotiation
and bargaining between social partners. It remains unclear if each
national council will be expected to make recommendations to
improve domestic competitiveness or if, in the case of Germany for
instance, the German council will be expected to recommend substan-
tial wage increases in Germany to reduce intra-area imbalances.
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Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union. The paper points out
the disagreements between MS in favour of more solidarity and those
claiming more responsibility of each MS; the text recognises the persis-
tence of economic and social divergences, and growth weakness in
some MS, but does not draw any conclusions in terms of global
economic strategy. The text recognises that the euro area architecture
and governance have become complex and difficult to manage. The
reform proposals address mainly three axes: 
— The Commission wishes to complete the banking union by
setting a common fiscal mechanism to support the Single Reso-
lution Fund and the European Insurance Deposits Scheme.
However, some MS refuse any additional solidarity, especially if
unlimited; other MS wish to keep the capacity for rescuing
domestic banks; it would be costly to set up a sufficiently large
fund able to intervene in any event, without “using public
money”. These issues arise only because euro area countries lost
their monetary sovereignty; because there is no clear separation
between deposit and credit banks and market banks; and
because some MS (Greece, Italy, Spain) still suffer from the crisis,
or are condemned to low growth, which weakens their banks. 
— The Commission is proposing the capital markets union, with
the view that firms will have access to more innovative and diver-
sified funding, but the 2007 crisis has shown the risks entailed by
financial innovations and diversification. 
— The Commission suggests lowering the share of public debt hold
by domestic banks, and to consider this debt as risky, which
should have a counterpart in banks’ capital requirement. EU
banks would thus have the incentive to reduce and diversify their
public debt portfolios. Thus, in theory, a government could
restructure public debt without putting domestic banks in
trouble.2 Simultaneously, one or several, synthetic assets would
be introduced, supposed to be safe and relying on government
bonds securitized portfolios. These assets would be owned by
banks or EU financial institutions. Financial engineering would be
relied upon to build and assess such safe portfolios, with senior
2. However, this measure would not have prevented the crisis. In Spain and Ireland, domestic banks held
very little amounts of public debt before the crisis. They have diversified too much away from government
debt to more profitable lending to households (thanks to John FitzGerald for pointing this out).
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Dutch bonds, and few Italian, Portuguese or Spanish bonds. The
report admits that the two former measures would however lead
banks to reduce the share of government bonds in their balance
sheet, which could “disrupt not only the functioning of their
home financial systems. It would potentially also impact on
financial stability for the euro area as a whole”. Obviously, inte-
rest rate spreads would rise strongly in the euro area if Italian or
Spanish banks were buying huge amounts of Northern coun-
tries’ bonds. 
These proposals would contribute to fragmenting the euro area
between countries considered as safe or unsafe. It would undermine
government borrowing, which would be deprived of a guaranteed
funding by its domestic banks and financial institutions. This fragility
would enhance speculation. Fiscal discipline would rely on financial
markets’ surveillance and on financial engineering, although the 2007
crisis showed the limits of this approach. How would one assess the
probability of events such as a sovereign default by France, Spain or
Italy, which depend not only on the domestic situation but also on the
ECB’s and other MS responses? The Commission seems to try to break
the link between national Treasuries and domestic financial intermedi-
aries, so as to restrict their ability to issue bonds. 
— The text advocates MS convergence, but often confuses conver-
gence, coordination and compliance with arbitrary rules. The
Commission wishes to set “…a strong link between related
reforms, the use of EU funds and access to a potential macroeco-
nomic stabilisation function”. The CCI is again envisaged as
“a dedicated fund to provide incentives to Member States to
carry out reforms”. 
— The text envisages a macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism
for the euro area, under such conditions that it would play a very
limited role: “The function should not lead to permanent trans-
fers, minimise moral hazard, and not duplicate the role of the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as crisis management tool.
Access to the stabilisation function should be strictly conditional
on clear criteria and continuous sound policies, in particular
those leading to more convergence within the euro area.
Compliance with EU fiscal rules and the broader economic
surveillance framework should be part of this”. 
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cratic. However, the text does not suggest the introduction of
euro area specific institutions, but rather hopes that all MS will
join the euro area. The Eurogroup could become an instance of
the Council, with a full-time president. The ESM could become a
European Monetary Fund (EMF), incorporated in the legislative
framework of the Treaties. A euro area Treasury could be in
charge of fiscal and economic surveillance in the euro area, of
managing the macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism, and of
coordinating the issuance of safe European assets. Fiscal rules
could be simplified. 
1.2. A strengthened project?
Recently, the European project was strengthened by four elements.
Since 2015, some economic recovery had been underway in the euro
area. Greece refused to leave the euro area. The UK did not succeed to
define a clear and dynamic Brexit strategy, which discredits the alterna-
tive of leaving the EU. The EU showed unity in both the Greek crisis and
Brexit. In both cases, strong positions won.
Last, the EU strategy has been strengthened by Emmanuel Macron’s
victory in the French Presidential election in 2017. Macron’s projects
for a European overhaul, in particular in his Sorbonne speech
(26 September 2017) attracted a lot of interest in Europe: “The time
when France proposes is back”. 
According to Emmanuel Macron, France, viewed as the “bad pupil”
of the euro area class, should commit to a strict fulfilment of its Euro-
pean commitments, cut its public deficit and implement structural
reforms, to show the euro area that France is a reliable partner.
However, France cannot be blamed for having run policies with
harmful effects for euro area partners: France did not run an excessive
external surplus; domestic competitiveness neither improved nor dete-
riorated strongly; and the French public debt was not subject to
speculative attacks.
In a second stage, renewed trust between France and Germany will
allow them to lead a “group for European overhaul”, i.e. a group of
euro area countries agreeing to move towards a rapid convergence in
fiscal, taxation and social areas.
Emmanuel Macron proposed, in his electoral programme in 2017:
“to create a budget for the euro area with three functions (investments
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Access to this budget will be conditioned on fulfilling common rules in
tax and social areas (to avoid dumping in the euro area). A Minister of
Economy and Finance of the euro area will be responsible for the euro
area budget, under the control of a Parliament of the euro area,
bringing together European parliamentarians of the Member States”.
This budget would be funded by digital and environmental taxation, a
financial transactions tax and a fraction of the corporate income tax
(CIT). It seems unlikely that France may obtain the implementation of a
substantial euro area budget, with an explicit stabilization target, after
having agreed to pass under the “Caudine Forks” of EU constraints. The
risk is that MS should abandon as a counterpart any independent fiscal
policies. The euro area Minister, responsible for stabilization, would
have a right of control on national budgets and could ask for budget
corrections if he considers them not to comply with the treaties. But EU
institutions have always denied the need for and the effectiveness of
fiscal stabilization policies and claimed instead that MS reach full
employment by fiscal consolidation policies and structural reforms. Will
this Minister be able to impose expansionary fiscal policies in countries
running excessive current surpluses? Emmanuel Macron did not clearly
question the fiscal rules of the Maastricht Treaty and of the TSCG.
However, he asked Germany to abandon its “fiscal fetishism”.
Establishing a Parliament of the euro area is supposed to democra-
tize the area, but it would not be possible to complicate the EU
framework by introducing euro area specific institutions.
At the same time, Emmanuel Macron still supports the traditional
French proposals. The European Pillar of social rights should define
minimum levels for health coverage, unemployment insurance and a
minimum wage (taking into account the unequal development of MS).
A common base and harmonisation of CIT rates should be settled to
combat tax optimization, but this proposal will face opposition from
several MS (Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium). 
The euro area would be split into two, between countries accepting
the renovation project, in particular tax and social convergence, and
those refusing it, which is difficult to imagine, since Europe would then
have three circles, even four if Brexit leads to create around the EU a
circle of countries linked by a customs union. Moreover there is
currently no agreement among EU people (not even among core coun-
tries) to move towards more integration. In the current situation, few
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their social systems should be decided by a federal body.
Emmanuel Macron has two contradictory positions. On the one
hand he wants to drastically transform the French economy and move
it towards a more liberal functioning. On the other hand, he asks the
other MS to get closer to France, in setting floors for tax rates, social
protection, and minimum wages, and in settling protectionist meas-
ures and industrial policies. 
The Meseberg declaration, signed by Angela Merkel and Emmanuel
Macron on 19 June 2018, is a compromise text. Germany supported
the French proposal to set up a euro area budget to promote “compet-
itiveness, convergence and stability”. However, the size of this budget
is not specified. Expenditure should come in substitution to national
expenditure; public debt reduction remains a priority. It is not said that
this budget could be run in deficit. The stabilisation function would not
mean permanent transfers. Strategic decisions on this budget would
be made by euro area MS, but expenditure would be managed by the
Commission. 
Eight MS (the Netherlands, Finland, Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Denmark and Sweden), dubbed the New Hanseatic League,
criticized the euro area budget proposal;3 they refuse any increase in
EU expenditure and transfers, and any EU-level taxation, as well as far-
reaching transfers of competence to the European level. For these
countries, the priority is to meet the requirements of existing fiscal rules
and to implement structural reforms at country level. They propose to
complete the single market and the banking union, to develop the
capital markets union (to foster cross-border private risk-sharing).
A framework for sovereign debt restructuring should be explored. The
EU budget should account for budget constraints and provide incen-
tives for structural reforms.
Hence, sharp contradictions remain among MS on many issues.
Some stress the need for macroeconomic coordination, social and tax
harmonisation and solidarity between MS. Others stress the need to
fulfil the current fiscal rules and to accept financial markets’ discipline. A
euro area ministry is considered either as a way to impose fiscal disci-
pline and structural reforms, or as a way to centralise fiscal policies, or
as a coordination instrument for autonomous economic policies.
3. Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Malta express similar considerations.
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together all EU27 leaders. The principle of strengthening the banking
union was enacted, but in order to meet the German request, the risks
of current national banking systems will have to be reduced before
they are shared. The ESM should establish a credit line, as a safety net
to the Single Resolution Fund, of the same size as the Fund itself. Any
contribution from the ESM to banks should be reimbursed by the
banking sector in three (or possibly five) years. Its introduction, after
2020, will depend on the evolution of risks in national banking sectors.
Political negotiations on the European deposit guarantee scheme could
begin, but its implementation will also depend on risk reduction. The
plan to limit government bonds in banks’ assets and to encourage
banks to hold a securitized asset was not mentioned. Ambitious steps
should be made by mid-2019 for the capital markets union. 
The name and the statute of the ESM will not change. The ESM will
be able to open a credit line to MS in trouble, provided they have run
sound fiscal policies and are not under a macroeconomic imbalance
procedure. The ESM Treaty will oblige introducing a collective action
clause (CAC) in government bonds. Finally, the ESM is supposed to
facilitate dialogue between a MS in trouble and its private creditors,
without a strict obligation of debt restructuring. The ESM and the
Commission will collaborate in assessing the situation and in negoti-
ating measures requested from a MS requesting ESM assistance. The
euro area budget will be a part of the EU budget; its size is not speci-
fied. It will be limited to the competitiveness and convergence
instrument. No agreement was reached on public investment or
macroeconomic stabilization schemes (particularly as concerns unem-
ployment insurance). In short, much ado about nothing. 
One challenge for any major reform (such as implementing transfer
mechanisms between countries in counterpart for increasing EU insti-
tutions’ control of domestic fiscal policies) is that it would require a
change in the Treaties, MS unanimity, and in several countries a
referendum, with no guarantee as to the results, as EU construction is
not currently popular.
2. The debate among economists
Economists have diverging views on European issues. Should MS
live with high public debts or should they try to reduce them? Should
the objective be to place MS under surveillance and to compel them to
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inducing negative externalities, or to facilitate economic policy coordi-
nation? Economists have diverging views on the reliability of national
governments, EU institutions and financial markets, but also on the
political project: should the EU move towards a federal union or remain
a Nation-States union?
2.1. Financial markets supervision? 
Public debts in advanced economies have risen sharply during and
since the 2008 financial crisis. The rise was smaller for the euro area as a
whole than for other economies (the US, the UK, Japan, Table 1). The
rise in public debts was due to developments in finance capitalism and
to the deepness of the crisis, and not to over-expansionary fiscal poli-
cies run before and since the beginning of the crisis (Greece being the
only exception). Public deficits and low interest rates offset insufficient
private demand, which was weakened by the decrease in the wage
share in value added, by the fall (in relative value) of needed invest-
ments, and by a rise in income inequalities. In view of low interest rates
and inflation, current public debt levels are not generating higher
interest rates or any crowding-out effect for private investment. It
would be detrimental for output growth to cut public debts as long as
the reasons why debts rose remain and as long as public debt cuts
cannot be offset by significantly lower interest rates. The euro area
already runs a large current account surplus and cannot expect to be
able to offset a fall in domestic demand by a higher external surplus,
without destabilising the world economy. 
Many economists and policy makers (especially in Germany) rely on
financial markets to ensure fiscal discipline in Europe. The high public
debt levels and the memory of the Greek partial default make it more
likely for public finances to remain under financial market supervision
in the coming years. But this surveillance is unsatisfactory: financial
markets have no macroeconomic perspective; their views are self-
fulfilling, and they are aware of it; they do not try to account for all
information available, but only for elements which are “in the mood of
time”; and they are schizophrenic, requesting simultaneously
economic growth strategies and fiscal consolidation. They have their
own judgement on appropriate economic policies, with a liberal bias.
There is no evidence that financial markets are able to judge public
debt sustainability and the relevance of public deficits. Financial market
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sionary policy for some time, but markets will react only when they
estimate that the debt level is excessive, i.e. too late. Macroeconomic
regulation cannot be restricted to fiscal discipline: markets cannot
oblige countries running too restrictive policies to borrow. Markets
were blind in the case of Greece before 2007, and have been too strict
for Italy and Spain since 2011. 
Letting markets freely set public debt interest rates, according to
their default fears, would maintain arbitrary interest rate spreads in the
EU. It would restrain fiscal policy (a country could be prevented from
running the needed policy, in order to reassure markets), and it would
reduce monetary policy efficiency. On the one hand, the EU would
claim that the Greek case was an exception, and that from now on no
euro area country will default. On the other hand, the EU would rely on
markets to assess how serious MS commitments are. Interest rate
spreads would be arbitrary, costly (should Italy pay each year 1.2% of
its GDP to financial markets to offset an alleged default risk?) and may
Table. Public debts and deficits
% of GDP
Public debt, 
Maastricht criteria Public balance
 2007 2017(and max.) 2007
Highest  deficit 
2007-17 2017
Germany 64 65 (81) 0.2 -4.2 0.9
France 64 97 -2.5 -7.2 -2.6
Italy 100 132 -1.5 -5.3 -2.1
Spain 36 98 (100) 1.9 -10.5 -3.1
The Netherlands 42 58 (68) 0.2 -5.4  0.7
Belgium 87 104 (108) 0.1 -5.4  -1.5
Austria 65 79 (84) -1.4 -5.3 -1.0
Greece 103 180 -6.7 -15.1 -1.2
Portugal 68 126 (131) -3.0 -11.2 -1.4
Finland 34 63 5.1 -3.2  -1.4
Ireland 24 70 (120) 0.3 -32.1 -0.4
Euro area 65 89 (94) -0.6 -6.3  -1.1
UK 44 87 -2.6 -10.1  -2.1
USA 64 108 -3.5 -12.7 -5.0
Japan 183 240 -2.8 -9.8 -4.3
Source: Ameco.
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak68become self-fulfilling. Conversely, the financial markets’ weight is
considered today by leading classes, Northern countries, and the EU
technocracy as a guarantee against deviating policies, and hence they
refuse to reduce the financial markets’ power.
A country that is keeping monetary sovereignty, and issuing bonds
in its own currency, is of course subject to the financial markets’ judge-
ment, but the effect is different. Markets do not fear government
default, and hence do not anticipate a crisis, but may anticipate a
currency depreciation, which is a normal phenomenon. This will not
inevitably raise interest rates (which would lower growth) but may
induce exchange rate depreciation (which may be expansionary). 
Numerous proposals aim to strengthen financial markets’ surveil-
lance. German economists and policy makers demand that principles of
no-solidarity between MS and no-guarantee by the ECB be re-asserted,
that the possibility for a country to default (and even to exit the euro
area) be explicitly written in EU Treaties, and that a MS supported by
the ESM be automatically obliged to restructure its public debt; so,
strong signals would be sent to financial markets to be more vigilant.
In May 2018, 154 German economists (including Hans-Werner Sinn
and Jürgen Stark) refused a “Europe of liabilities” or a “Europe of trans-
fers”.4 Under the principle of the responsibility of each country, they
refuse an EMF, which would help countries that did not undertake the
necessary reforms; and they refuse a Single Resolution Fund for bank
failures and a European Deposits Insurance Fund, which would relieve
bankers and national supervisory bodies of their responsibilities. They
propose to promote structural reforms, to consider the possibility that
a country leaves the euro area, to declare that public debts are risky.
The ECB should end its programme of buying government securities;
voting rights of the largest MS in ECB bodies should be increased; and
Target2 balances should be regulated. Asymmetric shocks would be
offset by portfolio diversification allowed by the capital markets union. 
Delpla and von Weisäcker (2010) and De Grauwe (2012) had
suggested that public debts be split into two categories: a “blue” debt,
collectively issued and guaranteed, with a ceiling of 60% of GDP for
each MS, and a “red” debt. Each MS would also be allowed to issue a
red debt under its own responsibility. Such a red debt would bear a
high interest rate, which would be a strong disincentive to issue public
4. In an open letter published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
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since 2007 by almost all euro area countries, for legitimate reasons.
According to us, one should not offer speculators new possibilities to
bet against different kinds of public debt. 
Fourteen German and French economists (Bénassy-Quéré et al.,
2018) published a text on 17 January 2018: “Reconciling risk sharing
with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform”
which recognizes “the persistent financial fragilities” of the euro area,
but in fact proposes to accentuate their causes by weakening even
more the States and by increasing financial markets’ influence. In order
to account for an especially widespread view among German econo-
mists and policy makers, the fourteen economists accept the
strengthening of a so-called “market discipline”, as if markets were not
the ones to be disciplined. These economists make six proposals, which
are in line with the Commission’s views: 
1) Penalise banks having too much debt of their origin country in their assets.
2) Provide a device for an orderly restructuring of public debt. 
Like the Commission, the fourteen economists propose claiming
that euro area MS public debts are risky, that they may be restructured,
and that banks holding these bonds take risks that should be assessed
according to the MS considered. Such a declaration would have three
consequences: public debts would effectively be more fragile, MS
would not be sure to issue safe bonds anymore, and speculation on
public debts would be encouraged. The authors propose bank deposits
to be guaranteed at the EU level, but the insurance premium paid by
banks on these deposits would vary depending on the “specific risks of
the country”.
3) Replace the current fiscal rules by a new simple one (see below).
4) Set up a Fund to help Euro area MS to absorb the most serious
economic crises. 
Countries could benefit from this Fund only if they followed a fiscal
rule defined as in point 3) and the European semester recommenda-
tions. To avoid permanent transfers, this Fund would receive national
contributions, which would rise with previous help received from the
Fund. Thus, countries having previously experienced difficulties would
finance countries currently in difficulty. A country having requested
support from the Fund would pay higher contributions for a long time
period, and so it would hardly be supported. 
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national public debt (see above). 
6) Reform the institutional architecture of the euro area. 
The paper makes no recommendations on how to improve the
coordination of euro area economic policies, to reduce imbalances
between MS, to launch a large investment programme required by the
ecological transition, to reduce the instability induced by financialisa-
tion, or to refocus the banking and finance sectors’ activity towards
lending to public and productive investment rather than speculating
on public debt. 
The 14 economists’ proposals were criticized by Messori and
Micossi (2018), two Italian economists, with arguments close to ours:
“their proposals heighten the risk of financial instability and weaken
euro area defences against financial shocks”.
2.2. Public debt centralisation? 
A simple solution would be to introduce a European Debt Agency
(EDA), which would issue a common debt for all euro area countries.
This debt would be guaranteed by all MS and would be considered as
safe by financial markets; its market would be broad and liquid, hence
it could be issued at very low interest rates. The proposal of an EDA
may be seen from two different perspectives: either as a way to impose
EU fiscal rules on MS or as a way to ensure MS autonomy in fully
protecting them from financial markets. In the first perspective, the
EDA would supervise domestic fiscal policies and would be entitled to
deny financing to over-lax countries, leading the latter to have to sell
domestic bonds on markets, at higher interest rates. The EDA would
raise the same problems as the SGP, even more strongly. What would
be its democratic and economic legitimacy? What would be its assess-
ment criteria? How would the EDA decide that a country runs an
excessive deficit, if the country considers that such a deficit is necessary
to support domestic output or to rescue domestic banks? Would it
implement rigid automatic rules (a country would be entitled to loans
from the EDA of up to 60% of its GDP) or softer ones (a country would
be entitled to loans from the EDA, except in exceptional circum-
stances)? The EDA would benefit neither virtuous countries (the latter
have no difficulty to borrow) nor countries in difficulty, which the EDA
would refuse to lend to. The EDA makes sense only, in the second
perspective, if it accepts to finance all public debts. Northern countries
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more incentives to cut their public debts.
Schulmeister (2013) suggested the introduction of a European
Monetary Fund (EMF), which would finance MS though issuing euro-
bonds guaranteed by the MS and the ECB. The EMF would maintain
long-term interest rates below GDP growth. Individual MS financing
would not be subject to a numerical constraint, but would be agreed
within the EMF by MS Finance ministers. This proposal hands over to
finance ministers the responsibility of agreeing on public deficit targets
for each country, which is problematic (what should be done in case of
divergent macroeconomic strategies?), and undemocratic (each
finance minister would impose in its national Parliament the fulfilment
of the target set at the European level).
The German Council of Economic Experts (Doluca et al., 2012) had
suggested the introduction of a European Redemption Pact, i.e. a fund
to guarantee the repayment of the share of public debts above 60% of
GDP. Countries with debt exceeding 60% of GDP would place the
share of their debt over 60% of GDP in a Redemption Fund (RF) and, in
counterpart, would transfer irremediably tax revenues allowing for
debt repayment over 25 years. Countries would transfer guarantees to
the fund, such as a fraction of their gold reserves. Moreover, they
would commit to implement structural reform programmes and would
fulfil the Fiscal Pact in bringing rapidly their structural deficit down to
0.5% of GDP. With these guarantees, the fund could borrow at interest
rates without risk premium. The debt-to-GDP ratio would thus fall
rapidly. But the proposal does not address the impacts of these restric-
tive policies on output, making the implicit assumption that the fiscal
multiplier is nil (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2014). Similarly, the proposal
does not consider the possibility that euro area economies might go
through slowdown episodes in the next 25 years, which may require
softening the restrictive stance of fiscal policies. The proposal resides on
a postulate: optimal fiscal policy consists in stabilising the structural
deficit at 0.5% of GDP (and hence government debt at 14.3% of GDP
under a nominal GDP growth at 3.5%) and refusing any discretionary
fiscal policy. 
The ESM was introduced through an inter-governmental agreement.
It could be enshrined in the EU Treaties and transformed into an EMF
(European Monetary Fund). According to some authors, the EMF would
control (and impose) that fiscal policies fulfil the SGP and the Fiscal Pact.
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accounting for the economic situation, without any political interven-
tion from MS. MS would entirely lose their fiscal autonomy. In the same
vein, other authors propose introducing a Euro Area Finance and
Economy Minister, a Commission’s vice-president, who would chair the
euro group. The minister would manage a euro area Treasury, to finance
euro area common public spending, macroeconomic stabilisation
spending and transfers within MS. This raises a question of democracy:
how would this minister be appointed: through a democratic political
choice or on the basis of the current technocratic consensus? For some
authors, this ministry should facilitate the coordination of MS economic
policies. For some others, the euro area minister should have the
capacity to oblige countries to modify their budget plans if they are not
in conformity with EU rules. Last, for some other authors, the euro area
ministry would define the policy needed at the euro area level, and then
policies needed at each country level, with no fiscal autonomy for MS,
which is not acceptable from a democratic point of view and is not real-
istic if MS economic situations differ.
Bofinger (2018) wrote: “The monetary union is an unfinished
building with a supranational monetary policy and 19 independent
national fiscal policies. Thus, the only way to make it stable is to go
ahead with political integration. With the transfer of fiscal policy
responsibilities to the supranational level, fiscal discipline of the
member states would be enforced by a democratically legitimised euro
area finance minister and not by myopic financial investors”. But
Bofinger does not explain the principles under which the Minister
would set MS fiscal policy and what would be his democratic legiti-
macy to intervene to impose this fiscal policy on MS. 
3. Changing the fiscal rules? 
The SGP and TSCG fiscal rules are arbitrary. They can oblige coun-
tries with insufficient demand to run restrictive fiscal policies, although
the latter cannot be offset by lower interest rates. Fiscal policy should
target employment (keeping it at or bringing it back to a satisfactory
level), while allowing inflation and interest rates to remain at satisfac-
tory levels. According to the functional theory of public finance, public
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Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2012), and not from arbitrary rules. 
Box.  Functional theory of public finances
A certain level of government debt and deficit may be necessary to
ensure a satisfactory demand level. If one writes: 
y = a + d + cy - σ (r - g) + k (h - l)    p
.
 = πy    h 
.
= d,  with y, GDP level (in
deviation from potential level), d, public deficit, a, private demand, r,
the interest rate, g, nominal growth trend, h, public debt as a % of
GDP, l the public debt desired by the private sector (when r=g).
Two situations should be distinguished:
The country controls its interest rate. Then full stabilisation can be
obtained without the fiscal tool, with the interest rate: 
r = g + (a + k(h - l)/σ. A negative demand shock or an increase in the
desired public debt allows for an interest rate cut (which can increase
investment, and then growth). A positive demand shock can be offset
by a rise in the interest rate (which is detrimental to investment) or by a
restrictive fiscal policy (which is more relevant). The rule is: fiscal policy
must allow to maintain unemployment at its natural level and an
optimal interest rate. 
In the long run, the debt ratio is stable so: d=0   r=g + k(h-l)/σ. The
country has a trade-off between interest rate and public debt levels.
A restrictive fiscal policy may be implemented if it allows for the interest
rate to decrease. 
The country does not control its interest rate, because the interest
rate is already at 0 or because the country belongs to the euro area,
short term fiscal policy is: d = -a + σ (r - g)
If this policy is implemented and if stabilisation is perfect, there is no link
ex post between the deficit and the output gap, which remains nil. Let us
note also that in this case government borrowing is considered as structural
according to the OECD or the EC methods, which does not make sense. 
In the long run, g = 0 and h = l + σ (r - g)/k. The long-term public debt
level is not arbitrary, but depends on private agents’ wishes: debt must
equal desired debt at the optimal interest rate, i.e. the rate equal to the
growth rate. 
This simple model shows that a fiscal rule like d = d - λy - μ (h - h)
cannot be proposed, since it would not allow for full stabilisation and
since the government cannot set a debt target independently of private
agents’ saving behaviour. The public debt level desired by private
agents is likely to have increased during the crisis, since households wish
to hold fewer risky financial assets and companies wish to deleverage. In
structural terms, population ageing implies that demand for safe public
assets increases. 
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SGP rules and the Fiscal Treaty. For instance, not to account for unem-
ployment-related expenditure or public investment in the 3% GDP rule
for the deficit, to set up temporary funds in good times to allow for
higher deficits in bad times, or to introduce a temporary debt in bad
times to be redeemed in good times, etc. According to us, it would be
better to write simply: a public deficit is acceptable if the inflation rate
is below the target, when the interest rate is below the normal level (i.e.
according to the golden rule, potential growth plus the inflation
target), and when the external deficit is below the target.
Claeys et al. (2016) propose that public expenditure (excluding
interest payments, unemployment insurance benefits, exceptional
expenditure, public investment, but including fixed public capital
consumption) may not rise more rapidly than the ECB’s inflation target
(2%) plus medium-term potential growth less a correcting term of
0.02 times the share of the debt above the 60% target. However, a
country may choose to raise its public expenditure if it raises tax reve-
nues at the same time, or to cut tax revenues if public spending is cut
at the same time. This rule is in fact a structural balance rule. A country,
such as France, where public debt stands at 100% of GDP, should set a
target for public expenditure growth 0.8 percentage point below
potential output growth, i.e. it should improve by 0.4 percentage
point each year its primary structural government balance, until its
debt comes down to 60% of GDP. This rule may seem relatively satis-
factory, since it lets automatic stabilisers play, and since it becomes less
binding if inflation is below 2% (1 percentage point of inflation below
the target allows to increase public spending by 1%, i.e. an additional
0.5 percentage point for the structural deficit). But the arbitrary 60% of
GDP target for public debt remains. Should the main objective of
French fiscal policy be to bring debt down to 60% of GDP within
20 years, i.e. to run average primary fiscal surpluses of 2 percentage
points of GDP, when the 60% figure is arbitrary and below debt ratios
in countries outside the euro area? These 2 percentage points could be
better used (for example, for the ecological transition). The impact of
permanent fiscal consolidation on output is not assessed. Discretionary
fiscal policies remain forbidden. The rule does not set an equilibrium
level for the primary fiscal balance and so does not bring debt to a
long-term equilibrium. A country with a 100% of GDP debt ratio and a
primary structural deficit of 1% of GDP will have to increase its primary
structural balance each year. After 18 years (under the assumption that
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of GDP and the primary structural surplus will reach 4.5% of GDP. The
rule gives no indication on what should be done once the debt reaches
60% of GDP: keeping it at that level, which means bringing rapidly the
structural surplus to balance, or maintaining a substantial structural
surplus forever.
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018) suggest replacing existing fiscal rules by
a new simple rule: “nominal [public] expenditures should not grow
faster than long-term nominal income (that is, the sum of potential
output growth and expected inflation), and they should grow at a
slower pace in countries that need to pay down their debts.” But the
authors also say that countries would be entitled to raise their expendi-
tures, if they raise their structural tax revenues. The rule is thus
equivalent to: “the structural deficit should remain stable, and even
diminish in countries where the public debt level is too high”. But will a
country be entitled to increase public expenditure or cut taxes to
support output in times of economic slowdown? The rule should
clearly state that discretionary, and defined as temporary, measures are
allowed. Let us assume that a country wishes to promote pension
funds. In the short and medium term this may lead households’ savings
to rise, and, at fixed interest rates and exchange rates, this may require
a rise in the equilibrium structural public deficit. This is not taken into
consideration in the proposed rule. How should excessive debt ratios
be defined, knowing that public debts rose since the crisis because of
the needs of macroeconomic regulation? Then the text says: “If a
country passes a budget with spending above the target, all excessive
spending must be financed by junior sovereign bonds, first to be
restructured in case a debt reduction is deemed necessary”. But the so-
called excessive expenditures should be financed by a guaranteed
public debt, if these reflect the need for output stabilisation. Financial
markets should not be asked to fine countries raising public expendi-
tures even if the latter are needed for macroeconomic stabilisation or
for rescuing banks or companies in a difficult situation. The proposal
relies on an irrelevant financial innovation: advanced economies would
issue sovereign bonds, while announcing there are unsafe assets. No
advanced economy outside the euro area ever did such a thing. How
can it be imagined that a large economy, such as France, may default,
even partially? According to which criteria? The enforcement of the
rule would be done under the control of an independent fiscal
committee, itself supervised by an independent committee at the area
level. Will this authority have to comply with the Commission's esti-
mates and stick blindly to the rule, or will it be able to have its own
estimates and evaluate policy based on macroeconomic relevance?
Besides, like the previous rule, this rule does not have any long-term
stability. It simply tells us: once a satisfactory debt ratio has been
reached, the structural balance may be stable, but its level is not
defined. Any fiscal rule should lead to stable debt and deficit levels
consistent with the macroeconomic equilibrium.
3.1. A euro area fiscal capacity? 
Some economists consider that the euro area could implement
stabilisation mechanisms at the euro area level, managed by a euro
area minister, but this is an illusion, as the European Commission mini-
mizes the size of output gaps (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2015), denies
the implementation of discretionary policies and sticks to automatic
fiscal rules. But many shocks or imbalances are country-specific. Imple-
menting stabilisation tools at the euro area level would be dangerous if,
as a counterpart, countries have to abandon stabilisation policies to
bring their structural budget (as measured by the EC) in balance and
should wait for the Commission’s green light to implement a stabilisa-
tion fiscal policy. 
A two-step procedure is often proposed: The Commission would set
the broad fiscal stance of the euro area, and would then verify the
compliance of all MS budgets. But this could make sense only if the
SGP and the Fiscal Treaty were abandoned, and the full-employment
target in the euro area re-affirmed. However, this proposal is irrelevant
if euro area cyclical developments and objectives differ too much. Why
say that fiscal efforts should be neutral in the euro area if countries with
fiscal room for manoeuvre refuse to run expansionary policies, while
countries in depression have to fulfil EU constraints?
Some propose implementing transfers between MS to ensure that
countries in good economic situations finance countries in depression.
Accounting for Northern countries’ reluctance, this system should
avoid permanent transfers, and each country should be in turn a net
contributor or receiver. Can a system on average in balance have a
visible macroeconomic impact? Some propose basing these transfers
on output gap differentials, since, for a given country, the output gap is
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output gap is a vague and unobservable concept, a measure that can
be criticized, and fluctuates over time (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2015).
As could be seen after the 2008 crisis, when a crisis occurs at year N,
potential output growth estimates are reduced for year N-1, N-2, …
Should there be re-payments each time the Commission’s estimates
are revised? Should a country in depression wait for EU funds to
support its economy, and meanwhile implement a pro-cyclical restric-
tive policy? Last, potential output growth, according to Commission
estimates, fluctuates very closely with observed output growth, and
hence transfers would necessarily be small. 
Some propose the unification of unemployment insurance systems,
unemployment expenditure being the most pro-cyclical category of
public expenditure. But national systems differ widely from one MS to
another (allowance levels and duration; accounting or not for the
family situation), and in many MS are run by social partners, who
would not agree on a unification done under the Commission‘s leader-
ship. The unemployment concept would have to be standardized
(what about recipients of vocational training, disability pensions, early
retirement schemes, or part-time unemployment schemes?). A country
having made efforts to reduce its unemployment rate would refuse to
pay for countries with high unemployment, blaming these countries
for not having undertaken the necessary reforms. 
Some propose transfers between countries based on the differences
between the observed and the structural unemployment rates. But
how to assess the structural unemployment rate, which according to
the Commission’s estimates varies like the observed unemployment
rate? Transfers based on differences in unemployment rates would
entail permanent transfers between countries. To avoid this, proposals
restrict transfers to unemployment regimes, applying them only to the
newly unemployed and for a limited time period (Dullien, 2017).
Transfers are generally small and become nil if the depression lasts and
hits all euro area MS. Transfers are expected to be nil for each country
in the long term, and thus may have only a limited impact. Others
suggest a reinsurance unemployment system, based on short-term
unemployment developments, normalized according to their past
volatility, with MS contributions depending on the extent to which
they previously resorted to the Fund (Dolls and Lewney, 2017, Aparisi
de Lannoy and Ragot, 2017). Social transfers cannot be based on
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on unemployment benefits, but only an ex post impact on the financial
equilibrium of unemployment regimes. 
The proponents of this proposal argue that it would have had stabi-
lisation properties in the past. In particular, Germany would have been
a net beneficiary in the beginning of the 2000s, which assumes that
the other MS would have agreed to pay for the German internal deval-
uation strategy. Also, this system would have softened the recession in
Southern economies after 2010, as if the EU, requesting fiscal austerity,
would have offset it at the same time by unemployment benefit trans-
fers. These authors assume that these transfers would be entirely
consumed by households (Dolls and Lewney, 2017). Let us consider
the case of France. Unemployment benefits were not cut after the
crisis, despite the rise in the public deficit; and they would not have
been larger if the EU mechanism had been in place. At best, the mech-
anism would have reduced the UNEDIC’s financing needs. So, its
impact on activity would have been weak, if not nil. 
Some economists (CAE, 2016) admit that the implementation of
this mechanism requires the convergence of domestic labour markets,
to be implemented by a European minister of labour. But a conver-
gence towards which model and decided by whom? Should labour
market flexibility be promoted (labour contracts revised in perma-
nence, precarious jobs, flexible wages) or a stable labour market
(companies and employees linked with long-term contracts, compa-
nies caring for maintaining their workers’ skills and investing in specific
skills). Should wage flexibility be promoted through wage bargaining
at the company level, or on the contrary through sector agreements or
national agreements based on the “golden rule” of wage growth, i.e.
the inflation target plus average productivity growth in the economy,
as the European Trade Union Confederation recommends? 
3.2. A federal and democratic euro area? 
Some economists recommend a move toward a more and more
federal EU (or euro area). They admit that technocracy currently prevails
in the EU, with a lack of democracy and a liberal bias, but they consider
that a more democratic federalism could be introduced. The euro area
would have a substantial budget and own resources; it could finance EU
common goods (military defence, research, infrastructure, migration
policy), and transfers between countries, both structural and cyclical,
including to deal with all or part of macroeconomic stabilisation. 
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(2017) propose a new Treaty. It would establish a Parliamentary
Assembly of the euro area, involving members of the national parlia-
ments and of the European Parliament. This Assembly would supervise
the euro area summit and the Eurogroup. But there is already a Euro-
pean Parliament. It is not realistic to introduce a new structure and
duplicate all EU institutions with euro area institutions. This assembly
would vote the various documents of the European Semester (the
Report on Mechanism Alert, MS Stability Programmes and National
reform programmes, EDP reports), directives, ESM assistance
programmes and Memoranda of Understanding. This would represent
on the one hand many elements that are dealt with at the EU level, and
so the process would duplicate European Parliament activities; and on
the other hand, it would cover fields that are currently domestic prerog-
atives: should EU Parliament members be asked to vote on each MS
Stability programme and National reform programme? The proposal
does not clearly set out the powers that would be attributed to the euro
area, as compared to the EU and to countries. It does not say if the SGP
and the Fiscal Treaty would continue to apply. What would be the
assessment criteria for national budgets: adequacy with the economic
context, or with the Fiscal Treaty? The proposal plans to put public debt
below 60% of GDP in common, which implies necessarily that countries
with debts higher than 60% of GDP launch a redemption process,
without any economic justification. Should unmanageable constraints
be accepted to ensure Germany’s agreement? The authors claim that
their project could be adopted by a subset of member countries, which
makes no sense, given the powers of their new assembly on the Euro-
group. Contrary to what the authors suggest, this Treaty would need to
be ratified by European citizens. According to the project, the Parlia-
ment would manage a common euro area budget. This budget would
be financed by four taxes levied at European level: a corporate income
tax, a high income tax, a high wealth tax and a carbon tax. It would
represent 4% of euro area GDP, of which 2 percentage points would be
used to finance the ecological transition, to host migrants and to finance
higher education, and 2 percentage points would be given back to
national budgets to reduce national taxes and help the poorest. The text
specifies that net transfers between countries would be limited to 0.1%
of GDP, probably to convince Germany, but how would net transfers be
5. Information in English about the proposal may be found at: http://tdem.eu/en/treaty
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does not clearly say whether the euro area budget could be run in deficit
if needed for stabilisation purposes. 
Aglietta and Leron (2017), in La Double démocratie (The twin
democracy), make a proposal for a European budget amounting to
3.5% of GDP, which would finance European common goods (such as
fighting against climate change), would have own resources (such as a
carbon tax and a financial transaction tax), and could issue euro-
bonds. A European Fiscal Agency would assess the economic and fiscal
situations of MS and would make recommendations for necessary
adjustment, which would be determined by a fiscal commission
(bringing together elected national parliament representatives),
adopted by the Council and implemented by MS governments. This
will allow changing the Fiscal Compact. But what principles would
guide this process: debt or deficit criteria, or full-employment targets,
and what scope (how to handle differences in competitiveness)?
Although the second element of the proposal is problematic, the first
element is interesting, setting up a specific field for EU action, with
dedicated funding.
Fourteen European economists (Andor et al., 2018) published a call
for a “democratic renewal of the eurozone”. They propose a jump to
democratic federalism, to a “real European executive that is democrati-
cally accountable before a parliament of the eurozone and leads
economic policy with expertise and a larger degree of political
autonomy”. The call however did not deepen the meaning of democ-
racy in a federal EU: can a population be constrained by decisions
made in a Parliament where its representatives are a minority? How to
account for different interests, situations and institutions in MS? Should
the subsidiarity principle be forgotten? The text suggests the appoint-
ment of a European Commissioner, in charge of fiscal and monetary
affairs for the area, who would chair the Eurogroup and make execu-
tive decisions. But the extent of his/her powers is not defined: would
he/she be able to amend budgets voted by National Parliaments?
Certainly, the Commissioner would be accountable to the euro area
Parliament, but how can one imagine that peoples would agree to
entrust to a foreign Commissioner and to such a Parliament powers
over their budget, public expenditure and their taxation? Moreover, it
is unclear if current budget rules would be maintained. Will the
Commissioner be a watchdog verifying that budgets are consistent
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tries’ economic policies? For the rest, the project is unrealistic. The euro
area budget should start with a small size, of the order of 1% of GDP,
but it should secure the financial system, and finance a new cohesion
policy for countries facing structural competitiveness problems (educa-
tion, university, training, justice), doing this without duplicating
European structural funds; it should encourage surplus countries to run
social policies; it should finance defence, innovation, and the environ-
ment, and be open to non-euro area members. “While under the
control of the Commission, this budget should, however, sit outside
the EU budget”. This budget would basically duplicate the budget of
the Union, to do what the EU does not currently do. But why would
governments, reluctant to increase the budget of the Union, create a
parallel budget? This budget would be financed by taxes and by
issuing debt, the text saying strangely that it will be a risk-free asset,
“complementing the constrained capacity of MS to issue safe assets.
This will be crucial if member countries were to default on their
national sovereign debt”: the non-guarantee of national public debts is
not questioned. The financial sector is expected to “perform its stabi-
lizing and risk-sharing function”; this is hardly what it has done in the
past. Finally, the text includes the project of a small unemployment
insurance scheme at the euro area level. On the whole, the text offers
little reflection on economic policies coordination, on the linkage
between national and European democracy. 
3.3. A Europe with more solidarity? 
Many economists claim for more solidarity, with more transfers, in
the euro area. According to us, the euro area’s functioning cannot
durably rely on transfers between Northern countries (in good
economic situations and with large current account surpluses) and
Southern countries (with high unemployment rates). Northern coun-
tries’ populations would not accept it. Southern countries cannot offset
bad economic situations with transfers, which would place them under
the control of Northern countries and of the European Commission.
Transfers between countries should take place only in exceptional
circumstances or in the framework of development policies. Each
country should find a satisfactory economic model, which today
requires differentiated strategies. 
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national solidarity. National characteristics remain, and people are
attached to them. There is no agreement today between MS citizens to
move toward a social Europe, a taxation Europe, a fiscal Europe, a polit-
ical Europe, insofar as this would imply undermining national
institutions. 
Accounting for current disparities in the EU and for the willingness
of EU institutions to cut public expenditure, it may not be obvious to
raise common EU expenditure. Many countries are reluctant, either
because they do not want to pay for the others, or because they want
to keep their national specificities. In military defence, for instance,
France and East European countries may not have the same priorities.
Migration policies differ, due to demographic and labour market pros-
pects. In higher education and research, there is a contradiction
between spending EU funds where they are the most efficient and the
desire of each country to develop them at home. 
The EU hesitates between an intergovernmental functioning and a
federal model, which the Commission and the Parliament tend to
promote. Can we imagine that major economic and social decisions be
made at the EU level, by the Commission, the Council or even the
Parliament, without accounting for national votes and debates? Can we
imagine a federal power that is able to account for domestic specificities
in a EU made of heterogeneous countries? In our view, accounting for
current disparities in the EU, economic policies should be coordinated
between MS and not decided by a central authority. EU institutions
should first show that they are able to implement an efficient strategy,
before the peoples accept to increase powers at the EU level. 
3.4. A Europe with several circles? 
Brexit, the deviations of some Central and Eastern European coun-
tries (Poland, Hungary), and the reluctances of Denmark and Sweden
could be incentives to move towards a EU in several circles.6 The first
circle would include euro area countries agreeing new sovereignty
transfers, and would build a political, social, taxation, and fiscal union.
This would be a step toward a democratic progress: a euro area Parlia-
ment, a EU Commission accountable to the Parliament. The second
circle would include EU countries that would not wish or be able to join
6.  This is what Emmanuel Macron advocates in his speech at the Sorbonne.
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EU with a free-trade agreement: Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Swit-
zerland, as of today, and the UK and other countries (Turkey,
Ukraine…) tomorrow.7
This project raises many problems. The Commission is not in favour
of it because it would undermine the EU move towards “an ever closer
union”. Non-euro area countries are hostile to such a project where
they would be marginalised as “second-class” members. EU institutions
would have to be split between euro area institutions functioning in a
federal mode, and EU institutions continuing to function in a Union of
Member States mode, with a EU Parliament and a euro area Parlia-
ment, EU and euro area commissioners, EU and euro area budget and
financial transfers, etc. There is no certainty that all euro area MS would
wish to be in a first circle where tax and social harmonisation would be
imposed; one would have to choose between accepting compromises
so that Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the Baltic countries
agree to join or have a euro area itself with two circles. The members of
the third circle would be in an even more difficult situation, if they had
to comply with regulations over which they would have no say. Thus
many issues would have to be tackled four times (at the restricted euro
area, euro area, EU, and free-trade agreement levels). Depending on
the issue, a member state could choose its circle, and it would rapidly
become an “à la carte” Europe. This is hardly compatible with democ-
ratisation at the EU level, which would rapidly require a different
Parliament for each field. Besides, there is no agreement among the
people of the EU, even in the euro area, to move towards a federal
Europe, with all the convergences and losses of democratic control that
this would entail. In the current situation, few peoples will accept that a
federal body decides their budgets, tax systems, and reforms of their
social systems.
3.5. Unconventional proposals
QE for people proponents suggest that the ECB should support
economic activity, by giving a given amount of money to each euro
area citizen each month. This proposal does not make much sense. The
ECB cannot distribute money without a counterpart. This is not the
Central Bank’s role; this is the role of fiscal policy. Such a policy would
7. See proposals by Pisani-Ferry et al. (2016) or Demertzis et al. (2018).
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domestic budgets. A bank must have assets equal to liabilities. The
ECB’s balance sheet would be in deficit, i.e. a debt that would be
affected to MS, the ECB’s shareholders, and would come on top of
government debt. 
For the same reason, the proposal asking the Central bank to buy a
substantial amount of public debt, before cancelling them (or keeping
them at a 0 interest rate forever) cannot be implemented. Because this
proposal implies that in counterpart the ECB would issue bonds, hence
transforming government debt into ECB debt (see for instance the
PADRE proposal, by Pâris and Wyplosz, 2014). Here too, the ECB’s
balance sheet would show a deficit, which would be added to govern-
ment debt. The ECB would not pay dividends to MS, but would be
subsidized by them. The savings in terms of interest payments for MS
would be offset by the loss of dividends received from the ECB and
from the amount of the subsidy that would be paid to the ECB. This
would be a mere accounting trick. 
Some consider that a fiscal money should be issued by the govern-
ment and accepted for tax payments (Bossone et al., 2015, Kalinowski et
al., 20178). The government could thus support output, by paying civil
servants, social benefits and suppliers, with this money. However,
contrary to what the proponents of this proposal claim, this money
would be part of the public deficit and debt. The authors do not specify
whether this money would be a full currency, or whether retailers would
be obliged to accept it in payment even for imported products. There is
no guarantee that economic agents would be ready to own it. It would
be either fully convertible (agents would exchange it rapidly for euros as
it would not yield any interest rate); or not convertible, which would
mean that two currencies would circulate, with parallel exchange rates,
a black market, instability risks, and complications for transactions. This
is only a way to circumvent the deficit and debt criteria. 
3.6. Coordinating policies in the EU 
In advanced economies, the system, which worked until 1999 and
still works in the US, the UK and Japan, is based on unity between the
government, the central bank and commercial banks. The central bank
is the lender of last resort for the government and banks. The govern-
8. The project is part of the programme of the new Italian Government under the name of "mini-bots".
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considered as safe and benefit from as low as possible market interest
rates. This system allows the State to guarantee the banking system.
The introduction of the euro area had led to a hardly manageable
structure. MS need to run more active fiscal policies because they have
lost control over their interest rates and exchange rates. In addition,
since 1973 and even more since 2008, the macroeconomic equilibrium
requires a certain level of public deficit and debt. However, in a single
currency union, current imbalances in one country may affect the other
MS. Therefore, excessive deficits (or surpluses) should be avoided, but
how to define them? Last, financial markets’ current functioning makes
it necessary for public debts to become safe assets again, while at the
same time Northern countries deny giving unlimited guarantees to
their partners. 
Euro area countries should again become able to run the public defi-
cits needed for their macroeconomic stabilisation needs and to issue
safe public debts, at an interest rate controlled by the ECB. The mutual
guarantee of public debts should be entire for countries agreeable to
submitting their economic policy to a coordination process. This coor-
dination cannot consist in fulfilling arbitrary rules. It should be done
through a negotiation process between countries. Coordination should
target GDP growth and full employment; it should account for all
economic variables; and countries should follow an economic policy
strategy allowing them to meet the inflation target (at least to remain
within a target of around 2%, which may be increased in time periods
when a strong recovery is needed), to meet an objective in terms of
wage developments (in the medium-run real wages should grow in line
with labour productivity), and in the short-run adjustment processes
should be implemented by countries where wages have risen too
rapidly, or not sufficiently.9 Internal devaluation strategies (such as
offsetting employers’ social contributions cuts by increases in VAT)
should be implemented only by countries having a specific competi-
tiveness problem. Countries should announce and negotiate their
current account balance targets; and countries running high external
surpluses should agree to lower them or to finance explicitly industrial
9. But the adjustment should not be done through the introduction of an automatic link between
the minimum wage and the current account, as proposed by IAGS (2014). If a country runs of
current account deficit due to a financial or housing bubble, the effort should not bear first on lower
paid workers. 
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unanimous agreement on a coordinated but differentiated strategy.
The Treaty should maintain an effective process in the event where no
agreement is reached. In that case, the new debt issued by countries
outside the agreement would not be guaranteed, but such a case
should never occur.
The ECB should maintain interest rates below the GDP growth rate
to reduce the public debt burden. Simultaneously, the ECB should give
incentives to banks both to abstain from speculative activities (in
particular by a financial transactions tax and by the separation of
deposit banks from market activities) and to finance productive activi-
ties (especially re-industrialisation and the ecological transition).
National fiscal policies would be facilitated if a European budget
financed public investment and more generally European common
goods (such as fighting against climate change) by common resources
(such as a carbon tax and a financial transaction tax), and by the issu-
ance of euro-bonds. But this should not be a pretext for adding
constraints on national budgets.
Economic policy coordination should not raise difficulties after
negative demand shocks (global or specific); it should not target objec-
tives lacking an economic rationale (such as a structural public balance
in equilibrium or a public debt below 60% of GDP). Coordination may
be harmful for a country having to implement a supply side policy after
a negative supply shock. On the contrary, coordination will be impos-
sible if a group of countries set non-cooperative targets, such as large
competitiveness gains or a large current account surplus. 
Besides, a political choice needs to be made. Does the EU want to
maintain and develop its social model, with its specificity in terms of
social and fiscal systems, with labour rights, and with ecological objec-
tives, or is its project to oblige reluctant countries to accept the
constraints of a liberal globalization? 
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FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECB’S PUBLIC 
SECTOR PURCHASE PROGRAMME
Harmen Lehment
Kiel Institute for the World Economy
The large Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), which the ECB started
in 2015 for monetary policy purposes, had major side effects on fiscal policy.
One concerns the programme’s uncommon seigniorage effects. We find that
the PSPP not only led to partly negative seigniorage gains, but also produced
super-seigniorage gains resulting from negative interest rates on the excess
reserves that were created by the programme. Another effect of the PSPP is its
interference with fiscal debt management, thereby making fiscal budgets more
vulnerable to changes in short-term interest rates. Finally, the experience with
the PSPP suggests that fiscal policy should prepare for a greater role in fighting
future recessions.
Keywords: Central bank asset purchases, seigniorage gains, debt management, monetary-fiscal cooperation.
In the face of persistently weak inflation dynamics, the European
Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council decided on 22 January 2015 to
adopt a Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) to stimulate
demand via lowering long-term interest rates. This paper intends to
examine this unprecedented policy measure by the ECB and its poten-
tial impacts on fiscal and monetary policies.
The PSPP has led to a massive change in the ownership of public
sector bonds. By the end of 2017, bonds on the order of 1,900 billion
euros had moved from the private sector into the hands of the ECB and
the national central banks (NCBs). These purchases had strong fiscal
implications. The PSPP has increased the fiscal exposure to interest rate
risk in the member countries of the euro area, as the programme has
turned long-run obligations of the State (such as government bonds)Revue de l’OFCE, Hors-série (2019)
Harmen Lehment90into short-term obligations (central bank liabilities paying variable
deposit rates).
The PSPP led to super-seigniorage gains for the euro area national
central banks (NCBs): additional interest income from the acquired
public sector securities and also interest income stemming from nega-
tive interest rates on excess reserves. Interest income on the PSPP
portfolio was particularly large for NCBs in countries with high interest
rates such as Italy and Spain, whereas it was negative for the Bundes-
bank, which had to purchase public sector securities with negative
interest rates.
In April 2018, borrowing via a country’s NCB had no advantages
over short-term borrowing via government securities, as the interest
rates on short-term government securities were below the banks’
deposit rate. For States with relatively high country risks, the ability to
borrow at the deposit rate may, however, turn into an advantage, if the
country risk were to increase. Borrowing at the deposit rate provides a
backstop against increasing country risk.
It appears that three years of huge asset purchases by the
Eurosystem had no sustained effect on the term premium and level of
long-term interest rates, which raised substantial doubts about the
effectiveness of the PSPP. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In part 1 we give an
overview of the PSPP and the relative size of the purchases of public
sector bonds by national central banks in the euro area. In part 2 we
analyse the seigniorage gains that have resulted from the PSPP so far.
In part 3 we discuss the effects of a normalization of monetary policy
on seigniorage gains. In part 4 we analyse the fiscal risks that result
from the accumulation of high excess liquidity due to the PSPP. In part
5 we address the question whether the PSPP has reached its limits.
In part 6 we discuss whether the experience with the PSPP suggests a
closer cooperation of monetary and fiscal policy in the future. In part 7
we highlight the main results and policy implications.
1. The PSPP—an overview
In the face of weaker-than-expected inflation dynamics and signs of
reduction in inflation expectations even at relatively long maturities, the
ECB Governing Council decided on 22 January 2015 to adopt a Public
Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) to increase the size of the
Fiscal implications of the ECB´s Public Sector Purchase Programme 91Eurosystem's balance sheet and change its composition (Andrade et al.,
2016). The PSPP is part of a larger Expanded Asset Purchase Programme
(APP), which also includes the Asset-backed Securities Purchase
Programme (ABSPP), the Covered Bonds Purchase Programme 3
(CBPP3), and the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP).
Monthly purchases under the APP, which started in March 2015,
amounted to 60 billion euros from March 2015 to March 2016,
80 billion euros from April 2016 to March 2017, 60 billion euros from
April 2017 to December 2017, and 30 billion euros from January 2018
to September 2018. With about 80 percent of the purchases, the PSPP
is by far the largest purchase programme of the APP.
The spectrum of securities covered by the PSPP includes securities
with a residual maturity ranging from 1 to 30 years.1 In terms of overall
breakdown, the intended allocation of the total purchases under the
PSSP is 90% to government bonds and recognized agencies, and 10%
to securities issued by international organisations and multilateral deve-
lopment banks.2 Purchases are to be split across eligible euro area juris-
dictions according to the ECB's capital key, and conducted with the aim
of maintaining market neutrality. To preserve normal secondary market
functioning, purchases were initially subject to a security-specific issue-
share limit of 25% and an issuer-specific limit of 33% in terms of
nominal value. In September 2015, the Governing Council decided to
increase the security-specific limit also to 33%, subject to a case-by-case
verification that doing this would not create a situation whereby the
Eurosystem would have a blocking minority for the purposes of collec-
tive action clauses, in which case the issue share limit would remain at
25%. The security-specific limit for international organisations and
multilateral development banks was raised to 50% in April 2016.
In line with the Eurosystem's regular monetary policy operations,
the PSPP is coordinated centrally by the ECB, but implemented in a
decentralised fashion. To this end, the ECB buys directly 10% of the
total amount, and the remaining 90% are purchased by national
central banks.3 Each national central bank restricts its activity to
domestic bonds issued by both the central governments and recog-
nised agencies of their jurisdictions. Since the recalibration of the
programme in December 2015, NCBs also purchase euro-denomi-
1. Initially the range was 2-30 years.
2. Until April 2016 the ratios were 88% and 12% respectively.
3. Until April 2016 the ratios were 8% and 92% respectively.
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governments located within their jurisdiction. Purchases are allocated
across issuers from the various euro area countries on the basis of the
ECB's capital key. In case the envisaged amounts to be purchased in a
jurisdiction cannot be attained, NCBs will conduct substitute purchases
in bonds issued by international organisations and multilateral devel-
opment banks located in the euro area. These purchases will be
subsumed under the 10% allocation to international organisations and
multilateral development banks, which will be purchased by some
NCBs and be subject to profit and loss sharing. Purchases of domestic
bonds by NCBs are not subject to profit and loss sharing.
By the end of 2017, the cumulated asset purchases under the PSPP
amounted to 1,900 billion euros, of which about 1,700 billion euros
were purchases of national public debt securities and about 200 billion
euros purchases of supranationals’ debt securities.
Table 1 lists the cumulative purchases of national public debt securi-
ties under the PSPP for the ten largest European Monetary Union (EMU)
member countries in absolute terms as well as in relation to the respec-
tive country’s GDP and its public debt. As can be seen from column 2,
the size of purchases relative to GDP has varied among the listed coun-
tries. There are two main reasons for this. First, the size of the purchases
is intended to follow the capital key of the Eurosystem, which depends
not only on a country’s GDP but also on the size of its population.
Countries with a low per-capita income benefit from this arrangement,
as their share in the Eurosystem’s profits and also their ability to
purchase public sector bonds under the PSPP is higher than it would be
with a capital key that depended only on GDP (Heinemann, 2017). This
explains why Italy and Spain in particular were able to purchase a larger
amount relative to GDP than countries with higher per-capita income
such as Germany and the Netherlands. The second reason for the
difference results from constraints concerning the permissible scope of
purchases under the PSPP, in particular the share limits that have been
set. In particular, this factor explains the relatively low purchases of Irish
asset under the PSPP relative to GDP. With official holdings of Irish
bonds already bloated by previous interventions between 2010 and
2014 in the context of the banking crisis, this meant that the ECB was
obliged to taper the amount it was spending on Irish bonds much
earlier than was required for other sovereign bond markets (Irish Times,
2017).
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column 3. For countries with a debt/GDP ratio above 1 (Italy, Portugal
and Belgium), the figure is below that of column 2. For the other coun-
tries with a debt/GDP ratio below 1, it is accordingly above the figure in
column 2. As can be seen, the ratio of cumulated purchases to public
debt is highest for the Netherlands (where it reached almost
25 percent), Germany and Finland. For countries with a high debt/GDP,
the ratio of cumulated purchases to public debt is in the range of 12-
15 percent. 
2. Seigniorage gains from the PSPP
The purchase of public bonds by national central banks leads to an
additional interest income. When this income is transferred to the
government via the distribution of central bank profits, the public
budget benefits from a resulting seigniorage gain. 
Table 2 shows the interest income on public sector securities that
have been acquired under the PSPP for the national central banks of
four countries (Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain), which publish the
respective figures in their annual reports.4
Table 1. Cumulative NCB purchases of securities under the PSPP 
for the ten largest euro area countries (Dec. 31, 2017)
Amount in 
billion euros
Relative to GDP 
(%)   
Relative to public 
debt (%)
Germany 459.3 14.1                     21.9
France 375.7 16.4                     16.9
Italy 326.7 19.0                     14.3
Spain 230.3 19.8                     20.3
Netherlands 102.8 14.1                     24.9
Belgium 65.5 15.0                     14.1
Austria            52.0 14.1                     17.7
Portugal 31.1 16.1                     12.5
Finland                        29.2 13.0                     21.7
Ireland 25.3 9.2                       12.0
Public debt figures refer to the 3rd quarter 2017.
Source: ECB; Statistical Data Warehouse.
4. Most of the national central banks in the Eurozone only provide information on aggregate
interest income, and do not specify interest income from the PSPP as a separate item. The table does
not include the seigniorage income of the ECB, which is distributed to the NCBs.
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the member countries of the euro area. Accordingly, one can expect
that NCBs of countries with relatively high interest rates experienced
particularly high seigniorage gains. This is confirmed by Table 2. The
NCBs of Spain and Italy received a positive interest income on their PSPP
securities in the period 2015-2017. The interest income for the Irish
NCB was positive as well. In contrast, the German Bundesbank recorded
a negative income on its PSPP portfolio in each year. The reason is that
the interest rates on German public securities were not only the lowest
in the euro area, but were negative even for bonds with longer maturi-
ties. As the interest income from the PSPP does not fall under the profit
and loss sharing agreement of the euro area, the seigniorage gains and
losses from the purchase of PSPP securities remain fully with the national
central banks, and subsequently increase or reduce the scope for a
transfer of central bank profits to the national government.5
To get a full picture of the seigniorage effect of the PSPP, one
should also consider its effect on the monetary base. The purchases of
public bonds, together with other measures of the Expanded
Asset Purchase Programme (APP), led to large excess liquidity (Baldo et
al., 2017). As excess liquidity has been subject to negative interest rates
(-0.1% from June 2014; -0.2% from September 2014; -0.3% from
December 2015; -0.4% from March 2016), the increase in excess
liquidity led to an additional interest income for the NCBs. This means
that currently there is a “super seigniorage effect”: the Eurosystem
receives not only revenues from the assets it has purchased (the normal
seigniorage) but also an additional interest income on its liabilities.6 
Table 2. NCB’s interest income on PSPP portfolio
Mn euros
2015 2016 2017
Germany -11 -78 -258
Ireland 20 84  128
Italy 358 1 427 2 845
Spain 371 1 514 2 470
Sources: Central bank annual reports and annual accounts, various issues.
5. It should be noted that a NCB’s purchase of bonds with negative maturities does not necessarily
imply a worsening of a country’s fiscal position. To the extent that the PSPP leads to lower interest
rates for public sector bonds, the resulting benefit of lower interest payments for the remaining
public debt may offset the loss from the NCB’s negative seigniorage gain.
6. The interest income on NCB’s liabilities can be considered as a tax on banks (if negative interest
rates cannot be passed on to customers) or on bank customers (if negative rates are passed onto them).
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sharing in the Eurosystem, the seigniorage gain of a NCB depends on
the total excess liquidity of the Eurosystem. While the Eurosystem does
not publish interest income on excess liquidity, the NCBs’ seignorage
gain can be roughly estimated using information on the total excess
liquidity, the negative interest rate and the country’s capital key.
The excess liquidity of the Eurosystem increased by about
1,500 billion euros in the period 2015-2017.7 Taking average figures
rather than end of year figures for 2017, the increase would be approxi-
mately 1,250 billion euros. With a negative interest rate of 0.4%, this
means that the expansion of the excess liquidity during this period
would yield an additional interest income to the Eurosystem on the
order of 5 billion euros in 2017. According to the capital key this implies
an additional interest income of 1.3 billion euros for the Bundesbank,
0.9 billion euros for the Banca d’Italia, 0.6 billion euros for the Banco de
Espana and 0.1 billion euros for the Central Bank of Ireland.
To what extent can the increase in excess liquidity and the resulting
interest income be attributed to the PSPP? As about 92 percent of the
extension of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet can be attributed to the
APP (the balance sheet expanded by about 2,250 billion euros from
end 2014 to end 2017, with assets for monetary purposes rising by
about 2,070 billion euros), and as the share of the PSPP in the APP
was about 82 percent, it is plausible to attribute 75 percent of
the additional interest income from excess liquidity to the PSPP, i.e.
3,750 billion euros. According to the capital key of the Eurosystem, this
implies for 2017 an additional interest income of 960 million euros for
the Bundesbank (which more than compensates the losses from the
negative yield of the PSPP portfolio), 660 million euros for the Banca
d’Italia, 470 million euros for the Banco de Espana and 60 million euros
for the Central Bank of Ireland.
An additional point to be considered is the Eurosystem’s interest
income on euro-liabilities against non-euro area residents. These liabili-
ties increased massively from 48 billion euros at the end of 2014 to
355 billion euros at the end of 2017, and are similar to the holdings of
excess liquidity (Baldo et al., 2017)—heavily concentrated in financial
7. The current account (including minimum reserve holdings) and the deposit facility together rose
from 367 billion euros at the end of 2014 to 1,882 billion euros at the end of 2017. Subtracting the
minimum reserve holdings (106 billion euros at the end of 2014 and 123 billion euros at the end of
2017) one obtains an increase in excess liquidity by 1,498 billion euros. Source: Eurosystem.
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ties is held with the NCBs of three countries: Germany, France and the
Netherlands. As the Eurosystem’s claims against non-residents have
not increased in this period, this suggests that the expansion of the
liabilities against non-residents is a result of the APP. According to
Baldo et al. (2017), more than 50% of APP purchases occurred with
counterparties belonging to banking groups whose head institution
was situated outside the euro area. To the extent that the returns from
the asset sales are not placed with banks in the euro area but end up at
NCBs of the euro area, as may e.g. be the case for bond sales by foreign
monetary authorities, this is shown by a respective increase of liabilities
against non-euro area residents.
Taking a closer look at the Bundesbank, which accounts for more
than 50 percent of the liabilities against non-euro area residents, we
find that interest income from negative interest rates on this item
amounted to 963 million euros in 2017 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2018).
This income remains fully with the Bundesbank, as it is not subject to
the profit and loss sharing of the Eurosystem.8 Again the question then
is to what extent the increase of the liabilities against non-euro area
residents can be attributed to the PSPP. Considering that 90-95 percent
Table 3. Central bank liabilities to non-euro area residents in euros (end of year)
Billion euros
2014 2015 2016 2017
Austria 0 1 1 1
Belgium 1 1 2 8
Finland 0 1 2 3
France 28 15 36 53
Germany 12 27 117 200
Netherlands 1 4 21 37
Ireland 0 0 0 1
Italy                                                    0 0 3 2
Portugal 0 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 2 3
Sources: Central bank annual reports and annual accounts, various issues.
8. Profit and loss sharing with respect to items on the liabilities side of a NCB’s balance sheet is
restricted to interest income on central bank money (currency and deposit liabilities to euro area
credit institutions). 
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the beginning of 2015, and that the Bundesbank’s claims against non-
residents did not increase in this period, it is plausible to attribute 90-
95 percent of the resulting interest income to the APP. With a PSPP
share of about 81 percent of the Bundesbank’s APP purchases, approxi-
mately 75 percent of the interest income on liabilities against non euro
area residents in 2017, i.e. 720 million euros, could then be attributed
to the PSPP.9 
3. The effect of a normalisation of monetary policy 
on seigniorage gains
The observation of substantial seigniorage gains raises the question
whether these effects are permanent or just transitory. One main
consideration is that the seigniorage gains that resulted from the PSPP
were a by-product rather than a target of the ECB’s policy, the latter
being guided by the aim of a medium-run inflation rate of below but
close to 2 percent in the euro area. This means that future seigniorage
gains will very much depend on the course of the ECB’s policy in the
coming years. 
There is currently intensive discussion about the normalization of
the ECB’s policy. Will normalization mean returning to monetary policy
as it was prior to the financial crisis, or will there be a “new normal”
that would entail different monetary policies (Claeys and Demertzis,
2017)? The most likely approach for the ECB seems to be to follow the
procedure of the Fed. This consists of the following steps: (1) terminate
asset purchases, (2) gradually raise short-term interest rates, and (3)
gradually reduce holdings of public bonds by not reinvesting the prin-
ciple in securities that are maturing.
Concerning the termination of the PSPP, the ECB already decided to
terminate purchases by the end of 2018. During this period the cumu-
lated purchases of public sector securities and the resulting seigniorage
gains will still increase. 
With respect to a rise in interest rates, the ECB has announced that it
will keep its rates at the present level for some time after the expiration
9. The loss of 258 million euros on the Bundesbank’s PSPP portfolio in 2017 would thus be more
than compensated by the PSPP-induced interest earnings on excess reserves and on euro liabilities
against non-euro area residents, which according to our estimates sum up to about 1,680 million
euros, resulting in a net surplus of around 1,420 million euros.
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concern the deposit rate. Raising the deposit rate from its current level
of -0.4% to 0% would remove the present positive interest income on
the Eurosystem’s deposits. The fiscal benefit of the PSPP will then be
limited to the return on the public sector securities that have been
acquired in the context of the programme. NCBs with a negative
return on their PSPP portfolio, such as the Bundesbank, would face a
loss from the PSPP at this stage. A subsequent increase of the deposit
rate into positive numbers would lead to further negative seigniorage
effects. As interest rates on the securities purchased under the PSPP are
fixed for a prolonged period of time, the payment of positive interest
rates on the NCB’s deposits would reduce the net interest income from
the PSPP—which thereby may turn negative also for NCBs that bought
securities with positive rates of return. 
A rise in the deposit rate will in particular affect the interest income
of NCBs in financial centre countries. As shown above, these NCBs
currently benefit from the negative interest rates on liabilities against
non-euro area residents, which are not subject to profit and loss
sharing within the Eurosystem. This in particular concerns the Bundes-
bank, whose liabilities against non-euro area residents reached an
amount of about 200 billion euros by the end of 2017. A swing from a
negative to a positive deposit rate would accordingly lead to a substan-
tial negative swing in the Bundesbank’s income account, which would
have to be fully borne by the Bundesbank.
With the existing large excess liquidity, an increase in the deposit
rate cannot be avoided if the ECB wants to raise money market rates.
Raising just the main refinancing rate (MRFR) will not lead to higher
money market rates, since high excess liquidity has made the refi-
nancing of minimum reserve requirements largely obsolete. Since the
start of the APP, money market rates have followed the deposit rate
rather than the MRFR. The deposit rate, therefore, has become the core
interest rate instrument of the ECB, and this is likely to remain the case
as long as substantial excess liquidity prevails.10
Removing the current excess liquidity through an unwinding of the
PSPP will take considerable time. A remarkable feature of asset purchase
10. In the United States, which has large excess reserves from its previous quantitative easing
programmes, the last one ending in October 2014, interest rates on required reserves (IORR) and the
interest rates on excess reserves (IOER) have been set at the same level. Since December 2015 they
gradually rose from 0.25% to 2% in June 2018.
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respect to accumulating and reducing assets. It is relatively easy for
central banks to buy public sector securities, even in high quantities,
but there are major reservations when it comes to selling them. The
main concern is that selling bonds in large amounts could provoke a
new financial crisis. Another concern is that a sale of bonds before
maturity could result in negative income effects for the central banks if
the bonds were sold with a loss. In light of these concerns, an
unwinding of the PSPP is likely to occur mainly by not reinvesting the
principle in maturing assets. Since the PSPP portfolio includes mainly
assets with a long duration, the unwinding of the PSPP would then be a
lengthy process (the PSPP portfolio can include bonds with maturities
of up to 30 years). In addition, it is not yet clear when such an
unwinding will start. The Fed only began unwinding its quantitative
easing programme in autumn 2017—three years after the end of the
last purchase programme.
Removing the current excess liquidity by raising the minimum
reserve ratio does not seem to be likely either. The Eurosystem’s
minimum reserve ratio was at 2 percent until January 2012. Since
then, this ratio has been lowered to 1 percent. The total minimum
reserve requirements for euro area banks amounted to 123 billion
euros at the end of 2017. Raising the minimum reserve ratio to the
earlier level of 2 percent would, thus, only remove a small fraction of
the Eurosystem’s excess liquidity, which amounted to 1882 billion
euros at the end of 2017. 
4. High excess liquidity: fiscal risks for the euro area
The PSPP has increased the fiscal exposure to interest rate risks in
the member countries of the euro area. Governments usually finance
themselves by issuing both securities with short duration and securities
with long duration. Purchases of long-term government bonds
through the PSPP alter the profile of the interest rate exposure: the
PSPP turns a long-term obligation of the State (government bonds)
into a short-term obligation (central bank liabilities paying interest at
the deposit rate). This increases government exposure to short-run
interest rate changes. Basically, the case is similar to the case in which
the government itself replaces long-term borrowing by short-term
borrowing (Williamson, 2017). In the latter case, an increase in short-
run rates affects public budgets directly through higher interest
Harmen Lehment100payments on short-term securities, in the former case indirectly
through lower profit transfers from the NCB.11 
From a fiscal perspective, borrowing short-term via a liability of the
country’s NCB has advantages over short-term borrowing via the issue
of government securities if the deposit rate is below the interest rate on
short-term securities. Two effects have to be considered here. The first
is that short-term government securities, such as treasury bills, have an
advantage over excess liquidity, since the latter can be held only by a
restricted set of financial institutions, while treasury bills are more
widely held and are useful as collateral in financial transactions (e.g.
repurchase agreements) in ways that reserves are not (Williamson,
2017). The second effect concerns country risk. While interest rates on
short-term government securities differ in the euro area due to country
risk, the deposit rate is the same for all countries. Thus the higher the
country risk, the higher is the probability that borrowing at the
common deposit rate is cheaper for the government than borrowing
via the issue of short-term securities.
Comparing the April 2018 market rates of government
securities with a residual maturity of 3 months in the euro area
(World Government Bonds, 2018), we find relatively high
negative rates for Germany (-0.68%), Netherlands (-0.63%) and
France (-0.51%) and relatively low negative rates for Italy (-0.47%)
and Portugal (-0.41%). While these figures reflect country risk, they
are still below the deposit rate of -0.40% also for the countries with
relatively high country risk, meaning that borrowing at the deposit
rate does not provide a fiscal advantage. Nevertheless, being able to
borrow at the deposit rate may turn into an advantage if country risk
should increase in the future. Short-term borrowing through the NCB
in the context of the PSPP thereby creates a backstop against
increasing country risk.
The risk of rising interest rates on excess liquidity and other NCB
liabilities resulting from the APP has led to an increase in central bank
11. Governments could react to the increased exposure to short-run interest rate changes that result
from the PSPP by an opposite operation, i.e. by reducing their own short-term borrowing and
increasing long-term borrowing instead. This would work in the direction of steepening the yield
curve, thus weakening the impact of the PSPP. Greenwood et al. (2014) find that this happened in
the context of the Fed’s quantitative easing programmes.
Andrade et al. (2016, pp. 46-49) obtain a similar result for the euro area in 2015. For Italy, the
Ministry of Economics and Finance reports an increase of the average life to maturity of total public
debt from 76.62 months in January 2015 to 82.95 months in March 2018 (MEF, 2018).
Fiscal implications of the ECB´s Public Sector Purchase Programme 101risk provisions.12 From a fiscal perspective, this reduced central bank
profits so that seigniorage gains from the APP in the years 2015-2017
were only partly passed on to governments. Yet, in case of an accelera-
tion of inflation pressure in the euro area, which would necessitate a
substantial increase in the deposit rate, current risk provisions may not
be sufficient.
The strong increase of excess liquidity that resulted from the PSPP
and other programmes of the APP also affects fiscal risks that are associ-
ated with TARGET imbalances. The increase in excess liquidity is not
distributed uniformly over the euro area but is heavily concentrated in
financial centre countries, such as Germany, France, and the Nether-
lands (Baldo et al., 2017).13 This preference for financial centre countries
resulted in rising TARGET claims of their NCBs against NCBs in other
countries, such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal (Eisenschmidt et al., 2017).
 Rising TARGET imbalances imply an increasing fiscal burden for
TARGET surplus countries in the case that a country with a TARGET
deficit would leave the Eurosystem and not honour its obligations. But
this per se would not necessarily constitute an argument against the
PSPP. To the extent that the programme stimulates economic activity,
it tends to reduce the probability of a crisis that would force member
countries to leave the Eurosystem. Moreover, by shifting public bonds
from the hands of the private sector to national central banks, it may
reduce the probability of speculative, self-fulfilling attacks on member
countries with high public debt.
5. Limits to the PSPP 
The large size of the PSPP has led to a discussion of the limits of the
programme. As shown by Claeys and Leandro (2016), constraints are
provided by the guidelines that the ECB has set itself. The guidelines
concern the eligibility of securities and the maximum share of a secu-
rity issue that can be bought by the Eurosystem. The maximum share
was imposed to preserve market neutrality and to prevent the ECB
12. The Bundesbank (2017, p. 76) explicitly mentions the risk of interest changes resulting from the
APP as a reason to increase its risk provisions.
13. Baldo et al. (2017) show that more than 50% of the purchases under the APP occurred with
counterparties from outside the euro area. Those non-euro area investors tend to manage their euro
holdings in financial centres of the euro area. But also euro area residents from non-financial centre
countries such as Italy are reported to have invested the returns from their bond sales in financial
centre countries (Banca d’Italia, 2017, p 14).
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collective action clauses, as the ECB did not wish to be in a position in
which it had the power to block a potential vote on the restructuring of
the ECB-held debt of a euro-area country (Claeys and Leandro, 2016,
pp. 5-6). Share constraints have been relevant for countries with low
debt/GDP ratios such as Germany, where the Bundesbank had to
purchase short-term securities with negative rates, as its share in long-
run bonds with positive interest rates had already reached the limit.
To overcome the present constraints to the PPSP, one option would
be to change the ECB’s guidelines with respect to both the eligibility of
securities and the permissible maximum shares. In fact, the ECB has
changed the original guidelines at various occasions to increase the
permissible volume of purchases:
— It expanded the list of national agencies that are eligible for
purchases under the PSPP
— It increased the duration of eligible securities from 2-30 years to
1-30 years 
— It removed the requirement that eligible securities must have a
return above the deposit rate
— It raised the issue share limit, which was originally at 25 percent,
to 33 percent for debt securities not containing collective action
clauses; for debt securities by supranational issuers the share was
even raised to 50 percent.
A further change of the guidelines, however, would give rise to the
question what is the worth of the ECB’s self-imposed limits if they are
changed whenever they are reached. This suggests that the present
PSPP has largely exhausted the ECB’s potential for conducting such a
policy. It is hardly conceivable that in case of renewed weak demand
the ECB would be in the position to launch a second PSPP of a similar
size as the current programme.
Apart from the limits that the ECB has set itself, there are also limits
to the effectiveness of a monetary policy that seeks to stimulate
demand via a reduction of long-term interest rates. The explicit task of
the PSPP was to lower long-term rates through a reduction of the term
premium.14 The announcement of the PSPP on 22 January 2015 and
14. Long-run rates can be decomposed into three components: the current short-term rate, the
expected future short-term rates and the term premium, which reflects duration risk. While before
embarking on the APP the ECB focused on lowering medium and long-term interest rates through
providing information on its intended future path of short-term interest rates (forward guidance), the
massive purchase of long-term securities in the market had the aim to reduce the term premium.
Fiscal implications of the ECB´s Public Sector Purchase Programme 103the initial purchases under the programme starting in March 2015 had
the desired effect: the yield of euro area 10-year AAA bonds fell from
about 0.6% at the beginning of January to about 0.2% in April 2015
(ECB, 2018).15 This reduction was, however, not maintained. By April
2018, the yields had again increased to around 0.6%—the same level
as before the announcement of the PSPP. As short-term interest rates
declined in this period,16 the spread between long-term and short-
term interest rates has not been reduced, despite the extremely large
purchase programmes, but even increased. Iskrev (2018) decomposes
observed 10-year euro area yields into expectations components and
term premia. He finds that the expectations component is relatively
flat, and that changes in long-term rates track closely the movements
of the term premium. His estimates show that while the term premium
declined in the first months of 2015, it went up at a later stage, and
that in October 2017 the term premium stood at the same level as
before the announcement of the PSPP.17 This suggests that the effect
of the PSPP on long-term interest rates was transitory rather than
sustained.18 Doubts on the efficiency of the PSPP are also supported by
Elbourne et al. (2018), who find that the effects of unconventional
monetary policy on inflation at the aggregate euro area level are
economically insignificant.
6. Does the euro area need closer cooperation on monetary 
and fiscal policy?
The established macroeconomic policy paradigm, building on the
assumption that central banks can and should control medium-term
aggregate demand and inflation through interest-rate policies, is
subject to increasing doubts: ”... after all, look what we have done for
the seven last years. We have done the most extreme monetary policies
we could imagine. We’ve had interest rates at zero. We’ve used
forward guidance to try to convince people that they are going to stay
at zero. We’ve used quantitative easing to try to bring down the long
15. Andrade et al. (2016. p. 15) consider the full spectrum of securities purchased under the PSPP
and find that the announcement and the initial implementation of the programme lowered 10-year
yields by 45 basis points.
16. The yield of 1-year AAA bonds fell from -0.10 in early January 2015 to -0.66 in mid-April 2018
(ECB 2018).
17. A similar result has been found by Chadha and Hantzsche (2018).
18. Praet (2018) finds that the ECB’s non-standard measures which started in June 2014 had a sizeable
and lasting impact on long-term interest rates. This result is, however, largely due to a substantial decline
of long-term rates in the second half of 2014, i.e. before the announcement of the PSPP.
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this, inflation is below target in all the major economies of the world.
So you can’t call this a success. The sheer amount of monetary policy
and the small effect it produced is really extraordinary” (Turner, 2016).
The question then arises what could be done to make monetary
policy more efficient in situations that call for an expansion of aggre-
gate demand in order reach the inflation target. Rather than trying to
push interest rates further into negative territory, a preferable way may
then be to stimulate aggregate demand by raising income. In fact,
there has been discussion in the context of the introduction of the PSPP
about whether the ECB could pursue an income-based monetary
policy in the form of direct transfers to citizens (BIS, 2015). The main
reason for not doing so is that direct transfers to citizens are usually
considered to belong to the realm of fiscal policy. An income-based
monetary policy would, therefore, require coordination with fiscal
authorities. This would be in line with standard business cycle models,
which show that monetary and fiscal policy together—not only mone-
tary policy—may be necessary for macroeconomic stabilization in the
wake of a large adverse disturbance such as the global financial crisis of
2008 (Corsetti et al., 2016).
Following this consideration, one could ask why fiscal policy in
recent years has not done more to support the ECB in its attempt to
raise aggregate demand and inflation rates in the euro area. Rather
than pushing deposit rates (and money market rates) into negative
territory and embarking on an asset purchase programme totalling
around 2500 billion euros, why not instead agree on a much smaller
expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet combined with, say, tax cuts to
raise euro-area aggregate demand in line with the inflation target?
One reason is the fragmentation of fiscal policy in the euro area. In
contrast to monetary policy, which is centralized in the euro area, fiscal
policy decisions are made at the national level, which generally compli-
cates the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy: “The problem is
that there is no common European fiscal policy, which is also not fore-
seen in the Treaty. The overall fiscal stance is not discussed and there is
no substantive effort to co-ordinate independent national fiscal policies.
Many economists have pointed out that this constitutes a significant
shortcoming of our monetary union design. Economic governance of
the monetary union depends only on monetary policy without any
concept of a macroeconomic policy mix“ (Constancio, 2015). 
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business cycles, may differ substantially between EMU member coun-
tries. So at the end of 2014—before the decision on the PSPP—the
German economy did relatively well, with no output gap, unemploy-
ment rates already below the pre-2008 crisis level and prospects for a
continued upswing in 2015/2016 (Boysen-Hogrefe et al., 2014). The
German government, therefore, saw no need for providing an additional
fiscal stimulus. It also did not share the concern of the ECB about the low
inflation rate and resulting deflation risks. On the other hand, countries
in the south of Europe with high unemployment, sizable output gaps
and low—in some cases even negative—inflation rates would have basi-
cally been in favour of a fiscal expansion, but were constrained by high
levels of debt and the resulting consolidation pressure.19
While it appears to be appropriate to use the current upswing in the
euro area for fiscal consolidation rather than fiscal expansion, the ques-
tion of a coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in the euro area
may come up again in the next recession (Feldstein, 2017). In the
following we discuss several aspects that will have to be considered in
such a case.
The standard textbook case of monetary-fiscal coordination is the
one in which government increases spending or lowers taxes, and in
which the central bank provides the money that is needed to finance
the resulting deficit. The assumption of the textbook case is that the
central bank does not pay interest on the monetary base. While fiscal
policy financed by the issue of bonds may fail to be an effective
instrument to stimulate demand, as it creates a debt burden on future
budgets that dampens spending (Ricardian equivalence), the
financing through the issue of central bank money does not create a
debt burden, as money has not to be repaid and does not involve the
payment of interest by the State. The latter assumption, however, does
not apply in the euro area. The ECB, like many other central banks,
pays interest on reserves holdings. As shown above, with high excess
liquidity the deposit rate is closely linked to money market rates.
Excess liquidity at the ECB has the property of short-term debt certifi-
cates with variable interest rates.20 When short-term interest rates,
19. In this respect there is a difference to the situation in 2008/09 when euro area countries were in
a common deep recession and embarked on fiscal stimulation programmes even in the absence of
coordination. 
20. The Bank of Sweden (2018) explicitly uses the term “debt certificates” in its balance sheet.
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will become a fiscal burden, similar to the burden of short-term
government securities.
In such circumstances monetary financing of a fiscal impulse does
not bring an advantage over financing the impulse by short-term
government borrowing. Both create a similar debt burden for citizens.
As shown above, the deposit rate has in various cases been above the
short-term interest rates that governments in the euro area had to pay.
This means that financing government expenditures via excess reserves
may result in a higher debt burden for the State than financing through
issuing short-term government securities. 
From the monetary side, a requirement for an effective coordination
of monetary and fiscal policy, therefore, is to restrict the payment of
positive interest on reserves. In fact, for long periods central banks did
not pay interest on reserves. There were two main reasons to introduce
them: lowering the opportunity cost of holding money (Friedman,
1969) and reducing the disadvantage of bank financing versus non-
bank financing such as the issue of securities. From a fiscal perspective,
the payment of interest on reserves brought a respective seigniorage
loss. This loss was considered to be acceptable in times when monetary
policy could steer the economy with its traditional instruments. But in
situations that call for a policy of monetary-fiscal coordination,
seigniorage gains tend to be crucial for the success of such a policy. 
To create a sustained seigniorage from a future monetary-fiscal
purchase programme, the Eurosystem would have to raise minimum
reserve requirements sufficiently to absorb the increase in central bank
money that has been created through the open market purchase of
government bonds. The increase in minimum reserves has to be
sustained, and interest rates on minimum reserves have to be set at
zero permanently21.
The fiscal side of a monetary-fiscal programme poses particular
problems in the euro area, as it requires a coordination of fiscal policy
among the various member countries. All 19 euro area member coun-
tries would have to agree on a fiscal package. A monetary-fiscal
programme is not possible for just a subgroup of countries, as asset
21. The MRFR applying to central bank lending would remain variable as would the deposit rate. 
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to be symmetrical to the Eurosystem’s country keys. Even if only a single
country does not agree, the programme cannot become effective. 
Even if all countries agree on the need for fiscal support to attain the
ECB’s inflation target, it still has to be decided which form the fiscal
policy support should take: tax cuts, increases in spending, and if so
which ones? This may turn out to be a complicated and lengthy proce-
dure, and a delayed decision in one country will prevent the whole
programme from getting started.
One suggestion to overcome these problems is to form a fiscal
union among the euro area countries, with its own budget and the
right to impose taxes and issue securities. Such a suggestion, however,
is subject to multiple objections, and it is not likely that a fiscal union
will be created in the foreseeable future. If a fiscal union is still far away
and if an explicit monetary-fiscal programme specifying the fiscal obli-
gations of each euro area member country is also difficult to put into
practice, what is left to fight the next major recession? 
Fiscal support would then basically have to come in the form of
voluntary contributions of euro area member countries. Experience
from the financial crisis shows that in a major recession there is wide-
spread political support for a fiscal expansion. The important point to
take care of is that a fiscal expansion is not prevented by concerns that
this would further increase a country’s debt burden. To remove these
concerns, the central bank could announce its own contribution to
stabilize aggregate demand. For example, the ECB could announce a
public sector purchase programme on the order of 2% of euro area
GDP to prevent any negative effects of the recession on the inflation
rate. This would, then, be a guideline for governments of the member
countries, signalling that they can take expansionary measures on the
order of about 2% of GDP without raising the debt burden.22 Consid-
ering the positive effect of the fiscal expansion on output and
employment, and hence tax receipts, the debt burden would even be
22. A fiscal impulse of 2% would be somewhat higher than the fiscal impulse during the financial
crisis when cyclically-adjusted general government net lending in the euro area rose from 3.30% of
potential output in 2008 to 4.92% in 2010 (OECD, 2018). As the ECB country key is based not only
on GDP but also on population size, the Eurosystem`s purchases would be somewhat above 2% for
countries with low per capita income, and accordingly the room for expansionary measures will be
somewhat above 2% for these countries. For countries with high per capita income, the room for
expansionary measures will be somewhat below 2%.
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provide fiscal support for fighting the recession.23
7. Conclusion 
The extent to which the initial seigniorage gains will persist depends
on the future course of the ECB’s monetary policy. Raising the current
negative deposit rate in the course of normalizing the ECB’s monetary
policy will reduce the seigniorage gains from excess liquidity and other
central bank liabilities. Positive deposit rates will transform seigniorage
gains on these items into losses, which could result in an overall nega-
tive interest income from the PSPP, in particular for NCBs that have
acquired public sector securities with low or negative yields.
While the PSPP and other programmes of the APP initially had the
desired effect of lowering the term premium of long-term securities
and thereby reducing long-term interest rates, this effect was not
sustained. As shown by Iskrev (2018), in October 2017 the term
premium was again at the level that it had attained before the
announcement of the PSPP. Comparing interest rates of 10-year AAA-
bonds, we find that interest rates in April 2018 are about the same as at
the beginning of January 2015, before the announcement of the
programme. The finding that three years of enormous asset purchases
by the Eurosystem had no sustained effect on the term premium and
the level of long-term interest rates sheds substantial doubts on the
effectiveness of the PSPP.
As central bank interest rates in the euro area are already very low
(the deposit rate being even negative) and as limits to the effectiveness
of the ECB’s quantitative easing policies are showing up as well, doubt
can arise that the ECB will be able to fight the next recession on its
own, without support from fiscal policy. Organizing fiscal support in
the euro area is, however, an extremely difficult undertaking. A fiscal
union does not exist, and a formal monetary-fiscal support programme
23. As mentioned above, an important requirement is that the Eurosystem raises its (non-interest
bearing) minimum reserves by the same amount as the purchase programme, i.e. in this case by 2% of
GDP. With a euro area GDP of around 11 trillion euros in 2017, this would imply an increase of
minimum reserves by about 220 billion euros, or a rise of the minimum reserve ratio from its current
level of 1% to 2.75%. The new level would be not far above the ratio of 2% that the Eurosystem
applied until 2012 and would not provide a major constraint on banks’ credit policy, in particular in a
period of large excess reserves. In a situation of excess liquidity and negative deposit rates, a rise of the
minimum reserve ratio would even strengthen the financial position of credit institutes, as it would
transform excess liquidity with a negative interest rate into minimum reserves with a zero interest rate.
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hard to achieve.
What may be viable is a less stringent form of monetary-fiscal coop-
eration in which the ECB creates a strong incentive for voluntary fiscal
contributions to fight the recession. So the ECB could announce a
purchase programme of, say 2% of euro area GDP (much smaller than
the current PSPP) and make sure that the purchase is leading to a
persistent seigniorage gain (by raising minimum reserves in line with
the amount of the purchase and by keeping interest rates on minimum
reserves permanently at zero). This would signal to governments in the
euro area that they can take expansionary measures on the order of
about 2% of GDP without raising the debt burden (as the interest
payments will be balanced by the NCB’s seigniorage gain). 
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Empirical evidence shows that a financial distress, faced by a bank or the whole
economy, might cause large-scale withdrawals of deposits even when bank deposits
are protected by deposit insurance, implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by a
government. Building on Kiema and Jokivuolle (2015), we present a new model of
such partial bank runs. In our model withdrawals are caused by the fear that both
the bank and the government's deposit guarantee might fail in the future. Our focus
is on a guarantee rather than on insurance, since the assets of deposit insurance
funds might not be sufficient in large-scale systemic crises. Guarantee failure is
possible because, being sovereign, the government may choose not to keep its
promises. This option causes a fixed welfare cost (e.g. a reputational cost), which in
a sufficiently severe crisis may be smaller than the costs from deposit guarantee
payments. We also assume that, being welfare-maximizing, the government
recapitalizes the bank during the early stage of the bank run. When decisions
concerning deposit guarantee payments are made, recapitalization costs are
already sunk costs, but the partial bank run has reduced the coverage costs that the
remaining deposits might cause for the government. In this way, the depositors
who withdraw funds during a partial bank run decrease the danger of a deposit
guarantee failure and increase the incentives of the remaining depositors to keep
their deposits in the bank. We apply our framework to the European Deposit
Insurance Scheme (EDIS), and we view the reliability of the Single Resolution Fund
and its backstop as the counterpart to the reliability of the government's promises.
It turns out that in an asymmetric shock that affects only a single eurozone country,
the EDIS improves bank stability, but its effects might be ambiguous in a systemic
crisis that affects the whole Banking Union.
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Empirical evidence suggests that even if bank deposits are
protected by a deposit insurance, implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by
a government, a distress that the bank or the government faces might
induce depositors to make large-scale withdrawals of deposits as in a
bank run. An example of such behavior was seen in Greece during the
period from 2009 to June 2012, as the aggregate amount of Greek
bank deposits decreased from €245bn to less than €174bn (Spiegel,
2014). It is estimated that only one-third of the funds were withdrawn
because of decreasing living standards, and that two-thirds either left
the country or were stored within Greece outside the Greek banking
system (ibid).1 
The Greek “bank jog”, i.e., the withdrawing of deposits only gradu-
ally, and only a part of them, would not have made much sense if
depositors during the years 2009-2012 had either no trust at all or
perfect trust in the deposit guarantee. This is because in the former
case it would have been rational to withdraw all deposits immediately,
whereas in the latter case there would have been no reason for with-
drawing any deposits. These two polar opposite cases are described by
the classical bank run model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), which is a
model with three periods (the period T=0 at which the bank makes an
investment; the period T=1 at which a bank run might emerge; and the
period T=2, at which the return from the investment becomes avail-
able). The model has two equilibria: in the bank run equilibrium it is
rational for all depositors to withdraw their deposits from the bank at
T=1, because all the other depositors do so, while in the other equilib-
rium (the one without a bank run) there are a sufficient number of
depositors (the patient depositors) for whom it is optimal to withdraw
their deposits only at T=2. 
A famous criticism by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005, p. 1294) points
to a certain incoherence in the Diamond-Dybvig model: despite the
existence of the bank run equilibrium, in the Diamond-Dybvig model
the mutual bank solves the problem of selecting the optimal deposit
contract assuming that a bank run will not occur. However, the model
1. Cf. also Brown et al. (2016), who have studied bank run-like withdrawals of deposits in
Switzerland during the crisis years 2008-2009. They compare the distress which various Swiss banks
were facing with the tendency of the depositors of each bank to withdraw their deposits. According
to ibid. (pp. 2-3), bank accounts in a highly distressed bank (UBS) were 23 percentage points more
prone to experience an outflow of funds than accounts in a non-distressed bank. Cf. discussion
below.
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does not as such answer the question which equilibrium will be realized
(or even yield probabilities for the two equilibria).
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) introduce a global games framework,
in which each depositor receives at T=1 an inaccurate signal and uses it
for deducing a probability distribution for the correct signal, and
further, for the revenue from the bank’s investment at T=2.2 The equi-
librium of this setting turns out to be unique. A unique equilibrium has
been proved to emerge also when the depositors coordinate their
behavior in an exogenously given manner,3 and when the demand
deposit contract is suitably modified.4
 The subsequent literature has also identified a variety of explana-
tions for the partial nature of many observed bank runs. For example,
Azrieli and Peck (2012) show that a bank run might remain partial
when there is more variety in consumer preferences than postulated by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Ennis and Keister (2010) consider a setup
in which depositors withdraw their deposits sequentially and the
government can respond to an emerging bank run by changing its
policies in order to stop the run. 
Most of the literature has so far focused on bank runs that occur in
the absence of a deposit guarantee, or when the deposit guarantee is
only partial (cf. Chen and Hasan, 2006, and Silva, 2008), i.e. guaran-
tees a sum that is smaller than the principal of the deposits. The paper
which, perhaps, is closest to our approach within the earlier literature is
Allen et al. (2018), which studies the effects of a partial government
guarantee with a global games framework. The guarantee extends in
ibid. to both period T=1 and T=2, just like in our model (and unlike
most of the earlier literature). 
2. Cf. also e.g. Takeda (2001), who applies a global games model to international capital flows,
Moreno and Takalo (2012), who interpret the dispersion in the signals of the global games
framework as a measure of bank transparency, and Silva (2008), who analyzes the effects of the
design of partial deposit guarantee schemes on bank run probabilities utilizing a global games
framework.
3. The equilibrium becomes unique when one postulates that the depositors coordinate their
behaviour (in accordance with some exogenously given rule) on the basis of a sunspot signal (see e.g.
in Peck-Shell, 2003). Cf. also Engineer et al. (2013, p. 534) and Dermine (2015). Dermine (2015)
considers a Diamond-Dybvig style setting and postulates that the bank has also capital and not just
deposits, and that a bank run emerges only when the bank´s loan losses are (according to the
information that becomes known in the interim period) excessively large, given the bank´s amount of
capital.
4. Cf. Allen-Gale (1998). Allen and Gale point out that a unique equilibrium can be found in a
Diamond-Dybvig style model with a shared signal if the bank’s investment cannot be liquidated and
if the bank is allowed to make the contract conditional on the return, which in their model becomes
known already at T=1, that the bank obtains at T=2.
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However, as e.g. the bank runs in Greece in 2009-2012 suggest, not
just a bank run or a government guarantee, but also depositors’ trust in
a deposit insurance or guarantee can be partial. The above-mentioned
models do not analyze the partiality of trust. In what follows we shall
put forward a model in which partial trust is represented by a govern-
ment deposit guarantee that might, due to the government’s decision
not to honor its promises, fail under sufficiently extreme conditions. In
our framework, the possibility of a deposit guarantee failure emerges
naturally as a result of the choices made by a welfare-maximizing
government. This possibility might motivate depositors to withdraw
their deposits after a negative signal, but it turns out that such bank
runs are always partial, and the model provides a natural explanation
for their partiality.5 
From the point of view of economic theory, the main contribution
of this paper consists in our uniqueness results: we prove that our
model has a unique equilibrium and that also the size of the partial
bank run is unique in this equilibrium, although we do not make use of
the rather complicated global games framework (cf. Goldstein and
Pauzner, 2005). On the other hand, our representation of partial trust
forces us to introduce into our model some complications that are not
present in most other bank run models. For example, our uniqueness
result (see Theorem 3 below) would not be valid if we assumed that the
investment would always produce one of just two different revenues, as
in the Goldstein Pauzner framework, or that a signal would uniquely
determine in advance the revenue from the investment, as in Allen-Gale
(1998, p. 1253). It is essential for our purposes that the possible reve-
nues form a continuum and that an advance signal can only provide a
probability distribution for the revenue values within the continuum.
 The analysis of the depositors’ trust in a deposit guarantee system
has become increasingly important with the development of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union. The roadmap that the European Commission
presented on 6 December 2017 for deepening Europe’s Economic and
5. The welfare function that the government of our model is maximizing has an affinity with the
representations of welfare in Hasman et al. (2011), Keister (2016), and Allen et al. (2018). In the
models of Hasman et al. (2011) and Keister (2016), the government chooses whether to bail out
banks when some depositors are in the absence of the bailout unable to withdraw their deposits.
While making its decision, the government takes into account both the utility that the withdrawn
deposits bring to the depositors and the depositors’ utility from a public good, whose available
amount is diminished by the bailout. However, we do not explicitly introduce a public good in our
model. Rather, we consider a government with deep pockets and assume that deposit guarantee
payments decrease welfare without explicitly considering the alternative uses of the funds that are
used for such payments. See footnote 9 for some further discussion.
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Monetary Union suggested that the European Deposit Insurance
Scheme (EDIS) should have been implemented already by the end of
2018 (European Commission, 2017a, p. 15), and in December 2018
the Eurogroup decided to set up a high-level working group to work on
the next steps of its implementation (European Council, 2018). 
Since it is unlikely that the assets of a deposit insurance fund
(whether national or union-wide) would suffice for reimbursing all
insured depositors in a severe, large-scale bank crisis, the availability of
other sources of funding is quite essential for the credibility of deposit
insurance. In the case of the EDIS, such extra funding would be
provided by the Single Resolution Fund and its backstop. According to
the proposal of the European Commission (2017b, p. 6), the backstop
will be provided by the future European Monetary Fund. As the
Commission points out, the backstop “will instill confidence in the
banking system by underpinning the credibility of actions taken by the
Single Resolution Board” (ibid.). 
Clearly, a theoretical analysis of the confidence and the credibility
that the Commission wishes to strengthen would be helpful for discus-
sions of these new tools. Wishing to focus on cases in which the assets
of deposit insurance funds are insufficient, we present a model with a
government deposit guarantee rather than an insurance. This simplifi-
cation leaves several important questions raised by the EDIS for further
work. As e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018) point out, the EDIS leads to
new kinds of moral hazard problems: the introduction of the EDIS
might increase the incentives of a government to force or nudge
domestic banks to buy sovereign bonds, if the costs of debt restruc-
turing to the depositors were under the EDIS paid by EU institutions
rather than by a national deposit insurance scheme. Such problems
could be analysed in a generalized version of our setting.
1. Model
There are three periods (T=0, T=1, and T=2), and consumers who
aim at maximizing their expected utility, a single bank that accepts
consumer deposits, and a government. (Like most other bank run
models, our model abstracts from the central bank’s actions as the
lender of last resort.) There is a riskless liquid asset, which may be used
for consumption at any time, and which we picture as cash money for
the sake of concreteness. The consumers deposit their liquid assets in
the bank at T=0, and they may withdraw their deposits at T=1 or T=2.
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Just like in the global games framework, there is a signal η that is
observed at T=1, and which provides the actors with information about
the state of the economy at T=2. It is quite essential in a global games
model that the possible signals form a continuum, since in it the signal
of each depositor is an inaccurate estimate of a more accurate (but
unknown) average signal. However, we do not need to postulate an
infinite number of different signals. To keep things as simple as
possible, we shall below assume that there are just two possible signals
η = G and η = B (G for “Good” and B for “Bad”). Intuitively, the good
signal G corresponds to a normal state of affairs, in which depositors
believe that bank deposits may be withdrawn at will, whereas after the
bad signal B they might lose their trust both in their bank and in
government institutions.
In our model the bank is owned by a banker who aims at maxi-
mizing his profit.6 The government aims at maximizing expected
welfare. It makes a promise of a deposit guarantee but, being sover-
eign, it can choose whether to respect its promise or not. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, in the presence of three types of actors there
are many more choices to be made than in a model in which only the
depositors are free to choose between different courses of action. A
general analysis of a sequential game that contains all the steps shown
in the Figure below would be quite complicated, but fortunately, it is
unnecessary for our current purposes. 
The point of our analysis is to study the case in which η = B, i.e. the
case in which the bad signal is observed, and our focus will be on the
choices that are made after its occurrence. We think of the bad signal
as an adverse, unexpected event, and our approach will be to first solve
the model, assuming that the signal is always good, i.e. that η = G with
probability 1. Keeping the choices made before the signal unchanged,
we then consider the choices that are made after it.
This procedure has two interpretations. We may think of it as corre-
sponding to a restricted rationality assumption which states that the
depositors and the bank behave at T=0 just as if the signal were known to
be good for sure. The emergence of the bad signal is under this interpreta-
tion an unexpected shock that makes the agents change their strategies. 
6. Our reasons for introducing a banker into our model, instead of considering the simpler mutual
bank of the Diamond-Dybvig model and most of the literature building on it, will soon become
obvious: we wish to consider bank failures at the last period, T=2, and such failures could not occur in
a Diamond-Dybvig style model in which the mutual bank simply divides its wealth between the
depositors at T=2.
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The other interpretation is based on the fact that—as we shall shortly
see—the equilibrium choices at T=0 that we present are corner solutions.
Even when the possibility of a bad signal is taken into account, they will
remain the optimal choice if the bad signal (relative to which they are
suboptimal) is sufficiently unlikely. Hence, the solution that we present
must correspond to a Nash equilibrium of the whole game depicted in
the Figure below, also without assuming restricted rationality, if the
probability of the bad signal η = B  is sufficiently low.
  
1.1. The timeline
The consumers form a continuum, whose size we normalize to
1 + μ, and which consists of μ impatient consumers and 1 patient
consumers. Each consumer is allocated one unit of the riskless, liquid
asset in the beginning of period T=0. 
Impatient consumers obtain utility only from consumption at T=1,
while patient consumers obtain utility from consumption both at T=1
and at T=2. The utility of both patient and impatient consumers is
represented by the utility function u, which by assumption satisfies the
familiar conditions 
u(0) = 0, u’(c) > 0, u’’(c) < 0 (1)
and which, by normalization, is also assumed to satisfy the condition7 
u’(0) < 1 (2)
7. The motive for introducing the assumption (2) will be made clear in Section 1.4. There it will be
seen that the assumption (2) restricts the weight that the government gives to consumer utility in its
welfare function ((26) below). 
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Denoting the consumption in periods T=1 and T=2 by u(c1) and
u(c2), respectively, the utility of a patient consumer is given by u(c1+ c2)
and the utility of an impatient consumer is given by u(c1). The charac-
teristics of being patient or impatient are unobservable to others, and
not yet known at T=0. 
The banker has profitable investment opportunities that are not
available to the consumers directly. Motivated by these opportunities,
the bank presents the depositors with a demand deposit contract that
allows them to withdraw R1 at T=1 or postpone withdrawal until T=2.
The government promotes bank stability with a deposit guarantee that
applies to the deposits withdrawn in each period. The deposit guar-
antee is a promise that the government provides the depositors with
the principal of their deposit (i.e., one unit of liquid assets), should the
bank fail to do so. We shall discuss the functioning of this guarantee in
Sections 1.2 and 1.4 below. 
The consumers may choose between depositing and storing their
wealth in the form of liquid assets. When the depositors are willing to
deposit, the banker may choose any number of depositors between
zero and the total number of consumers, 1 + μ. We denote the number
of depositors by D. Since the qualities of being patient or impatient are
not known, the number of the impatient depositors is 
(3)
and the number of patient depositors is 
(4)
Having received deposits, the banker uses the sum I0 (where 0 ≤ I0 ≤ D)
for an investment. 
At the beginning of period T=1 the signal η (where η = G, B)
becomes known, and the consumers learn their types (patient or impa-
tient). The banker then specifies the interest factor R2 that applies to
the deposits which are withdrawn only at T=2.8 Knowing the signal,
their own types and the deposit interest factors, the depositors choose
8. Observe that under these assumptions the banker cannot make at T=1 a binding commitment
(R1, R2 (η )) which would specify also the payoff at T=2, R2, and make it depend on the signal. The
exclusion of this possibility is motivated not just by realism (i.e., the fact that actual demand deposit
contracts do not make interest rates contingent on receiving negative economic signals) but also by
our interpretation of the signal η = B. Its real-world counterparts are not meant to be well-defined
economic indicator values that one could make contracts contingent upon, but various kinds of
negative developments that cannot be characterized precisely in advance.
1IMPD D
μ
μ
=
+
1
1PATD Dμ= +
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whether to withdraw. We refer to the decision not to withdraw as
staying for short. 
It is obvious that all the impatient depositors always choose to with-
draw. We denote the share of the staying and of the withdrawing
depositors among all patient depositors by χ and λ, respectively.
Clearly, 
λ + χ = 1 (5)
We could choose either λ or χ to be the variable that represents the
choice made by the depositors. It has turned out that using χ leads to
less clumsy notation. While λ would be a measure of the size of the
bank run, χ can be thought of as a measure of the stability of the
banking system, and we refer to it as bank stability for short. Clearly,
the value χ = 0 corresponds to the full-scale bank run of most bank run
models, while the maximum value χ = 1 corresponds to a no-bank-run
equilibrium, in which all patient depositors stay.   
If the withdrawal at T=1 exceeds the liquid assets of the bank, the
bank can get funding through government recapitalization. By recapi-
talization we mean a procedure in which the government provides the
bank with the extra liquid assets that it needs for the withdrawn
deposits and in exchange receives the ownership of some share sG of
the bank.9 This ownership gives the government the right to receive
the part sG of the payoff of the bank at T=2.
If government recapitalization were the only source of funding for
the banker in case of a liquidity shortage, our model would not yield
a well-defined equilibrium value for sG. However, we postulate that
the banker has also the possibility to disinvest. More specifically, if the
banker makes at T=0 the investment I0 and liquidates the part
ΔI (0 ≤ ΔI ≤ I0) of it at T=1, the liquidation immediately produces
γ (ΔI), where γ < 1. Disinvestment reduces welfare, and the
government prefers recapitalizing the bank to letting the banker disin-
vest. The outside option of disinvestment affects the equilibrium of the
9. We are assuming that the government is always able to provide the needed recapitalization. Our
model does not explicitly discuss sovereign debt or taxation as sources of government funding.
However, to motivate the government’s ability to recapitalize, we observe that recapitalization might
be a problem mainly when the bad signal relates to the whole financial sector of the deposit
guarantee area, rather than just to a single bank. In this case the bank of our model should be viewed
as a representative, average bank, and low values of the revenue ρ from the bank’s investment
should be viewed as counterparts of a systemic bank crisis (cf. discussion in Section 4 below). In our
model the “bad” signal η = B at T=1 is a signal which indicates that low revenue value ρ are possible,
rather than a signal stating that a low value of ρ has been realized. Hence, it is not implausible to think
that recapitalization could be funded by sovereign debt at T=1. 
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model via the value of sG , which is determined by the condition that
the banker would choose to disinvest if recapitalization reduced his
profits more than disinvesting. This is discussed in more detail in
Section 1.2. 
If the investment which remains at T=2 is I, it produces ρ I where ρ
is a random variable. The probability distribution of ρ is influenced by
the signal η. We assume that after each signal η (η = G or η = B) the
distribution of ρ is characterized by the density function hη (ρ). For the
purposes of comparative statics, it is practical to assume that hB (ρ) is
positive in some interval (0, ρB,max) with ρB,max > 1. This assumption
implies that, after the “bad” signal, arbitrarily small returns for the
investment occur with a positive probability. On the other hand, to
keep things simple, we shall assume that after the “good” signal the
investments are, at least to some extent, profitable in the sense that 
 hG (ρ) = 0 when ρ < 1 + ε  for some positive ε (6)
i.e., when the investment I produces after the “good” signal at least
slightly more than the value of the invested liquid assets.  
In the (non-equilibrium) case of disinvestment, the assets of the
bank will at T=2 consist of the return γ I from the remaining invest-
ment. The bank could also have liquid assets10 that remain after the
investment of T=0 and the withdrawals of T=1. The liabilities of the
bank consist of χ deposits of value R2. If the assets suffice for the with-
drawals, the depositors receive their deposits and the bank’s owners
(the banker, the government, or both) get the difference between its
assets and liabilities. When the assets are insufficient, the bank fails. In
this case the bank is taken over by the government. As we have seen,
the government has given a deposit guarantee, which obliges the
government to provide each of the staying depositors with the prin-
cipal (i.e., 1) of her deposit. As the last move of the game (which occurs
only in case of bank failure), the government chooses whether to
honor its promise. We postpone the more detailed discussion of bank
failure, and the welfare function that the government maximizes while
making its choice, to Section 1.4 below. 
10. We shall shortly see that at T=2 there are, as a matter of fact, no such remaining liquid assets in
the equilibria of the model.
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1.2. Recapitalization and the bank’s final payoff
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of period T=1. As we
have seen, all the DIMP impatient depositors will withdraw at T=1, and
in our notation the number of withdrawing and staying patient deposi-
tors are denoted by λDPAT  and by χDPAT, respectively. Remembering
(3), (4), and (5), we see that the withdrawals amount to
(7)
We denote the difference between the liquid assets of the bank (in
the absence of a disinvestment) and the withdrawals by L, so that 
(8)
Simple algebra shows that the liquid assets of the bank suffice for
the withdrawals (i.e. that L ≥ 0) even without any disinvestment if the
bank χ stability satisfies χ ≥ χ, where
(9)
By definition, the bank’s net worth at T=2 is the difference between
its assets and liabilities, and as we have seen, the bank fails when this
difference is negative. The bank’s final payoff is equal with the net
worth when the bank does not fail, and zero when it does. We denote
the bank’s final payoff by πBANK and the banker’s profit by πBANKER. These
are identical when the bank’s liquid assets suffice for the withdrawals at
T=1, and we may now conclude that they are in this case given by
  (χ ≥ χ) (10)
When χ < χ, the liquid assets of the bank are insufficient for the
withdrawals. In this case there are two strategies to be considered,
disinvestment and recapitalization. In a disinvestment, a part ΔI of the
bank’s investment changed into γ (ΔI) (where γ < 1) in liquid assets.
We assume that the government prefers recapitalization to disinvest-
ment independently of which one of the signals η = B, G is realized,
and independently of the size of the bank run.11 
11. Cf. footnote 9 above.
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We also assume that, in case of recapitalization, the government
prefers larger values of its share sG as an owner of the bank to smaller
ones. The latter assumption means, simply, that the government
prefers obtaining the bank’s payoff to giving it to the banker. Also the
intuition behind the former assumption is easy to see. Disinvestment
reduces the profits when ρ is sufficiently large to prevent the bank from
failing, and when ρ is smaller and the bank fails, a smaller revenue from
the remaining investment might correspond to larger deposit guar-
antee payments by the government at T=2. Hence, assuming that γ is
sufficiently small, it makes sense for the government to recapitalize the
bank instead of letting the banker destroy a part or the whole of the
investment. 
When extra liquidity is needed, the value of L (defined by (8)) is
negative, and the necessary extra liquidity amounts to L . As our next
step, we shall explain how the outside option of disinvesting deter-
mines the share sG of the bank that the government can demand for
itself in exchange for providing L. In general, a disinvestment of size
ΔI reduces the remaining investment to I = I0 – ΔI and produces γ (ΔI)
in liquid assets at T=0. Using the disinvestment strategy, the liquid
assets that are available at T=1 consist of the liquid assets D – I0 that
remain after T=0 plus the liquid assets γ (ΔI) from the disinvestment.
These assets equal the withdrawals only after the whole investment has
been disinvested (i.e. when ΔI = I0 and I = 0) if χ equals 
(11)
If χ ≤ χ, the disinvestment strategy would lead to the elimination of the
whole investment, and if χ < χ, it would cause bank failure already at
T=1. Between the two extremes χ = χ (for which no disinvestment is
needed and the remaining investment is I = I0) and χ = χ, the invest-
ment that remains under the disinvestment strategy is a linear function
of χ. Hence, we may express the investment that still remains at T=2
under the disinvestment strategy as 
(12)
After disinvestment, the assets of the bank would at T=2 amount to
ρIDIS (χ) and the liabilities would amount to R2 for each of the χ DPAT
remaining deposits. Remembering (4), it is seen that the final payoff
from the bank would be 
     (χ ≥ χ) (13)
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This final payoff would at the same time express the profit of the
banker.
The disinvestment strategy affects the equilibrium of the model, in
which extra liquidity is provided by recapitalization, via the result (13).
Under the recapitalization strategy, in which the government provides
the missing liquidity and demands in exchange the ownership of the
share sG of bank, the final payoff from the bank is
        (14)
The share sG of this payoff goes to the government and the share 1 – sG
to the banker. Hence, in this case the banker’s profit is
                                (15)
while the final payoff that the government receives from the bank is
                                          (16)
The banker will not accept recapitalization if the expected profit
from it is smaller than the expected profit from disinvestment. Intro-
ducing the notation
                             (17)
for the expectation value of any function of G(ρ) of ρ, assuming that
the signal is η (where either η = B or η = G), we may formulate the
condition that determines the government ownership sG as
                  (18)
We conclude from (12) and (13) that the result (18) is formally valid
also when χ < χ (i.e., in which the disinvestment strategy leads to the
elimination of the whole investment and bank failure already at T=1)
since in this case disinvestment corresponds to zero profit, implying
that the government can demand the whole bank for itself and that
sG = 1. Our analysis of the banker’s strategy is based on the result,
which is implied by (15) and (18), that
(19)
so that the banker’s expected profit-maximizing choices are identical
with the ones that correspond to the disinvestment strategy (despite
the fact that the recapitalization strategy is always chosen).
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1.3. The signal G and some simplifications
 We shall now consider the case in which the signal η turns out to
be G. According to (6), this implies that at T=2 the investment
produces at least slightly more than the value of the invested assets.
Our analysis of this case justifies a number of simplifications to our
model. 
Although we have already explained why we may leave the banker’s
choice between disinvestment and recapitalization out of the game
that we consider (and assume that recapitalization is always chosen), a
bewildering number of choices still seem to exist in the model. At T=0
the banker chooses R1; the depositors choose whether to deposit; if
they do, the banker chooses the amount of deposits D and the size of
the investment I0; after the signal η the banker chooses the interest
factor R2; the depositors choose whether to stay or withdraw; and at
T=2, in case of bank failure, the government chooses whether to
provide the promised deposit guarantee. 
However, our approach is to solve the equilibrium values R1, D, I0,
R2 and χ assuming that the good signal η = G is observed, to assume
that the choices R1, D, and I0 (which are made before observing the
signal) correspond to the good signal, and to investigate the game that
takes place after the signal when the signal is η = B. When the case
with the “good” signal is investigated, it is not necessary to consider
the choice of the government at T=2, because this choice (i.e., whether
to provide deposit guarantee payments) is made only in case of bank
failure, and it turns out that after η = G the bank never fails in equilib-
rium. As we stated above, under its obvious interpretation our model
describes a case in which the signal η = B is a shock that the actors
have not considered while choosing their strategies at T=0, but the
same equilibrium emerges also when the probability of the signal η = B
is sufficiently small, given the information of period T=0.
As our first step, we observe that a choice R2 < R1 would lead to a
full-scale bank run, since for a patient consumer the utility of with-
drawing is always u(R1), but the utility from staying is maximally (u)R2.
Accordingly, from now on we shall assume that R2 ≥ R1. Similarly, if it
were the case R1 < 1 and that the bank obtained a positive number of
depositors, the utility for them of withdrawing would be less than u(1),
the utility of not depositing. On the other hand, the utility of staying
would be u(R2) > u(R1) for any value of R2 that is slightly larger than R1,
implying that the bank could make all the patient depositors stay by
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offering an interest rate R2 < 1. Understanding this, the depositors
would not deposit if R1 < 1. 
From now on, we shall restrict attention to the non-trivial case in
which R2 ≥ R1 ≥ 1. The part (a) of the following result gives an explicit
formula for the profit of the banker that applies to interest factors
which are in the non-trivial range and which are “sufficiently small”.
Part (b) states that there is no point for the banker to raise interest
factors above the “sufficiently small” ones. The interest factor RM sets a
limit for being “sufficiently small” and it is given by 
(20)
where ε is the value which appears in (6). The investment I*0 which
appears in the following result is, intuitively, “of the right size” in the
sense that the bank does not have to disinvest if there is no bank run,
but it also has no extra liquidity after the patient depositors’ with-
drawals. 
Remark 1.12 Consider some strategy of the banker in which the
banker chooses R1 = R1 and, if the signal turns out to be good, chooses
R2 = R2 where RM > R2 > R1 > 1. 
(a) The choices D* of D and I*0 of I0 which maximize the expected
profit of the banker after the good signal are D* = 1 + μ (i.e., the
maximal investment) and 
I*0 = (1 + μ) – μR1
For these choices all patient depositors choose to stay after the
good signal, and the profit of the banker is
π*η = G (R1,R2) = ρ I*0 – R2
(b)Consider now choosing R1 and, if the signal turns out to be
good, R2, where R2 > R2  and R1 > 1. With these choices the
banker’s expected profit after the good signal is smaller than   
 where  
Together with our earlier discussion, Remark 1 shows that the equi-
librium choices R1 and R2 must satisfy 1 ≤ R1 ≤ R2 < RM. Letting R1 be
some fixed value that satisfies 1 ≤ R1 < RM, we observe that a choice
R2 > R1 cannot be the banker’s equilibrium choice after the good
12. An appendix containing the proofs of the Remarks and Theorems is available upon request from
Ilkka Kiema (ilkka.kiema@labour.fi) 
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signal, since in this case a slight decrease in R2 would according to
Remark 1 increase the banker’s expected profit. It follows that the only
Nash equilibrium is the limiting case in which R2 = R1, it is immaterial
to the patient depositors whether to stay or withdraw (since they know
that the bank never fails and their utility is in both cases u(R1)), and
they all choose to stay so that  χ = 1.
We now consider the banker’s choice of R1 at T=0. Since in equilib-
rium R2 = R1, we observe that 
Now the choice R1 > 1 cannot maximize expected profit, since
EρG (π*BANKER)  is decreasing in R1. Hence, the only Nash equilibrium is
the limiting case in which R1 = 1, it is immaterial for the consumers
whether to deposit since this yields the same utility as holding liquid
assets would yield, and the number D = D* = 1 + μ of consumers, as
desired by the banker, choose to deposit. 
Consider now the case in which the signal unexpectedly turns out
to be the “bad” signal η = B. Except for the result concerning the
interest factor R2, which is chosen only after the signal has been
observed, the above results remain valid also in this case. Remem-
bering (3) and (4), the simplifications that apply also to this case can
now be summarized as follows:
(21)
We also observe that the value of L defined by (8) (which expresses
the difference between the liquidity that the bank needs at T=1 and its
actual liquidity) is now given by 
L = χ – 1 (22)
implying that the bank never has extra liquidity. We saw above that the
case with extra liquidity corresponds to χ values with χ > χ. We can
now conclude from (9) and (11) that 
(23)
which also shows that the case with extra liquidity is impossible.
( ) ( )* 1 1 1 1, 1G R R R Rηπ μ μ ρ= = + − −
1
0
1
1
1
1
PAT
IMP
D
D
D
R
I
μ
μ
= +
=
=
= =
1
1
χ γ
χ
= −
=
Bank Stability and the European Deposit Insurance Scheme 129
Finally, remembering (19) and (13), we observe that the expected
profit of the banker can (in general, and not just after the “good”
signal) be now expressed as
(24)
where
(25)
Armed with these simplifications, we now move to the discussion of
the case in which the signal turns out to “bad”, i.e. η = B. There are
three choices that remain to be considered in this case: the choice of R2
at T=1 by the banker; the choice whether to withdraw or to stay, made
at T=1 by the depositors; and the choice whether to provide the prom-
ised deposit guarantee, made at T=2 by the government. To proceed,
we must now discuss bank failure and the government’s choice in
more detail. 
1.4. The deposit guarantee and the welfare function
By assumption, the welfare function that the government wishes to
maximize is
(26)
where the first term
(27)
is the aggregate utility of the depositors, us being the utility of each
staying depositor. (The withdrawing D – χ depositors include, of
course, both the impatient depositors and the withdrawing patient
depositors.) The next two terms correspond to the payoff that bank
ownership yields to the banker and to the government. The constant
multiplier ξ satisfies ξ < 1, which means, intuitively, that the govern-
ment sees less welfare value in the assets obtained by the banker than in
the assets it gets for itself. 
The fourth term represents the costs of recapitalization. We saw in
Section 1.2 that the needed recapitalization is always L , which
according to (22) equals 
L  = –L = 1 – χ
To explain the remaining two terms, it is necessary to discuss
deposit guarantee in more detail. In case of bank failure the assets of
the bank—which amount to ρ I0 = ρ, since the bank cannot have any
excessive liquid funds at T=1 in equilibrium—are divided equally
( ){ }2max ,0BANKER DIS DISE E E I Rρ η ρ η ρ ηπ π ρ χ χ= = −
( ) 1DISI χ γχ γ
+ −
=
( ) ˆ1BANKER GOVW U Fξπ π χ χτ= + + − − − −
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between the χ staying depositors. By assumption, the government
makes an additional transfer τ ≥ 0 to each staying depositor in case of
bank failure. The choice of the government in the game that we
consider consists in choosing the value of τ. This implies that the utility
of each staying depositor is 
(28)
We model the deposit guarantee as the promise that the payments
to each staying depositor, 
will altogether amount to at least 1 (i.e., the principal of the deposit).
In other words, the government promises that transfer τ amounts to at
least 
(29)
The quantity Fˆ is the counterpart of reliability of the government’s
promise. Being sovereign, the government can also choose not to
honor its promise, but this choice causes a fixed welfare cost F > 0. The
welfare cost represents e.g. indirect reputational costs from distrust in
government institutions, and because of it the welfare-maximizing
government can fail to provide the promised withdrawn deposits only
when providing them is sufficiently costly. Formally, we define Fˆ by
(30)
We are now in the position to motivate the assumption (2), i.e.
u’(0) < 1. We conclude from (27) and (26) that this assumption
restricts the weight that consumers’ utility has in the government’s
welfare function. In general, a welfare-maximizing government might
wish to make social transfers to the depositors of a failed bank even in
the absence of any deposit guarantee (simply in order to increase their
utility). However, wishing to focus only on government spending that
is motivated by the guarantee, we shall exclude the possibility of such
transfers from our model. To exclude this, we conclude from (1) that
the maximal aggregate utility that a small transfer Δc to m bank deposi-
tors could yield is m(Δc)u’(0), while the welfare cost of those transfers is
m(Δc). Hence, the postulate that such transfers are never socially
optimal may be formulated as the condition (2), i.e. u’(0) < 1.
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2. Solving the model
We are now ready to solve the restricted model that describes the
events after the “bad” signal η = B. Solving it consists of finding the
3-tuples (R2, χ, τ ), that correspond to its Nash equilibria. Proceeding
by backward induction, we begin by solving the choice of the deposit
guarantee payment τ by the government, when the values of R2
(which is chosen by the banker) and the value of χ (which emerges
from the choices of the patient depositors) have been given.
2.1. Choice of the government at T=2
The following remark, which is a straightforward consequence of
(2) and (26), states that the government never makes payments to the
depositors that would exceed the payments motivated by the deposit
guarantee; i.e., it makes either just the promised payment τDEP or no
payment at all.
Remark 2. The transfer τ that a welfare-maximizing government
chooses is always either τ* = τDEP (i.e. the minimal transfer that is
compatible with the promised guarantee) or τ* = 0.
Obviously, the choice τ* = 0 corresponds to deposit guarantee
failure whenever τDEP > 0. On the other hand, when the bank does not
fail, and also when the assets ρ of the failed bank suffice for covering
the principal of the remaining χ deposits (i.e. when χ ≤ ρ), (29) implies
that τDEP = 0. In this case Remark 2 simply states that the government
does not make any extra transfers to the remaining depositors of the
bank. According to the following theorem, deposit guarantee failures
can occur only when the revenue from the bank’s investment is suffi-
ciently small.  
Theorem 1. If the government lets the deposit guarantee fail for
some values of the bank’s revenue ρ, there is a threshold value ρ*GUAR  of
the revenue ρ which is such that the government lets the deposit guar-
antee fail when ρ < ρ*GUAR  but not otherwise. The value ρ*GUAR  is
determined by 
We can conclude from Theorem 1 that
(31)
as, of course, should be the case (since the deposit guarantee is not
needed when ρ ≥ χ ).
( ) ( ) **1 GUARGUARu u Fρχ χ ρ χ χ
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For the ease of notation, we now define ρ*GUAR = 0 if it is not welfare-
maximizing to let the deposit guarantee fail for any value of the
revenue ρ. Given this convention, Theorem 1 implies that the set of
revenue values ρ for which the government lets the deposit guarantee
fail is always the (possibly empty) interval (0,ρ*GUAR ). We shall still
present an essential result that is concerned with the comparative
statics of ρ*GUAR . 
Remark 3. The threshold value ρ*GUAR  increases with the number χ
of the staying depositors. More rigorously, the deposit guarantee
cannot fail if χ is sufficiently small, and ρ*GUAR  is strictly increasing in χ
whenever χ is such that the deposit guarantee can fail. 
Summing up, in our model the government makes only transfers
that are made necessary by the deposit guarantee. Further, the values
of the revenue ρ for which the deposit guarantee fails (if any) are below
the threshold value ρ*GUAR , and the range of such values (if any) gets
larger as the number of the staying depositors increases. This is, of
course, because of the rising costs that payments to a larger number of
depositors cause for the government.
2.2. The choice between staying and withdrawing by the patient 
depositors 
Having found the equilibrium choice by the government at T=2, we
now turn to the choice that the patient depositors make at T=1
between staying and withdrawing. While withdrawing always
produces the utility u(1), the utility from staying depends on both the
interest factor R2 and the signal η that determines the probability distri-
bution of the revenue of the bank’s investment, hη (ρ). We shall denote
the expected utility from staying (given η = B and R2) by Eρ BuS . 
Assuming that the bad signal η = B has been observed, there are
four cases to consider when evaluating uS . Firstly, the bank does not fail
if the revenue from the investment, ρ, is equal to or larger than its
liabilities χR2. In this case each depositor receives the sum R2. Secondly,
if χ < ρ < χR2, the bank’s assets suffice for paying the guaranteed sum
(i.e. 1) to each staying depositor despite bank failure. In this case the
assets of the bank are divided evenly between the staying depositors,
so that each of them receives the sum of ρ χ. Thirdly, if ρ*GUAR ≤ ρ < χ,
the payments to each staying depositor amount to the minimum that
is compatible with the guarantee, i.e. 1. Finally, if ρ < ρ*GUAR , the
government fails to honor its promise, and each staying depositor
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receives only the sum ρ χ that they would receive in the absence of
the deposit guarantee. Summing up, 
(32)
We are now in the position to explain why bank runs always remain
partial in our model. Clearly, a partial bank run makes the liabilities of
the bank decrease, but due to recapitalization, there is no corre-
sponding decrease in the revenue from the bank’s investment. Hence,
as Remark 3 also implies, the probability of bank failure must decrease
as the number of staying depositors decreases, and a bank run stops
when the expected utility from staying has become identical with the
utility from withdrawing, i.e. when 
(33)
Theorem 2. The bank run is partial for any interest factor R2 > 1. In
other words, when R2 > 1, the equilibrium number χ* of the staying
depositors satisfies χ* > 0. 
The monotonous decrease of bank failure probability implies that
the number of the staying depositors has a unique equilibrium value.
This result is due to recapitalization, and it is valid even in the absence
of the deposit guarantee.13 When extra capital is available, the decision
of some patient consumers to withdraw is not a reason for the other
patient consumers to follow suit; rather, it might be a reason to stay
because it reduces the remaining liabilities of the bank. 
Theorem 3. Assume that the banker’s interest factor choice R2 > 1 is
fixed. The subgame that consists of the number of staying depositors χ
and the government’s choice of τ has a unique equilibrium. In
particular, the number χ* of the staying depositors is uniquely deter-
mined in equilibrium.
To add further intuition to Theorem 3, one should note that the
costs of recapitalization are already sunk costs when the government
decides whether to make deposit guarantee payments. However, the
earlier bank run reduces the costs that are caused by the guarantee for
13. More rigorously, the situation in which there is no deposit guarantee may be represented by
putting F = 0 and ρ*GUAR = χ. The result (32) implies also that when these choices are made the
attractiveness of staying decreases with χ.
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the remaining deposits. Hence, the bank run serves as commitment
device, as it increases both the government’s incentives to keep its
promise and the remaining depositors’ expected utility from staying,
and this makes the bank run stop at a uniquely determined point. Also,
the following plausible result is valid.
Remark 4. In a partial bank run equilibrium the equilibrium number
of staying depositors increases with the bank’s interest factor R2. In
other words, dχ* / dR2 > 0 when the bank run is partial.
2.3. The choice by the banker
We shall now consider the first move of the three-move game after
the “bad” signal. This is made by the bank, and it consists of choosing
R2. The banker aims at maximizing his expected profit in choosing this,
and the expected profit is according to (24) and (25) given by 
Defining ρBANKER as the threshold value that satisfies
  ρ (34)
we may express the banker’s profit also in the form 
(35)
Theorem 3 implies that when the interest factor value R2 has been
fixed, there is a unique value of the bank stability χ that corresponds to
an equilibrium. Finding the expected profit-maximizing value of χ is a
difficult task despite this uniqueness result. Assuming that the expected
profit (35) is positive, there are three kinds of cases to consider. 
Firstly, we remember that according to Remark 3, the deposit guar-
antee never fails when the number of staying depositors is sufficiently
small. We let χM represent the threshold value that separates the χ
values for which the deposit guarantee can and cannot fail. Since it
must be the case that ρ*GUAR = 0 when χ = χM , we can infer from
Theorem 1 that χM is also characterized by 
 (36)
We now observe that as R2 approaches the minimum R2 = 1 from
above, the number of staying depositors must according to (32) and
(33) approach χM . (Intuitively, the interest R2 – 1 is a compensation for
2
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the loss that the depositor suffers when the deposit guarantee fails, and
in equilibrium this compensation approaches zero when the risk of
deposit guarantee failure approaches zero.) The profit that corresponds
to this limiting case is 
In this case the banker takes no action to stop the bank run that is
caused by the bad signal and relies completely on the government’s
promise as a tool for stopping it. 
Secondly, considering larger values of R2 , the maximization
problem might have an internal solution for which the derivative of
(35) is zero, i.e. for which
 (37)
 Thirdly, there is another corner solution to be considered: it might
be possible and optimal for the banker to increase the interest factor
R2 until there is no bank run, i.e. until χ = 1. We denote the smallest
value of the interest factor (if any) that suffices for this purpose by R2,M.
3. The welfare effects of a change in deposit guarantee 
reliability
In our model the reliability of the deposit guarantee is represented
by the cost F. As F represents the inability of the government to make
binding commitments, the search for the optimal (welfare-maxi-
mizing) value of F does not seem very meaningful; after all, F cannot,
by definition, be freely adjusted by the government. Nevertheless, we
shall address the question of how expected welfare (relative to the
probability distribution of ρ, given the signal η = B) would be affected
by changes in F. 
Considering the expectation value of our welfare function (36), it is
easy so see that the expected consumer utility
~
U is a constant, since in
equilibrium the utility of each consumer is according to (33) always
u(1). This is because in equilibrium the risks that bank failure or deposit
guarantee failure might cause to the depositors are always compen-
sated by interest payments. Hence, we may write expected welfare as
(38)
1max ,0MBANKER ME Eρ η ρ η
χ γ
π ρ χ
γ
  + −
= −    
( )2
2 2
0BANKER B
dE dR h d
dR dR
ρ
ρ
π ρ χχ ρ ρ
γ
∞   
= − + − =    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 ˆ, 1 1BANKER GOVB B BE W R u E E Fρ ρ ρχ ξπ π χ χτ= + + − − − +
Ilkka Kiema and Esa Jokivuolle136
Since we measure the reliability of the deposit guarantee by F, i.e.
by the cost of breaking it, an improvement in its reliability has a direct
negative welfare effect when the guarantee breaks down and which in
accordance with (30) shows up as an increased value of Fˆ. This nega-
tive welfare effect has no counterpart in the traditional bank run
models in which the guarantee is always perfectly reliable and often a
promise that one never needs to keep.  
The rest of the terms depend on (38) the reliability parameter F
indirectly, because of its influence on bank stability, as measured by χ.
In addition, the final payoff from the bank—which is divided into the
banker’s profit πBANKER and the government’s final payoff πGOV —
depends also on the interest factor R2 that the banker chooses, which is
affected by F. 
In a discussion of the aggregate effect on expected welfare, there
are three cases to consider. Beginning with the easiest case, we
consider the situation in which the banker eliminates the bank run alto-
gether by choosing the smallest interest factor R1 = R2,M that suffices
for preventing it. In this case there is no recapitalization, the banker’s
profit is identical with the final payoff from the bank, and χ = 1 so that
(38) becomes 
In the no-bank-run equilibrium the increased reliability of the deposit
guarantee will, according to Theorem 1, decrease ρ*GUAR , and in
accordance with (33) and (32) this effect must be compensated by a
decrease in the interest factor R2,M. Intuitively, as the government takes
care of improving the stability of the banking system, the bank can
make its depositors stay also with a lowered interest factor. Now the
positive welfare effect of the improved guarantee consists solely in the
banker’s increased profits.
In the other corner solution, R2 = 1, and the bank run stops only
when there are so few staying depositors that the government guar-
antee never fails. In this limiting case the number of the staying
consumers has the value χM , which is determined by (36). Now an
improvement in the reliability of the guarantee leads to greater bank
stability (i.e. greater χM) and greater profits for the banker. It also
decreases the amount of new capital that is needed at T=1 (i.e. 1 – χM),
which is a welfare-increasing effect. At the same time, it decreases the
part of the bank’s profit that the banker is obliged to give to the
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2, ˆ, 1N BANKERB B BE W R u E E Fρ ρ ρχ ξπ τ= + − +
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government at T=2, which is according to the welfare function (36) a
negative effect. 
The above analysis becomes much more complicated when one
considers the internal solution in which (37) is valid. It is clear that in
the internal solution the interest factor R2 and stability χ are between
the values that they have in the two corner solutions, i.e. that in the
internal solution 1 < R2 < R2,M and χM < χ < 1. While it is also obvious
that—keeping the interest factor R2 fixed—an increase in the reliability
of the deposit guarantee improves bank stability, it is not obvious how
the derivative dχ / dR2 , which according to (37) affects the expected-
profit-maximizing choice of R2 by the banker, changes as a result of a
change in χ. It is even conceivable that a small improvement in the
deposit guarantee reliability might motivate the banker to lower the
deposit interest factor to an extent that would increase the size of the
bank run χ. To understand this possibility intuitively, we may think of
the deposit interest rate R2 as the counterpart of all the efforts that a
bank could itself make to stop a bank run. In the non-corner solution,
the government and banker are both taking steps to stop the bank run,
and an improvement in government interference—i.e. increased relia-
bility of the government’s deposit guarantee promise—can motivate
the bank to decrease its efforts to such an extent that bank stability is
actually decreased by the improved guarantee. Again, when the posi-
tive and negative welfare effects are weighted against each other, one
must consider also the increase of the welfare cost F that emerges in
case of actual deposit guarantee failure. 
We may, however, observe that the three equilibria approach each
other when F approaches the value for which the deposit guarantee
never fails (not even when χ = 1 and all depositors stay). We conclude
from (36) that this will be the case when F is at least 
FN = 1 – u(1)
Considering the limit in which F approaches FN, we observe that in
the no-bank-run equilibrium (in which χ = 1) the deposit interest factor
R2,M approaches 1 from above, and in the maximal-bank-run equilib-
rium (in which R2 = 1) the bank stability χM approaches 1 from below.
In the limit in which F = FN one reaches the trivial equilibrium that
occurs also after the good signal η = G, and in which there is no bank
run although the interest factor is 1 and the depositors do not get
interest for their deposits.
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4. The effects of the EDIS on bank stability 
We now apply the insights from our new framework to the EDIS.
The natural field of application of our framework is a crisis that is suffi-
ciently large to make the assets of deposit insurance funds insufficient,
implying that reimbursing deposits may involve a political decision to
provide additional funding for the reimbursement. In the case of a
national deposit insurance scheme, the decision would normally be
made by the government, while in the case of the EDIS the counter-
parts of the “government” of our model would be the Single
Resolution Fund and—should the single Resolution Fund be unable to
fulfill its task—its backstop. The decision to make use of the backstop
would be a political decision and quite analogous with the decision
that the government makes at T=2 in our model. More specifically, in
the Commission proposal the backstop would be deployed only if the
decision to deploy it were backed by 85% of the votes of the member
countries (European Commission, 2017b, p. 6). 
Our model allows us to give precise formulations to two opposite
effects of a shared deposit insurance scheme. Firstly, consider a crisis
that is restricted in size, such as a financial crisis in a single eurozone
country or the crisis of a single large bank. Our framework leads to the
conclusion that in the case of a restricted crisis, the shared deposit
insurance scheme tends to improve the stability of the banking sector
(measured by the size of bank runs). This conclusion is normally
supported by referring to the better diversification that a larger insur-
ance company or fund provides. However, in our model the shared
scheme is a “diversification device” in a more abstract sense. 
As already discussed earlier, the government’s costs from a deposit
guarantee breakdown are in our model indirect (as they consist of
reputational costs and e.g. reduced trust in government institutions),
but the costs from reimbursing depositors of a failed bank are direct.
The indirect costs grow when the deposit guarantee area grows, which
can be represented as growth of the guarantee failure cost F in our
framework, while the direct costs are not affected by the size of the
deposit guarantee area. In other words, in case of a regional bank crisis
we may argue that the costs from a deposit guarantee breakdown are
increased by the shared deposit insurance scheme (since the “reputa-
tional” cost is now faced by the whole EU Banking Union) without a
corresponding increase in costs from reimbursing deposits. In our
model this should make a deposit guarantee breakdown less likely and
reduce or altogether eliminate partial bank runs. (In reality it might, of
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course, also happen that the national deposit insurance fund is insuffi-
cient for the needed reimbursements, while a shared deposit insurance
fund suffices for them, in which case a shift to the EDIS would alto-
gether eliminate the government decision that occurs in our model.)
On the other hand, the stability effects of introducing the EDIS
might be ambiguous in a systemic crisis that affects the whole Banking
Union and leads to the use of the backstop of the Single Resolution
Fund. In our model there is just a single bank, and a natural way to
apply the model to a crisis of the whole deposit guarantee area would
be to think of the bank as a representative “average” bank and of the
cost F as the reputational cost of deposit guarantee failure, divided by
the number of banks in which such failures occur. Under this interpre-
tation a change of scale would not by itself cause any changes in the
above analysis, if the aggregate reputational cost F grew in proportion
to the size of the deposit guarantee area. In other words, one would
arrive at the conclusion that the changing size of the deposit guarantee
area (e.g. shifting from a national deposit insurance scheme to the
EDIS) is irrelevant when a severe, systemic crisis hits the whole area
equally.
However, the “reputational cost” F represents also the depositors’
trust in the deposit insurance scheme, and such trust—as the example
of the Greek “bank jog” in 2009-2012 shows—is not identical in all the
eurozone countries. If under the EDIS the reputational cost and the
corresponding depositor trust reflected some weighted average of
member countries’ national levels of trust before the introduction of
the joint scheme, we could conclude that the EDIS tends to decrease
the danger of partial bank runs in the countries in which there is less
trust in the national deposit insurance than in the eurozone on the
average. However, the opposite might be the case in the countries in
which national institutions are trusted more highly. 
In addition, it might be excessively optimistic to view the trust that
depositors feel for the EDIS as an average. After all, trust depends also
on the ability of our model’s “government” (which is in the literal sense
a government in the national deposit insurance schemes, and the back-
stop and other EU institutions in the EDIS) to make fast decisions. Such
decisions might be more difficult for EU institutions than for national
institutions in a systemic crisis e.g. because of the required 85%
majority. One policy implication hence is that in order for the EDIS to
achieve its full potential stability benefits, the backstop should be
designed to be as credible as possible. 
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5. Concluding Remarks
We have considered bank runs that are caused by the suspicion
that, in spite of its promises, a government might not protect deposits
during a severe future crisis. In this setting, bank runs are quite different
from those in more traditional models, in which they occur in the
absence of a deposit guarantee and are caused by the fear that a
shortage of liquidity might lead to an immediate bank failure. In the
absence of a deposit guarantee, traditional models of bank runs (e.g.
Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) have two equilibria: the one in which no
one has an incentive to withdraw his deposits (except for immediate
consumption needs) because other depositors do not withdraw theirs,
and the other in which all depositors withdraw simultaneously. In
contrast, we have assumed that the government always bails out banks
by providing recapitalization if banks have a liquidity shortage in the
absence of a crisis. Nonetheless, as the government may break its
deposit guarantee in a severe crisis, bank runs may still occur.
Our model provides a simple explanation for why bank runs can be
gradual and partial, as has been recently often observed, e.g. in the
eurozone. As deposits are withdrawn during a bank run, the govern-
ment’s future liability of guaranteeing the remaining deposits is
gradually reduced. This increases the government’s incentive to honor
its promise, because the cost of breaking its guarantee (which might be
caused by e.g. reputational concerns) does not diminish like the
remaining payments. This in turn decreases the remaining depositors’
incentive to withdraw. Eventually, there is a unique point when the
bank run stops. As an application of our model, we contrasted the EDIS
with national deposit guarantee schemes and concluded that while the
EDIS probably tends to improve bank stability (measured by the size of
bank runs) in bank crises of a restricted size, the opposite could also be
the case in a systemic crisis that affects the whole eurozone. The effects
of introducing the EDIS might also differ in different countries,
depending on whether the citizens have more trust in national than in
EU-level institutions, or vice versa. 
From the point of view of economic theory, it is worth emphasizing
that the above mechanism renders the equilibrium of our model
unique, although we do not make use of the global games framework
that is in essence more complicated mathematically (cf. Goldstein and
Pauzner, 2005). Our analysis could be extended in a variety of direc-
tions. For example, it would be quite interesting to study the
alternatives to our postulated liquidation procedure and to introduce
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monetary policy and asset markets into the model (cf. Allen and Gale,
1998), to study the effects of various types of government guarantees
analogously with Allen et al. (2018), or to try to address the moral
hazard problems that the EDIS might cause for the governments whose
sovereign debt is held by domestic banks.
One of the interesting generalizations of our model is the following.
In our model the government reduces the future cost of its own deposit
guarantee liability when it provides liquidity to a bank so that the bank
can weather a partial run on deposits. In this way, liquidity provision, or
recapitalization, serves as a commitment device, which makes a deposit
guarantee breakdown less likely. This works out because we have
assumed that the cost of the government’s liquidity provision before a
crisis is a sunk cost. A possible extension to our analysis would be to
assume that liquidity provision is not a sunk cost completely, but
increases sovereign debt and contributes to the government’s financial
distress when the deposit guarantee is in danger of breaking down.
This would most likely reduce bank stability in the setting of our model. 
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